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Abstract  This thesis is about argumentation schemes that help to deal with inter-
actions between national and foreign canons of interpretation in private interna-
tional law cases. In fact, many legal orders, like Italy, require that, in conflict of 
laws disputes, courts apply the relevant foreign law using canons of interpretation 
and rules of application of the original foreign system. Our research hypothesis is 
that, in interpreting the foreign rule, domestic courts incur interpretive divergences 
of many kinds among the involved legal systems. Foreign law interpretation may 
result in linguistic and/or conceptual misalignments, in normative and/or interpre-
tive gaps, and in specific incompatibilities between inner and foreign canons of in-
terpretation. By focusing on interpretive conflicts within one legal system, legal 
theorists and AI and Law scholars have not yet paid sufficient attention to the is-
sue, even if pluralist logics and argumentation have been generally applied to legal 
pluralism and conflict of laws. The present study fills this gap in the literature: it 
explores the feasibility of a theory for arguing and interpreting in private interna-
tional law contexts, providing an argument-based conceptual framework that en-
compasses plausible interpretive interactions. To this end, and after addressing the 
epistemic concerns foreign law raises for domestic judges, the thesis gives a defi-
nition of cross-border interpretive incompatibilities and proposes argumentation 
schemes to reason with interpretive canons coming from different legal systems. 
An illustrative list of critical questions is used to evaluate the correctness of such 
interpretive reasoning. Lastly, the thesis presents the first formal developments of 
the study, based on the concept of meta-argumentation. It is possible to detect two 
main contributions to knowledge. First, this work identifies the components of 
foreign law interpretation, an interpretation activity with significant practical im-
plications for legal systems today. In so doing, it also indirectly contributes to bet-
ter understand interpretation at large. Secondly, its argument-based analysis paves 
the way for further formal applications in the domain of AI and Law. 
Keywords Argumentation Schemes, Meta-Argumentation, Legal Interpretation, 
Foreign Law, Private International Law   
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
    
1. Legal Reasoning: the Rear Window on Law 
Legal reasoning has fascinated scholars in legal theory, logic, and Artificial Intel-
ligence (AI) and Law. Exploring how judges and lawyers address a case, identify 
the applicable law, and apply and interpret it has long been a stimulating endeav-
our. Such interest has been particularly motivated by some peculiarities of legal 
reasoning: it can be seen as a form of practical reasoning, it often means reasoning 
with uncertainty, and it is sometimes led by general principles and goals. 
Practical reasoning embodies the human ability to determine, through reflec-
tion, what action has to be taken on a particular occasion (Wallace 2014): agents 
act after deliberately and thoroughly considering the existing situation in sight of 
their ends. Correspondingly, legal reasoning has been described as “the process of 
devising, reflecting on, or giving reasons for legal acts and decisions or justifica-
tions for speculative opinions about the meaning of law and its relevance to ac-
tion” (MacCormick 1998). According to MacCormick, legal reasoning is linked 
with action in that both by regulating what to do or not to do in practice and by is-
suing legal opinions, legal institutions (e.g., lawmakers, courts, and administrative 
authorities) give reasons to justify their activity. Moreover, a pragmatic approach 
to legal reasoning recognises the role of agents in applying the law to a concrete 
case (Hage 2015). This outlook on legal reasoning, first of all, echoes ideas about 
the law nowadays: in our interconnected world, the law would be more and more a 
matter of “relations between agents or persons at a variety of levels, not just rela-
tions within a single nation state or society” (Twining 2000, p. 139). Then, it also 
shows how legal reasoning could be seen as the foremost frontier of the concep-
tion of law as a system in all its articulations (Luhmann 2004, Lierman 2014). 
Complex adaptive systems (CAS) are systems the components of which are con-
nected and interact with each other; their main feature, as their name suggests, is 
that they are highly capable of adapting to changes and disorders. Some examples 
of CAS are the economic and financial world today, the biosphere, the Internet, 
and the cyberspace. CAS have then recently been also used to explain legal plural-
ism, where mutual respect, cooperation, and convergence have been acquiring ut-
most importance (Lierman 2014). Other interesting comparisons can be drawn 
with research trends in AI committed to planning and decision-making and fo-
cused on Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). Despite the lack of a unique definition of 
MAS, there is agreement on the fact that a MAS provides for a model of the 
world: an environment where many entities act, i.e., the existing agents have the 
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ability to transform the environment. Knowledge, goals, beliefs, intentions, execu-
tion ability, decision-making skills, and also rules need to be embedded in MAS. 
As a simplification of the real world, MAS contribute to study collective phenom-
ena that involve rational entities acting in a stable and shared environment (Nor-
iega et al. 2013): this simple social world requires institutions and rules, formali-
zation of time, interactions, epistemic components, as well as a priori definition of 
behavioural patterns to define compliance with the rules governing the system. 
Distances between AI and legal reasoning reduce, if it is possible to conceive of 
such similarities, and thus take advantage of their respective point of view. 
Even though legal certainty is a pillar of the rule of law and the wall against 
which judicial discretion clashes for the sake of the division of powers and of the 
protection of those subject to the law, uncertainty in law is a reality, it takes vari-
ous forms, and affects legal reasoning as a consequence. Firstly, as recognised by 
Hart (1994), legal reasoning requires to deal with open texture terms, a core trait 
of the law. Vagueness, ambiguity, and imprecision of legal texts are often a side 
effect of multiple factors: lawmakers cannot predict each and every detail of any 
possible situation and, even if they could do that, the costs of such an undertaking 
would be incredibly high; moreover, there are undeniable political incentives in 
maintaining vagueness. All this frequently makes law application both unclear and 
open to multiple, often contradictory outcomes. Widely-known, the example of 
the prohibition for vehicles to enter a public park, and the doubt of what should be 
actually considered vehicles, helps to clarify range and scope of the issue. Second-
ly, legal reasoning is quite frequently reasoning with conflicts. Within the same 
legal system, it might happen that pieces of laws contrast with one another, or that 
more incompatible interpretations of the same legal rule can be given. On these 
occasions, legal systems usually provide the interpreters with modes to handle 
conflicts, and these shape the way the courts reason with conflicting pieces of leg-
islation, or conflicting interpretations. Lastly, law is often fragmented: the law to 
apply can be reconstructed only referring to different normative texts, even per-
taining to various field of law. This phenomenon, known as ‘legal rule fragmenta-
tion’ in jurisprudence (Wahlgren 2000), and increasingly experienced by lawyers, 
judges and individuals in unexpected forms,
1
 implies that legal reasoning is also 
reasoning with fragmented pieces of knowledge, and is aimed at making sense of 
disparate sources and texts into a unitary vision. 
General principles and goals have been recognised to play a fundamental role 
in the application and interpretation of law. Be it in strict connection with morality 
and moral truth (Dworkin 1978, 1986), be it in connection with the rule of recog-
                                                          
1 Fragmentation is today mainly fragmentation of international law: in fact, international law has 
lately developed into many specialised fields, and its branches do not miss to interact, overlap, 
and conflict. A significant scholarly debate has ensued from the 2006 report of the International 
Law Commission on the matter (see ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difﬁculties aris-
ing from the Diversiﬁcation and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of 
the International Law Commission, 13 Apr. 2006, A/ CN.4/L.682, and, among others, Smits 
2010, Michaels and Pauwelyn 2012, Deplano 2013). 
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nition in a positivist view of the law (Hart 1994, MacCormick 1994), the reference 
to superior principles of the legal system as a whole, or to the goals and intentions 
of the legislator is no doubt a tool available to judges when they have to exert their 
decision-making power. Nevertheless, following an ongoing, and never-ending, 
scholarly debate, it has to be said that turning to principles and goals, historical or 
objective, when it comes to applying and interpreting the law is not an uncontro-
versial venture for lawyers and courts, for it is not clear whose will and intention 
they are after (Liebwald 2013): is it the will of the author of the text? Or has the 
rule an autonomous, objective purpose? 
However, also reasoning by analogy frequently implies reasoning with general 
legal principles (Verheij and Hage 1994): if the legal rule cannot be applied be-
cause one or more of its conditions are not satisfied, or if the legal rule is not 
clearly applicable to the concrete case, it might be useful to retrieve the underlying 
goal of the norm, i.e., what it is meant to achieve within society. The debate on 
analogical reasoning in law is far from new.2 Rather, its very conceivability, its ra-
tionality and persuasive force as a justification, and the content of the related con-
cept of similarity have been object of extensive study worldwide (Lamond 2016). 
In common law countries, such reasoning basically allows the doctrine of prece-
dent to function in concrete (e.g., Sunstein 1993), as it is better explained in chap-
ter 2. In civil law systems, the promulgation and enforcement of Constitutions, in 
the twentieth century, meant to put principles and standards in writing for the first 
time and, as a consequence, to allow judges to reason with them in the decision-
making. Legal theorists have also been interested in discussing the impossibility to 
resort to analogy in criminal matters3 and the distinction between analogy and ex-
tensive interpretation (Canale and Tuzet 2014). 
Also AI and Law scholars have explored ways of reasoning with purposes and 
goals. After Berman and Hafner’s pioneering work, which in 1993 offered a teleo-
logical analysis of the now famous wild animals cases, many perspectives on the 
same problem have been taken and developed over the years: reason-based logic 
(Hage and Verheij 1994), value preferences (Bench-Capon 2003), proportionality 
(Sartor 2010), value judgments and intermediate legal concepts to compare cases 
(Grabmair and Ashley 2011), just to mention a few. Berman and Hafner contribut-
ed to define “a powerful and important strand of modelling legal argument, the use 
of purpose and value in justifying legal decisions” (Bench-Capon 2011, p. 241), 
and also to recognise that the law does not consist of mere rules, but also of prin-
ciples, even if often elusive and ambiguous. 
Although legal reasoning has awakened a transverse academic curiosity, there 
exists no uniform theory of legal reasoning, and the approaches to its study have 
                                                          
2 See Nerhot (1991) and Hage (1997, 2005) for thorough investigations into this topic. 
3 Article 25, par. 2, of the Italian Constitution impedes a criminal law to be retroactively valid 
with references to facts that occurred, or actions that were committed, before its enactment. The 
constitutional provision expresses the principle of legal certainty in criminal matters and is read 
as also preventing analogy, which implies to add new and similar facts or behaviours to laws. 
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been various and diversified. From rule-based approaches typical of civil law 
countries, to case-based ones more closed to common law tradition, up to combi-
nations of the two, each approach has been backed up by an underlying conception 
of what the law is, the question of questions of legal theory and jurisprudence, and 
how it develops in our changing society. 
2. Reasoning with Conflicts in Law 
Legal reasoning is often reasoning with conflicts. As interestingly remarked by 
Glenn (2014), law has always been pluralist in kind, and this pluralism fuels con-
flict: within the same ‘major’ legal tradition (e.g., civil law, common law, hindu 
law), different ‘minor’ sub-traditions flourish, feeding themselves on religion, his-
tory, multiculturalism, and emerging needs. One should only think of internet law 
as a form of autoregulation of online commercial interactions, or of the lex merca-
toria, arriving at our times as a tool to deal with globalised commercial relations. 
Besides, Glenn argues that exactly the capacity of legal traditions to encompass 
and reconcile diverse trends within themselves is suggestive of their solidity, en-
during power, and projection into the future: a legal tradition that is able to main-
tain diversity is meant to keep on developing. 
These opening observations introduce two important situations that legal tradi-
tions and legal systems witness on a daily basis, and that end up deeply challeng-
ing legal reasoning: 
1. Internal conflicts; 
2. Relations with other legal systems and potential conflicts. 
Within the same legal system (1.), legal rules conflict with each other even if 
they are the product of the same legislative power. Three different situations can 
occur: a) conflicts among pieces of legislation: two legal rules apply to the same 
case, with incompatible legal outcomes; a1) conflicts among different interpreta-
tions of the same legal provision; b) apparent conflicts among provisions or 
norms.
4
 From a logical standpoint, this contributes to make the system incon-
sistent (Hage 2015), not to mention the negative effect for individuals and compa-
nies subject to contradictory legal consequences. In line with what Glenn (2014) 
claims, legal systems usually provide for modes to handle these idiosyncrasies 
within the system. The next section shows that various perspectives have been 
proposed to look at legal reasoning in action in such situations, stressing the role 
played by interpretive reasoning. 
                                                          
4 In the whole thesis, it is considered the distinction between provision or rule, i.e., the linguis-
tic/textual statement of the law, and norm, i.e., the meaning attributed to the rule, its interpreta-
tion, what has to be applied ultimately to the concrete case (Ross 1959, 1968, Crisafulli 1964, 
Guastini 1998). 
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As for the relations that legal systems establish with each other (2.), conflicts 
may take many forms, also in consequence of overlapping normative levels (inter-
national, supranational, national, regional, etc.), of the international rule fragmen-
tation, and of always new practices of legal interaction (e.g., transnational law, 
soft law, etc.). Complex scenario, it has not been paid much attention to from the 
position of legal reasoning and interpretation, despite its relevance in every day af-
fairs and its virtual capacity to subvert traditional conceptual frameworks. 
2.1. Normative and Interpretive Conflicts within One Legal System 
Interpretive reasoning is the chief way through which the law is applied to the 
concrete case, and helps legal professionals deal with inconsistencies in the legal 
system. Even if theoretically possible, finding laws that do not require to be inter-
preted (so called direct understanding, talking of which the Romans would say in 
claris non fit interpretatio) is like looking for a needle in a haystack. Laws are cur-
rently featured by several inner and outer cross-references, unclear linguistic ex-
posure, excessive use of technicalities: identifying and then applying the appropri-
ate law cannot help but be a proper interpretive adventure. Indirect understanding 
of a legal text is thus much more common. 
This introductory chapter is not the place to go in depth into all that relates le-
gal interpretation: the literature is huge, and the topic only partially pertains to the 
present research aims. Still, the lively interdisciplinary scholarly debate on the link 
between interpretation and understanding (what comes first?), on what it really 
signifies ‘meaning’ when it comes to interpreting a legal text (sense vs reference, 
connotation vs denotation, internalism vs externalism), and on what conditions are 
necessary and sufficient to interpret a (legal) text, is the unavoidable background 
for what it is going to be said about legal interpretation. 
Following Alf Ross’s famous distinction (1959), legal interpretation is seen as 
a double-sided exercise. So, legal interpretation is both an activity and a result: on 
the one hand, it is the activity through which the legal operator ascribes a meaning 
to a legal provision; on the other hand it is its exact meaning, i.e., the result of the 
interpretive activity. Typically, this distinction mirrors a semantic theory of inter-
pretation. Though, according to the advancements in linguistics and philosophy of 
language, the semantic perspective is not the only one, and other theories of inter-
pretation have been developed over the years, stressing other semiotic layers of 
texts. Considering the syntax, for example, induces the interpreter, approaching a 
text, to focus on the peculiarities of the linguistic expressions, highly language-
sensitive (e.g., use of connectives, punctuation, and negation). In AI and Law, sys-
tematic mechanisms to spot and solve those issues within the legal texts have been 
elaborated, following the seminal work by Allen and Saxon (1986), but such tools 
are still rarely used in the legal practice. Rather, pragmatics looks at how context 
contributes to the attribution of meaning. Many aspects fall under this category: 
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intent of the author of the text, underlying common knowledge, expectations con-
cerning the addressee, societal conditions, etc. Accordingly, meaning is conveyed 
not just by expressions and grammar, but also by contextual elements. All in all, 
the three layers help give a thorough vision on interpretation. 
What allows lawyers and judges to derive the norm from the legal textual unit, 
be it a statutory provision or a contractual clause, is interpretation as activity. Be-
yond the positivist view according to which there would always be a perfect corre-
spondence between provision and norm in one-to-one ratio, reality shows how, 
sometimes, the norm is the result of interpreting several provisions jointly consid-
ered, a phenomenon above called legal rule fragmentation. In other cases, different 
norms can be extracted from the same legal provision: as legal practitioners well 
know and experience in everyday practice of law, there might exist multiple ad-
missible interpretations of the same provision (Pino 2013). Unwritten law, such as 
customs, would even prove the existence of norms without dispositions. 
However, in practice, different norms often turn out to be compatible or in-
compatible with one another. As mentioned above, three situations frequently oc-
cur: a) genuine conflicts among pieces of legislation; a1) conflicts among different 
interpretations of the same legal provision; b) apparent conflicts among provisions 
or norms. 
A typical case of (a) occurs when two different laws, i.e., r1 and r2, apply to the 
same behaviour a, qualify it differently, and give incompatible legal outcomes: for 
example, while r1 says that a is prohibited, r2 states that a is admitted. Such genu-
ine rule conflicts are solved by investigating if one rule prevails over the other one 
for some reasons, established by the legal system: it is more recent (lex posterior), 
it is higher in the hierarchy of the legal sources (lex superior), it is more specific 
(lex specialis), it is acknowledged precise competence in the matter (competence 
criterion). 
It can also occur that multiple meanings can be ascribed to the wording of the 
text of a provision and collide (a1), because they express incompatible meanings, 
qualify the same behaviour in different ways, or their applicative scopes overlap. 
They represent a subset of genuine normative conflicts (a), so they are also proper 
antinomies. Rotolo et al. (2015) consider article 575, Italian Penal Code, regulat-
ing homicide: “Whoever causes the death of a man is punishable by no less than 
21 years in prison.” The sentence is not clear about how to interpret the word 
‘man.’ In the Italian language, ‘man,’ uomo, has an ordinary, plain meaning (I1), 
corresponding to an adult male human being. But this reading excludes many in-
dividuals from the application field of the norm: not only adult female human be-
ings, but also children. A literal interpretation as such gives rise to doubts of con-
stitutionality of the provision itself. Another interpretation (I2), more faithful to the 
general principles of the Italian legal system, thus, reads it as person, irrespective 
of gender and age. 
The example encourages some comments. Article 575 allows both I1 and I2 and 
also from a logical perspective, there is no conflict, since I1 is included in I2 (I1 ؿ 
I2): a man is a human being. Yet, a legal system that punishes just killers of men is 
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an inherently defective system since what is not explicitly prohibited ends up be-
ing permitted: murders of women and children are implicitly admitted. I1 and I2 no 
doubt mirror precise historical legal frameworks. The statutory disposition was 
conceived of, and formulated, in a society essentially male-oriented: the year was 
1930, Italy and other European countries were under dictatorships, and, world-
wide, women’s and children’s rights were still mostly unknown. Therefore, I1 
would be expression of such a historical moment. However, emerging constitu-
tional values and a generally changed societal perception showed its narrowness 
and the necessity to adopt the other reading I2. Article 575 has to be read along 
with other provisions of the legal system, among which article 3 of Italian Consti-
tution: “All persons have equal social status and are equal before the law, without 
regard to their sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, and personal or so-
cial conditions.”5 This operation has been called constitutional oriented interpreta-
tion, and regarded many legal provisions promulgated before the enactment of the 
Italian Constitutional Chart in 1948. 
Apparent conflicts (b) take place when the field of application of any derivable 
norm is not overlapping with the others: the resulting norms are definitely compat-
ible. As way of example, Pino (2013) proposes article 2043, Italian Civil Code, 
regulating tort liability. The provision states that “any fact, committed with malice 
or without intention, that causes others an undue damage forces he/she who com-
mitted the fact to refund the damage.”6 Since malice and unintentionality exclude 
each other by definition, two distinct and not conflicting norms are actually de-
rived from the wording of the text: one regards the case of malice, the other re-
gards unintentionality. The “or” used in the natural language text is logically ex-
clusive: there cannot be malice and unintentionality at the same time. 
Let us now consider the Dutch Penal Code: articles 310 and 311 provide for a 
difference of punishment depending on the moment of the day in which theft was 
perpetrated (Hage 2015). Theft is generally punished with at most four year im-
prisonment, whereas theft committed at night is punished with at most six year 
imprisonment. Apparently, the legal system punishes the same factual conduct, 
i.e., theft, in two different ways, so that it seems to instantiate a proper normative 
conflict. Still, the conflict is only apparent: the two rules need to be read jointly, 
and this is mostly accomplished through interpretation. 
So, within the same legal system, (a), two legal rules can apply to the same 
case and give different legal consequences, and this is mainly because their ap-
plicative scopes (temporal, territorial, or personal) overlap (Hage 2015), and, (a1), 
two or more incompatible norms can be derived from a single disposition since 
there is no univocal interpretive canon. Though, these situations do not exempt 
judges from their task: they are required to dissolve the impasse and choose the 
norm to apply to the case in front of them. Normally, the legal system itself, also 
with the contribution of Superior Courts safeguarding the uniform application and 
                                                          
5 Our translation. 
6 Our translation. 
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interpretation of the law,7 provides for ways to deal with the conflict: there exist 
domestic laws establishing hierarchies among the norms, presumptions of statuto-
ry interpretation, principles for balancing the interests at stake, the possibility to 
resort to systematic coherence, in a list that does not claim to be complete. 
2.1.1. Various Approaches to Systemic Rule Conflicts 
Two main formal approaches to systemic normative conflicts have been explored. 
Belief-revision, first theorised by Carlos Alchourrón and David Makinson (1981) 
and then developed into proper theories of knowledge dynamics, directly address-
es the change occurred in a system. A system based on a set of information (e.g., a 
set of legal provisions) can actually change in consequence of the progressive ad-
dition of information, and, therefore, turn out inconsistent because of the incom-
patibilities between existing and new information. Various operations can be per-
formed on the set (e.g., contraction, expansion, consolidation, and merging), but 
revision is specifically meant to restore consistency within the set, while minimis-
ing change: the original set is revised so that it remains consistent even though 
new pieces of information are included. 
But legal reasoning and argumentation have provided for the preferred observa-
tion deck on normative conflicts. In particular, defeasible reasoning has been con-
sidered the most appropriate form of reasoning to study law and normative con-
flicts since it allows to withdraw a (just provisional) conclusion in presence of 
new information (such as new piece of evidence in a trial). Beginning from the 
mid-Nineties, the AI and Law community has been highly concerned with ques-
tions regarding what kind of reasoning the legal operator uses when facing rule or 
interpretive conflicts, and how this reasoning could be formalised. 
Defeasible reasoning conceives of the legal system as a knowledge base, in 
which conflicting rules can coexist since they are distinct from each other for their 
relative importance and scope of application. Abstract argumentation, pioneered 
by Dung (1995), has been used to model this type of defeasible reasoning with 
conflicting norms: each norm is seen as an argument that can be attacked by other 
arguments. The attacks can be stronger or weaker, and so defeat or simply weaken 
the first argument. A conclusion can be validly inferred only if its supporting ar-
guments get through all the possible attacks. Sartor (1992) and Prakken and Sartor 
(1995) have developed the idea of deriving arguments from the conflicting norms 
and of making one argument prevail over the other one through the use of compet-
ing principles normally included in legal systems. These are legal principles bor-
rowed from the Roman interpretive tradition, presented in the previous section:  
 Lex specialis, i.e., the specific law derogates the general law; 
 Lex superior, i.e., the higher law derogates the lower law; 
                                                          
7 In Italy, for example, the Supreme Court of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione) protects the uni-
form interpretation of the law (funzione nomofilattica). 
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 Lex posterior, i.e., the recent law derogates the older law. 
Also combination of rules can avoid rules conflicts. Any lawyer would resolve 
the inconsistency given by the said different treatment of theft by jointly consider-
ing the two rules: theft is punished with at most four year imprisonment, unless it 
is committed at night time, in which case the thief can be punished with at most 
six year imprisonment. Such constructed rule is different from the original two 
since it has no specific source in the legal system; though, it results crucial to the 
consistency of the system itself. According to Hage (2003, 2005), each legal sys-
tem is composed of an exhaustive set of such constructed rules, called “case-legal 
consequence pair” (CLCP). The set is exhaustive in that every possible concrete 
case can be subsumed under one and only one CLCP: sticking to the theft exam-
ple, the system should thus include a description for “theft during daytime” and 
for “theft during night time”, but no general rule on theft that replicates incon-
sistency of results. These CLCP are modelled from the original legal rules, taking 
into account interpretive canons, priority rules, and the principles of the legal sys-
tem. The CLCP-set is built by the agents, like judges and lawyers, who operate in 
the system and have at their disposal common legal materials, so that, ultimately, 
legal systems prove to be agent-relative. 
The analysis of conflicts among different interpretations of statutory provisions 
(in the previous sub-section, case a1) takes advantage of the argumentative ap-
proach. Argumentation in such cases focuses on the proper use of interpretive 
canons in order to solve the conflict. Interpretive canons, or canons of construc-
tion, are seen as defeasible rules that compete with each other and submit to supe-
riority relations established among them (Rotolo et al. 2015). Multiple interpretive 
possibilities with regard to the same provision, or to a term in it, arise in legal con-
texts that are homogeneous and unique, where precise rules of engagement govern 
the play. For instance, it is not rare that the legal system establishes a hierarchy 
among canons of construction, so that priority relations among canons are derived 
from such hierarchy. The preliminary dispositions to the Italian Civil Code include 
the following article 12:
8
  
1. In applying the law, it is not possible to ascribe to it a meaning other than that resulting 
from the proper meaning of the words according to the connection existing among them, 
and to the intention of the legislator. 
2. If a controversy cannot be decided with a precise provision, it should be referred to 
provisions regulating similar cases or analogous matters; if the case still remains 
undecided, it is ruled according to the general principles of the legal system of the state. 
It basically states that, usually, the canon for literal interpretation prevails over 
other interpretive rules. Only if the literal interpretation fails, it is possible to refer 
to analogy (with the exclusion of criminal matters, ex art. 25, Constitution),9 and, 
in case the doubt endures, to the general principles of the normative system. 
                                                          
8 Our translation. 
9 See previous footnote no. 3. 
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Much work in AI and Law has been recently done to model reasoning mecha-
nisms deployed in statutory interpretation. In Sartor et al. (2014), defeasible argu-
mentation schemes have been used to represent the logical structure of the argu-
ments used in statutory interpretation. Framework for their analysis is given by 
doctrine and legal theory, in particular the vast comparative study on interpretive 
arguments edited by MacCormick and Summers (1991), Tarello’s (1980) catego-
rization of canons of interpretation, and Alexy and Dreier’s (1991) list of criteria 
to solve conflicts between interpretive arguments. So, Sartor et al. have identified 
the general structure of interpretive arguments, and provided for a logical model 
that uses meta-canons to reason with preferences among canons themselves. De-
veloping this approach, Rotolo et al. (2015) have conceived of a logical machinery 
for reasoning about interpretive canons based on deontic defeasible logics. 
Also Araszkiewicz (2015) has incorporated doctrinal theories in a model of in-
terpretation. Part of a broader study on statutory interpretation (Araszkiewicz 
2013, 2014), this paper aims to investigate how doctrinal theories about the con-
cept of causation in attribution of legal responsibility should be taken into account 
in models of legal reasoning. The project is designed with an eye to future practi-
cal implementation and automation. Notably, among the methodological choices, 
doctrines and theories of causation coming from different jurisdictions are explic-
itly excluded: the research focus is on a single jurisdiction, given that theories de-
veloped elsewhere could be inconsistent with each other. 
2.2. Inter-Systemic (Potential) Conflicts 
If systemic normative and interpretive conflicts have been largely studied and are 
still receiving attention by the academic community, what happens when different 
legal systems interact with each other still remains mostly underinvestigated from 
the perspective of legal reasoning. Even if relations and various forms of exchange 
among nation states, international institutions, supranational organizations, judi-
cial authorities, and individuals as well, have hugely increased over the last few 
years, and have highly diversified as regards modalities and effects, detailed stud-
ies on how legal reasoning is affected by such dialogues and interdependencies are 
not very common. 
Although they are still largely isolated, these efforts are critical to understand 
scope and range of phenomena that are strongly affecting not only the practice of 
the law, but also how we conceive of the law. 
2.2.1. Logic and Argumentation for Inter-Systemic Conflicts 
Over the last few years, and alongside with the emergent need to advance the the-
oretical and logical understanding of complicated legal relations, the possibility 
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that conflicts among distinct normative systems occur more easily than ever be-
fore, has not failed to draw the attention of the AI and Law community. Among 
many possible examples of inter-systemic interactions, this research has mainly 
focused on private international law (or conflict of laws), the field of law that 
identifies jurisdiction and competent substantial law in cases in which more than 
one legal system is potentially competent to decide them. 
In 2011, revising a precedent version of their work dating 2010, Dung and Sar-
tor acknowledged that we live and act in an interconnected and interdependent 
world, where multiple normative systems overlap, interact, and compete in many 
ways. In such a scenario, they found it interesting as well as relevant to investigate 
how lawyers and judges take into account those legal systems, especially in inter-
national contracts, tort, or family law cases involving multiple countries at once. 
In particular, they proposed a logical analysis of private international law based on 
modular argumentation. They intended to give a logical model of a legal technique 
that coordinates normative systems without the imposition of a hierarchy among 
them. In their opinion, conflict of laws is a unique branch of law in that it provides 
lawyers and judges with tools to understand “the ways in which each system takes 
into account the existence, the content and implications of other systems” (Dung 
and Sartor 2011, p. 234). These interactions are actually inter-systemic in kind 
since they occur between different legal systems, and private international law ap-
proach practically guarantees their coexistence: it does not impose any overarch-
ing regulation nor does it establish any priority relation between the systems in-
volved in the cross-border relation. Two mechanisms make certain that the case is 
allocated to a precise court and that the legal system according to which the case 
must be ruled is determined: jurisdiction, establishing what court is competent to 
hear and rule the case, and choice of law rules, identifying which law, domestic or 
foreign, the court or other deciding authority should apply. 
But talking about inter-systemic ‘conflicts’ among legal rules may be mislead-
ing: jurisdiction and choice of law mechanisms address conflicts that are different 
from those regularly occurring within one legal system, examined above. On the 
one hand, these are conflicts between legal systems: each of them is in some way 
linked to the case and supposedly competent to decide it according to its own body 
of law. Private international law aims to regulate those potentially conflictual situ-
ations (for this reason, it is also called conflict of laws) and its techniques mostly 
prevent such conflicts from happening in practice and make them just virtual. On 
the other hand, it is reductive and not compliant with reality to hold that private in-
ternational law techniques avoid any kind of conflicts among different legal rules 
and systems. The legal orders involved in a cross-border case often provide dis-
similar or even contradictory answers to the same problem, regulate institutions 
unknown to other legal orders, or ascribe different meanings to apparently similar 
legal concepts. Thus, as clarified in the next pages, conflicts among legal systems 
may unpredictably appear, by reason of different rules of interpretation, when the 
relevant foreign law is concretely applied. 
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From a logical standpoint, no contradiction nor inconsistency exists if two legal 
systems regulate the same situation in a different way (Hage 2015): the fact that 
the same case has different legal consequences, merely depending on where it is 
eventually ruled, is logical-indifferent, for legal systems are separated by defini-
tion. Besides, legal systems are founded on a concept of authority that cannot be 
detached from territorial sovereignty,
10
 excluding that foreign rules may be validly 
applied where such sovereign power is exerted. Nevertheless, Hage argues that, 
from the point of view of individuals and companies, subject to two legal out-
comes in their cross-border relations, a dilemma subsists for they need to decide 
according to which of the laws they should act. In fact, both legal systems offer 
reasons for action. As anticipated, legal reasoning is first and foremost a form of 
practical reasoning and conflict of laws is but an instantiation of what it means to 
reason with the law in practice. 
Additionally, as in systemic normative conflicts, scope conditions of rules play 
a fundamental role also in inter-systemic potential conflicts: private international 
law is mainly constituted of conflict rules that limit the applicative scope of legal 
rules, identifying not only which court of which state is competent to rule the 
cross-border case, but also according to the law of which state, be it national or 
foreign, the ruling will take place. Conflict rules11 are scope-defining rules in that 
they determine when national rules should be applied, i.e., when no foreign legal 
rule is applicable to the case. In Hage’s view, this logical reasoning is not easy to 
catch, since conflict of laws operates with a type of procedural rules that regulate 
how legal systems interact, without expressing judgements on values and contents. 
On a theoretical level, then, private international law arises a big question as for 
the status of the foreign law once it has accessed national legal systems. Hage 
holds that legal systems tackle the issue either by merely referring to the law of 
the other state, i.e., the foreign law remains a fact and as such is treated, also in 
trial, or by incorporating it in the domestic legal system, thus recognising it as 
law. 
So, despite its preliminary state, Hage’s analysis is helpful in that it isolates 
some interesting issues pertaining conflictual relations among legal systems: a) 
there is no contradiction nor inconsistency from a strictly logical perspective since 
legal systems are ideally separated; b) conflict rules are rules that regulate scope 
conditions of national rules; c) it is important what status the domestic system 
eventually assigns to the foreign law. All in all, and following what has already 
been stated with regard to systemic normative and interpretive conflicts, logics 
cannot solve conflicts, but it could outline “a conceptual framework that clearly 
defines when a rule conflict occurs and which tools are available to avoid these 
conflicts or to deal with them.” The working paper does not yet provide for a logi-
                                                          
10 The concepts of sovereignty and authority have lately undergone momentous transformation in 
consequence of globalisation. Consider the huge literature on the subject: e.g., Roughan (2013) 
addresses the change in the conceptualisation of authorities. 
11 For the definition of conflict rules, see chapter 3, sect. 2.1. 
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cal model of the legal reasoning in such situations or in private international law 
applications to concrete cases. Still, referring to Glenn’s work (2014) on the sus-
tainability of diversity in law, Hage seems to conceive of a pluralist logic, mirror-
ing that “multivalence thought” that would be the only one able to encompass all 
the complex interactions among legal traditions, levels of laws beyond the borders 
of nation states, cross-references among courts belonging to different legal sys-
tems, and so on.  
The semi-formal approaches, here presented, consider private international law 
mainly as a technique to avoid conflicts among normative systems: legal systems, 
although interacting, remain distinct and independent. But, this vision does not 
seem to mirror the legal reality accurately. If conflict rules no doubt prevent con-
flicts from occurring, they also formally authorise exogenous pieces of legislations 
to enter domestic legal systems. Moreover, national courts need to interpret the 
foreign law when they apply it to decide cases, and interpretation should be ac-
complished using the interpretive rules and traditions of the foreign legal system, 
as for example article 15, Italian law no. 281/1995 requires. This is far from just 
avoiding superficial virtual conflicts of jurisdiction and choice of law: it is a full 
interpretive enterprise, where domestic judges use rules of interpretation and ap-
plication coming from abroad, and it often implies that unknown legal institutions 
or concepts access the legal system of destination and clash with inner laws. Such 
a perspective on private international law, focused on foreign law interpretation in 
cross-border proceedings before national courts, has so far remained unexplored. 
Consequently, linked research questions are yet to be answered. 
3. Problem Statement: Foreign Law Application by Domestic 
Courts 
The debate on the possibility of a fruitful dialogue among different legal systems 
is not new. In recent years, though, it has significantly intensified in consequence 
of legal globalisation, of technological and scientific progresses, identifying new 
frontiers for international and transnational legal cooperation (e.g., robotics), and 
of the information revolution, allowing for data exchange irrespective of temporal 
and spatial location (e.g., Floridi 2014). The three phenomena are all increasing 
the complexity of our times, and this growing complexity has largely impacted on 
the reality we live in, on the personal and commercial relations we normally estab-
lish, and, thus, on the law as a mirror of societal changes. 
Unquestioned reality, complexity is flourishing at many levels and in many ar-
eas of life, and so is the change affecting the law, with no exception for any field, 
and with no special consideration for traditional boundaries among legal systems, 
external and internal hierarchies, powers, or subjects. National judiciaries play a 
prominent role in this framework: almost regularly, they handle pronouncements 
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of foreign courts,
12
 or legislations and legal institutions that are exogenous to their 
national legal system, coming from other normative systems. These elements front 
onto the courtyard of domestic legal systems and legal proceedings in ways more 
or less formalised, and intensified by globalisation and the other phenomena pre-
viously outlined. 
Private international law represents one of such formalised ways, and, tradi-
tionally, probably the most practised and studied. Legal relations featuring cross-
border elements have largely increased, and, as a consequence, people and com-
panies frequently get involved in private and commercial agreements that present 
links with many countries at once. Just consider the high number of marriages in 
which the spouses are of different nationalities and maybe live in a third state, or 
how many contracts see their parties coming from different countries and identify 
the law of a third country as the applicable law to their relation, or even cases of 
death of a person, who lived in a state, was citizen of another, and held some real 
estate in a further country. Private international law is exactly that field of law 
committed to coordinating these different normative systems in order to guarantee 
that, eventually, just one of them will be competent to rule the case, according to 
the substantive law of one legal order. The mechanisms of jurisdiction and choice 
of law together prevent the normative systems from conflicting with each other, as 
explained in the preceding section. However, even if the conflict is avoided in 
terms of competence and applicable law, the fact that the conflict rule identifies a 
foreign law as the law to be applied discloses further thorny scenarios for the court 
ruling the case and the recipient legal system, as clarified in the next sections and 
extensively argued across the whole thesis. 
A peculiar, and exceptional,
13
 case of explicit authorisation for national courts 
to refer to foreign law to interpret constitutional provisions is included in article 
39, 1996 South African Bill of Rights: “(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a 
court, tribunal or forum [...] (c) may consider foreign law.” South Africa was re-
covering from the wounds inflicted, and left open, by the apartheid regime, and 
democratisation of the society as a whole was perceived as an impelling priority. 
Therefore, openness to foreign solutions was probably promoted by two comple-
mentary needs (Lollini 2012): the regaining of international legitimacy after the 
racist distortions of the apartheid system, and the taking of the international con-
stitutional framework as an interpretative point of reference. After all, not only the 
Bill of Rights was a pristine constitutional text, with no history nor traditions, but 
also judicial review was a novelty: overcoming the borders of South African legal 
                                                          
12 In what follows, the focus is kept on how foreign law accesses domestic legal systems. Still, 
the practice of cross-reference among courts of different states is also quite common, e.g., when 
it comes to applying and interpreting an international treaty. On such occasions, the domestic 
court often quotes the opinion already issued on the same matter by the court of another state that 
is part to the treaty. This happens so often with double taxation treaties that scholars have sup-
posed the existence of a principle of uniform interpretation of tax treaty provisions (Ward 2007). 
13 To the best of our knowledge, the Bill of Rights of South Africa is still the only Constitution in 
the world including such a provision. 
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system probably appeared an advantageous solution. South African judges, thus, 
when interpreting the Constitution, may refer to foreign law, and, “during the ar-
gumentation (legal reasoning), transform this information in a proper legal infer-
ence able to provide a conceptual basis for the adjudication” (Lollini 2012, p. 61, 
italics in the original). 
However, even if South Africa is no doubt a sort of legal unicorn in that it is 
the only one providing for the option to refer to foreign law when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights, it is far from an unicum from a merely practical point of view. In-
deed, cross-border legal borrowings are on the agenda of almost any court in our 
interconnected world, and have been examined in many respects (Slaughter 2003, 
Waldron 2005, Markesinis and Fedtke 2005, 2009). So, it frequently happens that 
national courts use the foreign law without any express normative provision in this 
sense, i.e., they informally refer to foreign law while interpreting domestic provi-
sions to decide the case before them. Such borrowings mainly occur in constitu-
tional law since constitutional provisions often need to adapt to changed societies 
and to new perceptions of the legal reality: transcending known boundaries not 
rarely reveal unforeseen solutions to problems. 
A famous example is represented by the US Supreme Court decision in Roper 
v. Simmons14 in 2005. On that occasion, the Supreme Court overruled Stanford v. 
Kentucky15 (1989) and decided that juvenile death penalty is not permissible under 
the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution. The opinion has 
had dramatic resonance and impact not only for its content, but also because it 
supported its argumentation referring to exogenous sources of law. The idea that 
capital punishment is a disproportionate form of punishment for minor offenders 
has been maintained by observing the isolated position on the matter of the USA 
in the international landscape, by citing an international law provision (article 37, 
United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child, which by the way had not 
even been signed by the USA), and by comparing the USA with the experience of 
a foreign country (specifically, the UK, which is the legal system of origin of the 
Eight Amendment). Commenting upon the decision, Waldron (2005) stresses how 
it basically lacks a “general theory of the citation and authority of foreign law:” in 
the majority opinion, the Justices have missed an occasion to theoretically explain 
why national judges should refer to external sources of law to apply and interpret 
their own body of law, including the Constitution, and, thus, what kind of authori-
tative power the foreign law should be acknowledged within national proceedings. 
Paradoxically, one of its major opponents, Justice Antonin Scalia, was also the 
one who got the closest to articulate such a theory, even if just to reject it. In his 
concurring opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004),16 he actually proposed that 
this theory should be based on the idea of global legal consensus. Following this 
line of reasoning, Waldron (2005) holds that national courts cite foreign law be-
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cause this is part of a large legal consensus on how to solve legal problems which 
different jurisdictions share, thus seeing law mainly as a problem-solving activity. 
This consensus would ground the so called law of nations. 
However, after the discussed Roper v. Simmons case, many opinions have been, 
and still are, ruled with more or less open references to foreign law. In a recent 
book, Justice Stephen Breyer has bluntly recognised that the US Supreme Court 
cannot avoid to deal with cases involving some foreign elements: “even in ordi-
nary matters, judicial awareness cannot stop at the border” (Breyer 2015, from the 
Introduction). This situation directly derives from enhanced communications and 
commerce, and from the fact that many problems, pertaining, e.g., to environmen-
tal, health-, or security issues, are growingly shared by the international communi-
ty. An interdependent world cannot but talk also from a legal standpoint and also 
Supreme Court’s references to the legal world beyond the US borders have shifted 
from exceptional to routine (id.). In addition, such references more and more ex-
press the idea that a tighter judicial coordination and cooperation will be necessary 
in future to the efficient functioning of economy and institutions.  
Nevertheless, originalists, and Justice Scalia as one of their most famous repre-
sentatives, have been severely contrasting any foreign influence on US law and 
legal practice: the US Constitution would be a private affair, and its interpretation 
a matter of mere historical reconstruction of the intention of the Founding Fathers. 
This is not the place to deeply investigate the originalists’ ideas, but their position 
sheds some light on the main doubts the use of foreign law raises within domestic 
legal systems: where does the foreign law acquire authority, so that it can have ef-
fects within the national legal order? Which foreign law should the domestic court 
opt for? Is there no risk of a guided choice, in the sense that the national court 
picks the foreign legal system that is most convenient to the achievement of its 
own predefined, practical targets? Anyway, both positions were debated in a fa-
mous discussion at the American University Washington College of Law (Dorsen 
2005), where Justices Breyer and Scalia confronted with the question if it is desir-
able for US justices to rely on foreign judicial decisions or other materials in de-
ciding US constitutional issues. It was particularly stressed whether the reference 
should be acknowledged authoritative (like any other precedent), persuasive, or 
rhetorical force. 
Cross-border constitutional borrowings lead to what comparatists have called 
“legal transplants” (Watson 1974). They are generally considered the major source 
of development for domestic legal systems: when legal rules are transferred from 
one system to another, the transplantation itself would boost developments and 
advances in the receiving system. What is borrowed, according to Watson, would 
not be the legal rule itself, but the idea underlying it, somehow (re)defined by the 
transfer. As a result, transferred legal rules would not have a meaning strictly 
linked to the community of origin, in historical, sociological, geographical, and 
linguistic terms, and the courts of other jurisdictions, even if lacking specific 
knowledge of the initial context, could effectively use them. Strongly criticised, 
e.g. by Legrand (1997), this theory has regardless grounded research projects set 
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out to demonstrate its validity: the European Legal Development project, conduct-
ed by John Bell and David Ibbetson, has aimed to prove that private law has his-
torically been a rich soil for such cross-fertilizations between legal systems (Bell 
and Ibbetson 2014). By way of illustration, Bell (2011) has described how the 
concept and regulation of product liability have developed in Italy and Germany 
following the US model. 
Believing that foreign law can exert such a pervasive and meaningful impact on 
domestic laws presupposes a functionalist conception of the law: comparative rea-
soning, that is, reasoning with foreign law or foreign legal solutions in comparison 
to national law, stresses how other countries could have already faced the same 
problems, and, thus, be useful repository of efficacious legal solutions (Bell 2011). 
All the legal systems would mainly aim to solve common practical issues, and so a 
dialogue among them would be not only possible, but also indispensable. Func-
tionalism and contrary comparative law theories are analysed in chapter 3. 
In the past, also in line with the US tendency to disregard foreign law, scholars 
did not fail to formulate theories on the imminent end of comparative law (Siems 
2007). Over the years, however, the practice of law has gone exactly the other way 
round, showing how that premonition seems to have missed the target. Nowadays, 
under the thrust of many forces, foreign law plays a momentous part in domestic 
legal systems, and national judges daily engage with it, by applying and interpret-
ing it in various ways. 
3.1. The Case for Private International Law 
This broad framework depicts a world in which previously closed and isolated le-
gal systems have progressively become open to multilevel legal interactions that 
take place in unpredicted ways. The process seems to be pointing to even greater 
forms of integration, uniformity, and harmonisation, both of political relations and 
of legal solutions: the European Union (EU) is probably the most illustrative ex-
ample of such trends. As legal experts and citizens, we have witnessed the devel-
opment of a network of variously integrated and communicating systems,
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 to 
which foreign law, infiltrating domestic law and proceedings, has been contrib-
uting over the years.  
In the light of what it has been outlined in the previous subsection, the applica-
tion and interpretation of foreign law within domestic legal systems generally cast 
some far from trivial theoretical and practical doubts. Even though these are most-
ly evident when the foreign law is referred to and applied in informal ways, such 
                                                          
17 
System theory is not new to the field of law. Biological theories (e.g., that of general systems) 
have for example been used to give a description of international law and of its development 
(D’Amato 2014). Also the idea of legal systems as complex adaptive systems has been proposed 
(Lierman 2014). 
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doubts prove to be critical also in private international law. They take the follow-
ing forms: 
 To what extent should a domestic court recognise and give effect to foreign le-
gal rules? To put it differently, what justifies the importation and application of 
the foreign law within the borders of the state? 
 What is foreign law? 
A) What does it fall under those very general terms? According to what criteria 
does the domestic court choose what is the foreign law to refer to? 
B) What status does the foreign law acquire in the domestic system?  
 How can national courts know the foreign law however understood? 
 How should the foreign law be concretely interpreted and applied? 
 How do the foreign legal rule and the concepts, or institutions, it conveys, im-
pact on the recipient legal system, most of all if the national and foreign sys-
tems do not even belong to the same legal tradition? 
These questions unveil a potentially contentious scenario that hides beneath the 
mere coordination of different legal systems, all somehow involved in the cross-
border legal relation: at the superficial level, the conflict is usually avoided thanks 
to conflict rules that identify the applicable law. Still, at a deeper level, when the 
identified foreign law is imported within the domestic system and applied by na-
tional courts, its impact may turn out troublesome: canons of interpretation, legal 
concepts, and legal institutions coming from the foreign legal system, as well as 
various interactions of principles, goals, and values end up challenging the inter-
preters and the recipient system. Besides, once accepted within the borders of the 
domestic system, they cannot help but influence it, triggering the discussion on the 
adoption of legal solutions that were previously unknown. 
It is common knowledge that private international law is the branch of law that, 
first, has made it “possible the application, within the territory of the State, of the 
law of foreign States,” as summarised by Hersch Lauterpacht, justice of the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Boll case.
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 But, as any other field of law, 
private international law has been observing that same shift from a world of dis-
jointed nation states, which were essentially legally isolated and interacted with 
one another only occasionally, to a world of interconnected and interdependent le-
gal systems. In the last few years, private international law has been shaken in its 
backbone and has assisted to modifications in its sources, the overlapping of levels 
of governance and law, a major openness to non-traditional forms of law (e.g., soft 
law, religious law), pushes towards harmonisation and uniformity, and a renewed 
public law dimension. 
Therefore, private international law can provide a unique perspective on the le-
gal phenomenon of application and interpretation of the foreign law within domes-
tic systems. First, even though it regulates a use of the foreign law that is author-
                                                          
18 Netherlands v. Sweden, Judgments [1958] ICJ 8; ICJ Reports 1958 p. 55. The passage is taken 
from p. 94 and is also quoted by Bogdan (2012), at p. 65. 
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ised by domestic legal systems, and as such it originated as far back as in the An-
cient Rome, it has also been profoundly transformed, and its nature of mere nation 
state law has changed as well, at least partially. Actually, conflict of laws has long 
been primarily and fundamentally inner law: not only choice of law rules were 
promulgated just by national lawmakers, but also the foreign law they referred to 
was mainly the law of other sovereign states. Both assumptions have been going 
through significant changes. Likewise, Savigny’s vision of a strictly private and 
apolitical private international law has undergone deep revision, and new theories 
of a public facet of private international law have been proposed. Secondly, con-
flicts of law theorists have been fascinated by the question about what status for-
eign law acquires in the legal system of destination: is it fact, law, or a tertium ge-
nus? How each legal system replies to this question gives hint to which kind of 
relation exists between systemic and inter-systemic elements, mostly in case of 
clashes, when foreign rules are applied. Thirdly, applying the foreign law in pri-
vate international law cases is time-consuming, also because the access to its con-
tent is a difficult enterprise for judges trained in a different legal context (Bogdan 
2012). In particular, how foreign law is applied in concrete leaves doubts about 
the very feasibility of such application and the scope of discretionary powers left 
to the judges: what interpretive criteria, principles, and goals do they actually ap-
ply, conform to, and pursue? 
Private international law, being focused on cross-border legal relations, una-
voidably builds bridges among legal systems. It shows not just how distinct nor-
mative systems interact, but also how different levels of governance (i.e., interna-
tional, federal, regional, and national) overlap, network, and interrelate (Mills 
2013). Further, it assigns a significant role to domestic judges, those who substan-
tially determine how the dialogue between legal systems and levels of law occurs 
in practice, whether and how this dialogue is not only conceivable, but also con-
cretely possible, and with what strategies of reasoning it can be achieved. 
3.1.1. Connecting the Dots: What Reasoning when Interpreting the Foreign 
Law 
Progenitor of all the new forms of interactions among legal systems, private inter-
national law ends up representing a privileged ground to test whether theory of ar-
gumentation may explain how domestic legal systems deal with foreign law and, 
conversely, how foreign law impacts on them, mainly at the interpretive level. 
Legal reasoning and argumentation theory provide thoughtful insights on: 
 How systemic and extra-systemic canons of interpretation should coexist in the 
judicial opinion; 
 How national judges should reason before many possible interpretations of the 
same foreign rule and, so, choose among many legal solutions; 
 How the recipient legal system should receive the foreign elements. 
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As it is explained in detail in Chapter 5, our model assumes that multiple legal 
systems exist: each has its own laws and these laws are different from each other. 
Italy is the legal system considered domestic and its courts are always competent 
to decide the cross-border case, on the basis of its choice of law rules. In turn, 
choice of law rules identify the substantive law, be it national or foreign, applica-
ble to the case. The court is then required to apply it complying to art. 15, of law 
no. 218/1995, reforming the Italian system of private international law: “The for-
eign law is applied and interpreted according to its own canons of interpretation 
and application over time.”19 This rule implies that the relevant foreign law is 
transferred into the domestic system with all its apparatus of interpretive canons. 
Canons of interpretation (or construction) are interpretive rules which indicate to 
the courts which interpretive principle leads to the attribution of meaning to the 
law. Usually, such canons emerge from judicial practice and legal doctrine, but are 
sometimes codified in legislative texts (Tarello 1980, MacCormick and Summers 
1991), as in the case of the cited article 12 of the preliminary dispositions to the 
Italian civil code. 
Imagine that choice of law rules of the Italian legal system refers to the Spanish 
normative system: the Spanish substantive law should regulate the case before the 
Italian court. At this point, the Italian court needs to search not only for the Span-
ish law concretely applicable, but also for the canons of construction that are usu-
ally applied by Spanish courts to interpret that piece of legislation. Troubles may 
for example arise in front of vague concepts, difficult linguistic translations, or 
normative gaps. Theoretically, the next interpretive case scenarios can occur, orig-
inated by the necessity to transfer not only the law, but also its mode of interpreta-
tion: 
 The application of the same interpretive canon gives different results in the for-
eign and domestic legal system; 
 The foreign interpretive canon gives an interpretive result the effects of which 
are contrary to the public policy of the domestic legal system; in such case, 
there might exist a domestic interpretive canon that gives a non-conflicting in-
terpretation of the foreign law; 
 A legal institution, provided for by the applicable foreign law and as interpreted 
according to foreign interpretive canons, has no correspondence in the domestic 
legal system, even if it does not explicitly conflict with its public policy or with 
any other fundamental principle; 
 A foreign legal institution, as interpreted according to foreign interpretive can-
ons, corresponds to a domestic institution only partially; 
 The foreign interpretive canons do not resolve the vagueness of a concept or of 
a term provided for by the applicable foreign provision; it may happens that 
such vagueness can be avoided applying a national interpretive canon. 
                                                          
19 Our translation. 
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Although not exhaustive, the bulleted list shows where the problem, so far un-
der investigated, lies: the conflict between distinct normative systems, avoided 
thanks to jurisdiction and choice of law rules, emerges when interpretation of for-
eign law is performed and national and foreign interpretive arguments eventually 
meet. 
Some further observations ensue. First, such conflict, interpretive in kind, gives 
an interesting outlook on how legal systems concretely interact: the dialogue is be-
tween basic interpretive units, and it takes different shapes depending on how the 
judges reason with those units. Secondly, how judges should reason with those 
units can be examined through the lenses of argumentation: in the end, how the 
conflict is avoided in concrete is but a matter of managing those same interpretive 
units, wherever they come from. Considering argumentation the favoured perspec-
tive also implies that application and interpretation of the (foreign) law is under-
stood in terms of dialogue among agents. Courts are agents in such endeavour, as 
are the parties in a transnational contract opting for a specific foreign law to regu-
late their relation. It could be objected that such perspective is biased since it does 
not account for the epistemic concerns foreign law raises in practice: in the thesis, 
the issue is discussed in many respects and we maintain that, despite the undenia-
ble difficulties, domestic courts can acquire an acceptable knowledge of foreign 
law and, thus, apply it. 
Conflict of laws ends up being, at the same time, characterised and distressed 
by its intrinsic, back-and-forth tension: on the one hand, it opens to foreign legal 
systems, promoting international dialogue and legal cooperation, on the other, it 
puts the domestic system necessarily in contact with exogenous legal traditions, 
concepts, and institutions, all sifted through an interpretative activity that chal-
lenges its inner coherence. 
4. Purpose of the Study 
Purpose of the present study is to define a conceptual framework that encompasses 
the various interpretative interactions occurring between legal systems in the con-
text of private international law. When national courts apply foreign rules to han-
dle cross-border disputes or relations, interactions cannot help but result from the 
legal reasoning that unfolds. In particular, applying a foreign piece of law within 
the domestic legal system requires that national courts, despite the difficulties they 
face to get acquainted with both foreign law content and its interpretation, apply it 
using its own canons of interpretation and application over time. 
This conceptual framework, in turn, aims to achieve two additional theoretical 
purposes: 
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1. To increase understanding of a form of interpretive legal reasoning that has not 
been fully explored yet, i.e., application and interpretation of foreign law in 
domestic systems; and 
2. To provide for a standard of correctness of such reasoning. 
The two central themes of the thesis are therefore legal reasoning and legal in-
terpretation as one of its fundamental components. As section 6 on methodology 
argues, both will be read through the lenses of argumentation theory and argumen-
tation schemes. A mainly informal approach to the research problem is maintained 
in order to keep track of the reasons that guide domestic judges when engaging in 
foreign law application. Besides, argumentation schemes have been used to study 
practical reasoning in a logically sound way (Walton et al. 2008), and have proven 
powerful tools to reconstruct the possible strategies of argumentation in defeasible 
contexts. A first formalisation is however introduced to support the utility of the 
present theoretical model for AI and Law research. 
Of course, as any other theoretical endeavour, this research runs the risk to be a 
modern Janus, fighting with its own two-faced nature: on the one hand, its idealis-
tic drive to abstract from reality in order to find the ultimate answer; on the other 
hand, its eternal recurrence to reality and its unpredictable developments. But as 
the wording says: not all evil comes to harm. Indeed, its intrinsic contradictions is 
also its force: being mainly aimed at increasing understanding, it cannot but search 
for reconciling different facets of reality. 
5. Research Objectives and Questions 
Considering private international law from the perspective of foreign law applica-
tion in domestic proceedings implies the focusing on how foreign canons of inter-
pretation are applied and how they interact with inner interpretive rules. As such, 
it has remained underinvestigated in legal reasoning and argumentation (see pre-
vious section 2.2.). On the contrary, over the last few years, scholars have shown 
interest in reasoning with and about inner canons of interpretation when domestic 
laws are applied (Sartor et. 2014; Rotolo et al. 2015; Walton et al. 2016). In par-
ticular, they have identified specific interpretive arguments, exploring how they 
can be used to successfully perform legal interpretation. The research objective 
and questions we present below are thus grounded in that literature: those interpre-
tive arguments, duly modified, can help to study interpretation in private interna-
tional law, which entails not only the use of foreign canons of interpretation, but 
also various interactions with inner interpretive rules. In this light, our research in-
tervenes both to analyse a so far ignored problem and to enrich understanding of 
interpretation as generally performed by courts, given that foreign law application 
is by now “routine business.” 
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With these premises in mind, the main research objective is to explore the fea-
sibility and utility of developing a theory for arguing with canons of interpretation 
coming from different legal systems, once that canons of interpretation are seen as 
basic inference rules in interpretative arguments. 
With this goal in mind, the following research question is addressed: 
 How can theory of argumentation and, specifically, argumentation schemes be 
used to explain the way domestic courts should reason when they apply and in-
terpret a specific foreign law in order to decide the cross-border case in front of 
them? 
Such research question will be satisfactorily answered if the next sub-questions 
are analysed and provided with constructive replies. In fact, each of them focuses 
on a key component of our theory for arguing with and about different canons of 
interpretation in private international law cases: patterns of reasoning; strategies to 
face interpretive incompatibilities; means to guarantee the concurrent examination 
of foreign and inner interpretive rules in the reasoning. 
1. Which argumentation schemes can help in dealing with interpretive canons 
coming from foreign legal systems? 
2. How do the identified argumentation schemes help to deal with interpretive 
incompatibilities occurring in foreign law application? 
3. How can the identified argumentation schemes give an explanatory view on 
what should happen when foreign canons of interpretation enter the national 
legal system, i.e., on the interactions between intra- and inter-systemic inter-
pretative elements in the judicial reasoning? 
These sub-questions concern rules, methods, and techniques that the domestic 
court should follow when required to apply and interpret the foreign law. 
It is worth repeating that the underlying research hypothesis is that conflicts be-
tween normative systems, which have been avoided by private international law 
and, in particular, its conflict rules, can occur at the level of interpretation. In fact, 
applying a foreign law within the domestic system often means to tackle concep-
tual misalignments, to fill normative and interpretive gaps, and to solve clashes 
between canons of interpretation. Establishing a standard of correct reasoning for 
foreign law interpretation helps to better handle such interpretive conflicts. 
6. Methodology 
Legal reasoning is a method to manage disagreement and uncertainty in law, as il-
lustrated above. As such, it is suitable to study conflicts occurring between norms 
and interpretations, first within and then beyond the borders of a legal system. In 
attempting to build a theory for arguing with foreign canons of interpretation in 
domestic systems and proceedings, some preliminary assumptions about what le-
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gal reasoning is need to be presented as starting point of the thesis. In the subse-
quent list, they are linked to one another, in sequential order: 
1. Legal reasoning is a multi-layered process, and interpretation is a milestone of 
it; 
2. Legal reasoning is mainly argumentative in kind; 
3. Legal reasoning is primarily reasoning with rules; 
4. Legal reasoning is essentially defeasible. 
As regards point 1., legal reasoning can be seen as constituted by progressive 
steps, all meant to reach the final decision, be it a judicial opinion, or legal advice: 
identification of the legal issue starting from the examination of the facts of the 
case, search for the law to be applied, application and interpretation of the identi-
fied piece of law, evaluation of its legal outcomes, formulation of the decision 
(Wahlgren 2000). In this picture, legal interpretation ascribes meaning to the law, 
narrowing or broadening its scope: it plays a critical role in resolving uncertainty, 
considering that “reasonable uncertainty and disagreement are usually taken as oc-
casions for interpreting the law–for figuring out meaning that it may have” (Lyons 
1999, p. 305). At the same time, it represents one of the trickiest moments in legal 
reasoning, since, frequently, the activity of meaning attribution is hindered by ab-
stract or vague textual formulations (Prakken 2005). 
Legal reasoning is then argumentative in kind (point 2.), since each legal con-
clusion needs to be supported by a proper argumentative backbone. Different par-
ties in the lawsuit express different positions and interests: judicial decisions in-
tend to solve this inner conflict. Concretely, it means to see whether and why the 
legal conflict exists and, then, to attribute, justifying them, strengths and values to 
the positions at stake, which are often the results of divergent interpretations of the 
law. Legal reasoning is understood as a dialogue involving different players, the 
parties and the judge, whose differently supported positions confront with each 
other, until the stronger one defeats the weaker, according to the rules governing 
the procedure (MacCormick 1994). 
This brings to point 3., for any argumentative strategy developed by the parties 
can be seen as composed by arguments shaped on the if-then structure of rules, 
where the term ‘rule’ is free from any legal connotations. Reasoning with argu-
ments is thus reasoning with rules, each of them expressing reasons for acting in a 
certain way instead of another. Legal reasoning is a form of practical reasoning 
and argumentation mirrors exactly this (MacCormick 1998), showing that the pre-
vailing argument is the one that allows the most reasonable course of action, how-
ever this may be defined. 
Finally, point 4. refers to the defeasible nature of legal reasoning (Sartor 2012): 
any conclusion of this game played by the parties, using legal and interpretive 
rules, can be reassessed in light of new or additional facts. The potential openness 
and circularity of such defeasibility is interrupted by the achievement of the end of 
the game that is usually established by civil procedure law (e.g., for civil law-
suits), or by the realization of the target (e.g., in case of signature of the contract 
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the parties were negotiating). Defeasibility is therefore connected with argumenta-
tion: both allow to study how legal arguments relate to one another, to assign dif-
ferent values to each position, and to see which one eventually wins.  
For these reasons, theory of argumentation is a good perspective of inquiry also 
to better explain reasoning performed by domestic courts when applying and in-
terpreting the foreign law in private international law contexts, provided that due 
regard is paid to non-argumentative facets of the problem (e.g., acquisition of for-
eign law knowledge). If each legal system can be seen as composed by basic in-
terpretive rules, then dialogues with other legal systems are established on the ba-
sis of those same rules, which are triggered whenever the foreign law somehow 
challenges the recipient legal system. Exploring how and in compliance with what 
general rules, values and goals those interpretive rules are used is but an attempt to 
reply to the question concerning the feasibility of such inter-systemic dialogues. 
In addition, the argumentative perspective overcomes the view of judicial syl-
logism that restricts law and legal reasoning to a logical theory, where conclusions 
are deduced as its direct consequences. A “naive deductivist view on legal reason-
ing” (Prakken 1997, p. 19), judicial syllogism, although it is still the main struc-
ture of judicial reasoning (Sartor 2009), cannot fully explain and include those le-
gal relations, and the reasoning they bring about, that exceed the borders of nation 
states. If normative systems are interdependent, interconnected, and included in a 
network of multiple normative levels, inter-systemic dialogues cannot be boxed in 
monotonic logical theories that do not admit absence of a proper hierarchy among 
norms, exceptions, gaps of various nature, vagueness of legal concepts complicat-
ed by linguistic translations, and so on. Conversely, argumentation as a theory of 
legal reasoning is more flexible, takes account of the variables given by intrinsic 
conflicts of law arising on many levels and in many forms, giving space to the 
agents in action, investigating what forces (e.g., superior principles, political rela-
tions, individual interests) try to prevail in the conflict. 
A theory of argumentation and argumentation schemes that has interpretation 
as its main object of investigation can thus provide a model of post-rationalization 
of legal reasoning in private international law cases, determining its standards of 
correctness while considering the challenges it unavoidably confronts. 
7. Thesis Contributions 
The narrative in the previous pages should have by now shed light on the interdis-
ciplinary character of this work, which finds itself at the intersection between ap-
plied law, legal theory, and AI and Law. Trying to abridge the distances among 
these knowledge fields, it enriches the comprehension of emergent and pervasive 
legal phenomena while identifying new applicative paths for AI and Law formal 
tools. In this larger perspective, two contributions make the present work probably 
relevant. 
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First, from a legal theoretical standpoint, the study investigates new outlooks 
on conflict of laws. Up to now, private international law has been mostly seen as a 
domestic law tool used both to coordinate interactions and to avoid virtual con-
flicts among normative systems. Legal theory has long debated around a central 
issue of conflict of laws, that is, why states should even apply foreign law, lacking 
a moral or legal obligation in this sense, and to what extent they are supposed to 
do so. In other words, legal theorists across the globe have substantially tried to 
justify the very essence of this field of law and the status of foreign law rules, 
once crossed the domestic borders. This point of view lacks to stress what impact 
the foreign law may concretely have on the domestic system, mainly when courts 
need to interpret it: virtual conflicts among jurisdictions and normative systems, 
avoided by choice of law rules, may result in interpretive conflicts. As already 
mentioned, in Italy, when private international law rules recognise that the law ap-
plicable to the particular case is the foreign law, courts are required to apply it us-
ing rules of interpretation and application over time coming from the foreign legal 
system. At this level, interpretive incompatibilities of many kinds may arise, and 
unknown legal concepts or institutions may be introduced into the domestic sys-
tem. 
Secondly, to the best of our knowledge, this form of interpretive reasoning in 
law has not been explored from formal or semi-formal perspectives, even though 
attempts to formalise pluralist legal reasoning (Sartor 2005), and to logically ap-
proach conflict of laws (Dung and Sartor 2011, Hage 2015) have been made over 
the last ten years. As much work in the AI and Law community shows (Verheij 
2003, Walton et al. 2008, Bench-Capon et al. 2013, Sartor et al. 2014, Prakken 
and Sartor 2015), then, theory of argumentation and argumentation schemes, even 
though still at an informal stage, are a precondition to conceive of a formal model 
of legal reasoning. Argumentation schemes, in particular, can transmit the explicit 
reasons that support a conclusion, allowing the reasoner/interpreter to trace back 
to the specific legal information that has inspired the reasoning process. 
Besides, our theoretical study has been partially formalised in a defeasible logic 
framework, as introduced in chapter 5, and, thus, lays the groundwork for future 
further AI and Law applications, specifically exploring foreign law interpretation. 
8. Thesis Structure: a Roadmap of the Work 
Stories have the power to offer keys to access reality in new ways,
20
 and this doc-
toral thesis has the opportunity to tell one of such stories. 
                                                          
20 This idea is borrowed from an Italian novelist, Gianni Rodari: “La fiaba è il luogo di tutte le 
ipotesi: essa ci può dare delle chiavi per entrare nella realtà per strade nuove, può aiutare il 
bambino a conoscere il mondo.” (1964, La freccia azzurra. Editori Riuniti, Roma). 
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It is composed of seven chapters, organised in the following way. Chapter 1 has 
introduced the reader to the work as a whole. As such, it has described the re-
search background and identified the research problem and hypothesis, defining 
both the research perspective and the methodological choices that have been tak-
en. The successive Chapter 2 is a basic chapter dedicated to theory of argumenta-
tion and argumentation schemes, which are the theoretical backbone of the thesis. 
In particular, the chapter illustrates how informal and formal argumentation tools 
have been increasingly implemented over the years to analyse and reproduce legal 
reasoning. It ends with a focus on legal interpretation, considered one of the most 
significant phases of legal reasoning as well as a form of reasoning itself. It shows 
that also legal interpretation has been extensively studied through the lenses of ar-
gumentation; though, starting from Tarello’s legal theoretical work in 1980, the 
study has exclusively concerned interpretation within one legal order, even when 
acquiring a comparative perspective, as in the comparative survey edited by Mac-
Cormick and Summers (1991). 
Chapter 3 switches to the law and introduces private international law, seen as 
a benchmark for application and interpretation of foreign law within domestic sys-
tems. From a legal theoretical standpoint, the chapter provides an overview on its 
theoretical foundations, emerging theories, and open questions. It also addresses a 
topic that is critical to the very implementation of private international law, i.e., 
how national courts acquire knowledge of the relevant foreign law. Given its im-
portance, the issue is discussed again: chapter 4 studies what solutions the Italian 
lawmaker has adopted to put its courts in an adequate position to know foreign 
law; chapter 5 acknowledges the epistemic concerns such step undeniably raises, 
providing for ways to face them in a reasonable way. Then, Chapter 3 does not 
disregard the deep transformations private international law has been witnessing in 
its sources, content, and general understanding. Also, in line with Chapter 2 and 
the leading threads of the thesis, it describes AI and Law attempts to formalise 
how courts reason in pluralist contexts, demonstrating that legal reasoning in such 
situations can be logically correct. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the Italian legal scenario: it takes a picture of private in-
ternational law as resulting from the reform promoted, in 1995, by law no. 218, 
and from the growing EU legislative production in conflict of laws, starting from 
the Amsterdam Treaty. General concepts, e.g., public policy and overriding man-
datory rules, are described in some detail by reason of the crucial role they will 
play within the model we propose in the following chapter. 
Chapter 5, the height of the thesis, proposes an argument-based framework for 
analysing the interpretative reasoning triggered by private international law, after 
showing that such reasoning often materialises in proper incompatibilities among 
the foreign and national legal systems. In so doing, it not only advances argumen-
tation schemes and critical questions to reason with foreign canons of interpreta-
tion in domestic systems in a sensible and justified fashion, but also suggests to 
formalise the whole theoretical framework by using meta-argumentation. Consider 
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that a co-authored paper, developing such first formalisations, is included as Ap-
pendix to the thesis. 
Chapter 6 explores how the proposed theory works in practice. To this end, it 
deconstructs two working examples, drawn from real legal cases: it reduces them 
to the basic interpretive and argumentative moves, which both the different canons 
of interpretation and the various interests at stake could theoretically justify. 
Last but not least, Chapter 7 discusses whether and how the research questions 
have been replied to in the thesis, what main contributions to knowledge can be 
identified, how the present research work is connected to what has been already 
done in the field, and, finally, whether the research outcomes have revealed new 
research questions, worthy of investigation in future. 
Hopefully, by the end of the book, the reader will have the impression to have 
run into one of those stories mentioned at the beginning, and so to have gained un-
expected keys to access an increasingly complex (legal) reality. 
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Chapter 2: Argumentation Theory, Argumenta-
tion Schemes, and Legal Interpretation 
 
1. Introductory Remarks 
Argumentation theory is an interdisciplinary research area where philosophers, 
psychologists, logicians, linguists, legal theorists, and AI scholars have met and 
shared insights, knowledge, and methods over the years. Arguments, seen as the 
basic unit of reasoning, have been object of a vibrant research work exploring the 
possibility to understand and reproduce how human beings reason.  
Many facets of argumentation have attracted researchers from so different per-
spectives. Firstly, argumentation is one of the core modes of expression of human 
intelligence and communication. From their first societal gatherings,21 human be-
ings have probably expressed themselves, shaped their perception and comprehen-
sion of the surrounding world, and interacted with each other through argumenta-
tive processes. We commonly argue to support our ideas, to communicate how we 
see and evaluate facts and events, to persuade others of the soundness of our opin-
ions, and to (counter-)attack others’ positions. All in all, even this doctoral thesis 
is nothing but argumentation. 
Secondly, argumentation is relevant because it lends itself to the needs of prac-
tical reasoning and ordinary discourse, in that: 
 It is context-dependant (Walton et al. 2008, Verheij 2003); 
 It is usually constrained by procedural rules (van Eemeren et al. 2014); 
 It allows for reasoning in presence of new information, exceptions, and special 
cases (Prakken 2005, 2011, Prakken and Sartor 2015): this means that it is not 
limited to deductive reasoning, where the truth of the premises guarantees the 
truth of the conclusion, but permits to perform reasoning that is valid only pro-
visionally, i.e., where conclusions can be withdrawn if additional pieces of in-
formation become available to the reasoner. 
Thirdly, it offers an informal understanding of what can be defined correct rea-
soning, studying how reasons support conclusions, what rules regulate the inferen-
                                                          
21 Herein, other ways of human expression, such as non-verbal ones, are not considered for they 
are not strictly relevant to our purposes. Still, we acknowledge that non-verbal communication, 
behavioural traits, and emotions play a significant role in argumentation and in legal argumenta-
tion in particular: consider, for example, their importance during judicial trials, or in settling dis-
putes outside the courtrooms. 
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tial process, how to distinguish a good argument from a bad one in a chain of rea-
soning, what are the purposes of the reasoning itself (Walton 2005). 
Each knowledge field has originally contributed to develop our idea on reason-
ing and on how it develops in concrete, which is also the basic question of argu-
mentation theory. In AI, studies on argumentation have mainly intended to build 
and programme computer systems capable of reproducing practical reasoning and 
argumentative interactions. In doing so, AI researchers have been integrating di-
verse viewpoints: those of theoretical systems, artificial systems, and natural sys-
tems, respectively focusing on formal models of argumentation, on computer sys-
tems and software, and on argumentation as a real life phenomenon (van Eemeren 
et al. 2014). 
Moreover, great attention has been paid to find applicative areas for AI proto-
types. One of these testbeds has soon become the legal domain. The parties in a 
lawsuit argue in front of the court to support their claims; in turn, the court de-
cides the case justifying its opinion, so that the argumentative path it followed can 
be traced back to. In law, argumentation mainly meets constitutional needs. On the 
one hand, legal justification is a public warrant for the review of judgements by 
society as a whole. On the other hand, it guarantees that the losing party knows the 
motivations of the court and, if need be, can file an appeal against the decision, in 
accordance to right to defence and fair legal procedures. So, the law can also be 
seen as an argumentative process taking place among the parties and the court. 
Logic is the trait d’union between AI, law, and the informal study of reasoning 
conducted in argumentation theory. Many logical models have been proposed to 
formalise legal reasoning as a form of practical reasoning and have shown the lim-
its of classical logic when applied to legal argumentation. Overcoming the pitfalls 
of deductive reasoning in law has thus toughly challenged logicians and AI schol-
ars interested in that field; but, it has also pushed to generally reconsider logic, its 
objectives, and its methodological role, revealing ways to model reasoning that are 
closer to reasoning in real contexts. 
As a result of this redefinition of boundaries, many AI and Law approaches to 
legal reasoning have been grounded on non-monotonic logic and the defeasible 
scheme, both more adherent to how legal operators reason in practice. Defeasible 
reasoning allows for rejecting a conclusion even though its premises not only have 
been accepted, but also still hold. Non-monotonic logic seems to be the most ap-
propriate way to convey such form of reasoning (Brożek 2014). So, computer sys-
tems based on defeasible reasoning models do not limit themselves to identify one 
univocal solution to a question or problem. Rather, they provide users with plausi-
ble arguments to justify controversial positions, to assess the state of arguments in 
the frame of the overall argumentation structure, and to choose the best argumen-
tative strategy. Famous example of such an approach is the case-based reasoning 
system HYPO (Ashley 1991), in trade-secrets law. This computer program, sup-
plied with a set of facts, can generate the skeleton of a legal memorandum that in-
cludes legal conclusions, cited opinions, hypotheticals, and counterexamples. The 
expert system does not simply give the right answer as output; it also sheds light 
31 
on possible alternative paths, allowing to take into account hypothetical cases and 
alternative reconstructions of the facts of the case. 
Much has been done since then and the relation between logic, law, and argu-
mentation has kept on thriving (Prakken and Sartor 2015): a mutual exchange has 
been possible because, in the end, both logic and law are all about arguments. The 
present chapter, structured around three main sections, exactly aims to take an ac-
curate picture of this scenario. Section 2 reconstructs the relation existing between 
argumentation theory, defeasibility, and legal reasoning, from historical, legal-
theoretical, and AI and Law perspectives. The number of applications and exten-
sions of Dung’s abstract argumentation framework (Dung 1995) in the legal do-
main confirms that formal argumentation can be fruitfully used to study legal ar-
guments, which are usually defeasible in kind. AI and Law has, then, also studied 
and implemented argument schemes, considering them the missing link between 
formal methods and practical reasoning, such as legal reasoning. Section 3 ex-
plains what argument schemes are, if they can be efficaciously formalised, and 
how they have been applied in the legal field. Lastly, section 4 expands on legal 
interpretation as a characteristic stage and form of legal reasoning, showing how 
argument-based approaches have so far been applied to this research problem. 
Note that legal interpretation represents the activity, through which legal operators 
derive the applicable norm from textual provisions. In accomplishing this crucial 
task, interpreters are often challenged by vague or open-textured terms, as well as 
the need to promote or demote certain goals, values, and principles when applying 
the law. Also, by interpreting the law, public policies, the rule of law, and the pri-
vate interests of the parties emerge and confront in order to gain the upper hand on 
each other. 
2. Argumentation Theory, Defeasible Reasoning, and Law 
At the heart of argumentation lies the notion of argument. But argument is also 
what logic is about, as any basic logic textbook maintains (Tomassi 1999, Harde-
gree 2011). Science of reasoning par excellence, logic considers arguments the 
building blocks of reasoning and aims to distinguish correct reasoning from incor-
rect reasoning. 
An argument is a set of statements: statements are declarative sentences that 
can represent data, information, and facts, and can be true or false, even if the rea-
soner can be unaware of their truth value. Depending on the role played within the 
argument, some statements are premises and one is the conclusion: the premises 
are reasons for drawing the conclusion. The conclusion is inferred starting from 
the premises, and reasoning is exactly making such inferences (Hardegree 2011). 
For an argument to be a correct form of reasoning, classical logic requires it to 
be valid: the truth of the premises must guarantee the truth of the conclusion. In 
other words, if the premises are true, so is the conclusion, with no exceptions. Va-
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lidity is thus a property of (some forms of) arguments, and consists of their truth-
preserving nature. Logically valid arguments are also called deductive arguments. 
Syllogism, dating back to the Greek philosopher Aristotle, is a type of deductive 
argument. Let us see it: 
Major Premise: All men are mortal 
Minor Premise (instantiation): Socrates is a man 
Conclusion: Therefore, Socrates is mortal 
Another typical deductive argument is modus ponens. Consider the following 
example: 
If you have the password, you can log in. 
You have the password. 
Therefore, you can log in. 
By looking closely at it, we realise that any argument having this form, i.e., in 
the language of propositional logic, 
p → q 
p ∴ q 
is a logically valid argument, whatever content it may refer to: its conclusion is 
true whenever its premises are also true. Validity in classical logic thus focuses on 
the form of arguments, disregarding their specific content: reasoning is correct if it 
complies with specific formal standards. Being deductive in kind, modus ponens 
warrants that reasoning is valid reasoning since, according to classical logic, de-
ductive arguments are the only form of valid inference, and, in turn, valid infer-
ence is the only form of correct reasoning. 
But is this last claim actually true? Are logically valid inferences the only way 
to reason in a logically correct way? In our daily life, we normally employ forms 
of reasoning that are not strictly deductive, and this does not automatically mean 
that we are talking nonsense, even if it does not even exclude it, actually. Howev-
er, this observation already hints at a negative reply to the prior questions. 
Apart from deductive arguments, several kinds of arguments exist: inductive, 
abductive, presumptive, a list that is not exhaustive. Each of them pursues differ-
ent objectives in the reasoning process, which could be making generalisations, 
identifying causal links among facts, or finding similarities among events. In an 
inductive argument, for example, the premises provide the conclusion with strong-
er or weaker evidence, and make it simply probable, likely, or plausible, and not 
certain as in a deductive inference. The following example clarifies the concept 
(Vickers 2016): 
All observed emeralds have been green. 
Therefore, the next emerald to be observed will be green. 
Inductive arguments typically occur in scientific reasoning. While allowing for 
drawing predictions from the observation of reality, they also do not prevent the 
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reasoner from drawing contrary conclusions in case new pieces of evidence con-
tradict those expectancies (e.g., the discovery of an emerald that is not green). 
Conversely, abductive reasoning, also called inference to the best explanation, 
allows to infer that a is an explanation for b. Even if, at first glance, inductive and 
abductive arguments may appear similar, explanatory considerations take on a 
specific role in the abductive argument, whereas inductive arguments simply base 
their conclusions on probabilistic or statistical data (Douven 2011). Here is an ex-
ample of abductive reasoning: 
There has been a robbery at Tim’s place. 
Bob has been seen fleeing from Tim’s place. 
No other satisfactory explanation is available.  
Therefore, it is a plausible explanation that Bob is the robber. 
A series of hypothesis leads the reasoner to the conclusion that at best explains 
the facts of the case: on the crime scene, the detective usually formulates plausible 
hypothesis to explain what happened and to find out who is responsible. 
These forms of arguments are typical of everyday thinking, practical reasoning, 
scientific reasoning, and legal argumentation (Walton 2001). They have in com-
mon that conclusions are reached in a provisional way: they can be retracted or 
abandoned in a later moment, when further information, such as new empirical da-
ta in science or new pieces of evidence in law, is collected. For this reason, they 
are normally jointly considered as defeasible arguments: their conclusions can be 
defeated by other arguments. Pollock (1987) has shown that perceptual reasoning, 
which is a basic way for humans to shape their knowledge about the world, is in-
trinsically defeasible. Consider his example of an object that looks red. 
The object looks red. 
Therefore, the object is red. 
But the object may look red because some red light illuminates it. This red light 
objection is enough to weaken the previously stated conclusion about the colour of 
the object. It may be red, as it may be not. Perceptions are therefore only “prima 
facie reasons,” in Pollock’s terms, to build certain beliefs about the world. 
Defeasible arguments are logically invalid inasmuch as their conclusions can 
be falsified by further information, even if their premises hold true. However, they 
are still reasonable: they allow us to argue in favour of an opinion, and to reach 
conclusions for acting in a certain way, for adopting a scientific theory, for prefer-
ring a specific legal solution, even though we cannot have knowledge of every el-
ement impacting on the situation. Of course, in such a scenario, there might be 
other, even stronger, or otherwise better reasons for holding contrary opinions, so 
called counterarguments: unsurprisingly, refutation by counterexample is actually 
a way to show that an argument is logically invalid. But, as Prakken (2011) wittily 
observes, “as long as such counterarguments are not available, we are happy to 
live with the conclusions of our fallible arguments.” Therefore, also those argu-
ments that classical logic has always depicted as fallacious for they are logically 
invalid, contribute to make our reasoning logical, that is, rational. 
34  
In order to formalise such defeasible reasoning, further types of logic have been 
developed alongside with classical, monotonic logic. A form of non-monotonic 
logic, argumentation logic, for example, accounts for the dialectic nature of practi-
cal reasoning and can deal with new pieces of information that lead the reasoner to 
retract the conclusion even if the premises still hold true (Prakken 2011). The next 
subsections intend to explore the way informal studies on argumentation, logic, AI 
developments, and law have met in the end, and have found common ground to 
examine how legal argumentation develops in concrete, what constitutes good ar-
guments, how such arguments can be constructed. 
2.1. Argumentation Theory and Law: a Long-Term Relationship 
Many scholars have paved the way towards argumentation theory as a separated 
area of knowledge, have contributed to ensure its enduring success, and have actu-
ally kept on exerting great influence on research in AI and, in particular, in AI and 
Law. 
In 1958, the British philosopher Stephen Toulmin published The Uses of Ar-
gument. He criticised classical logic since it just focused on mathematical reason-
ing, substantially neglecting any other form of reasoning, such as common-sense 
or legal reasoning (Prakken 2011). Walking away from the traditional paradigm of 
the conclusive, deductive argument, he proposed an argument scheme that admits 
the possibility to be rejected and supposed that an argument is good if it is capable 
of defending itself against other arguments. He recognised that arguments consist 
of several parts, each playing a different role during the argumentation process. 
These basic components are: 
 Claim: it is the conclusion, which the reasoner is trying to establish;  
 Data: it represents the facts that form the foundations for the claim;  
 Warrant: it is the general rule that allows to pass from the data to the claim;  
 Modal qualifier: it is a word or phrase that expresses the degree of certainty the 
reasoner has with reference to the claim (‘possibly,’ ‘necessarily,’ etc.); 
 Backing: it supports the warrant and all the elements that certify or justify the 
statement expressed in the warrant;  
 Rebuttal: it refers to circumstances rejecting the claim, or restricting its scope.  
A successful argument is thus an argument that has a solid justification and that 
resists to contrary reasons in dialectical battle fields. Together with this idea, many 
factors have made Toulmin’s argument scheme extremely attractive for legal theo-
rists and AI and Law scholars. First of all, it lends itself to the dialectic of law that 
instantiates in the cut and thrust occurring between the plaintiff and the defendant 
during the trial. In addition, it is simple, it is centred on rules, and it leaves room 
for handling exceptions and special cases, which are so frequent in the legal do-
main. The following example (Toulmin 1958) clarifies the point. If we want to 
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prove that George is a British citizen (claim), and if he was born in Bermuda (da-
ta), we need a statement (warrant), such as “A person born in Bermuda is legally 
a British citizen,” that authorises us to bridge data and claim. In order to make the 
warrant stronger, we add that there is a UK statute that provides that any person 
born within the territory of Bermuda holds the British citizenship (backing 1) and 
that, since we are barristers trained in the UK (backing 2), we are aware of the ex-
istence of such a piece of legislation. Someone could challenge our claim, holding 
that George is a spy and so he has betrayed the UK: this is a reason for losing the 
British citizenship in accordance with UK law (rebuttal). 
Warrants and backings can thus be legal rules, the application of which allows 
for asserting the claim. Likewise, rebuttal acknowledges that non-monotonic as-
pects govern the law: new information can always be added, or exceptions raised, 
in this way preventing the warrant from operating, even if the premises still hold 
true. 
In the same year, the philosopher of law Chaim Perelman published together 
with the linguist Lucy Olbrechts-Tyteca Traité de l’argumentation, a treatise on 
argumentation. As Toulmin attacked the focus of logic on deductive reasoning, so 
Perelman censured how formal logic assesses the validity of arguments on the 
mere basis of their syntactic form. Rather, in ordinary discourse, arguments aim to 
persuade a specific audience with their rhetorical force. Therefore, according to 
the authors, rational is not just what is logically valid, but also what seems to sup-
port the claim (more) reasonably: again, an extended concept of rationality. Ar-
gumentation is exactly the field of what is reasonable, plausible, and even re-
tractable. 
Their theory builds on some ideas that would be analysed and expanded by AI 
and Law scholars at a later time. First, arguments are always addressed to an audi-
ence and develop depending on it. Secondly, any type of argumentation is essen-
tially rhetoric in kind: its aim is to persuade its audience of the reasonableness of 
the claim it asserts. Thirdly, in argumentation, the participants agree on facts and 
values, even if they are arguing in favour of opposing claims and need to settle a 
dispute. Participants select which element to stress in their argumentative strategy, 
depending on the goal they want to achieve. 
Perelman’s work on argumentation influenced his thought on legal reasoning 
and legal logic (Perelman 1978). Assuming an antiformalist perspective, he held 
that formal logic is not suitable: 
 To reproduce the dialectics of judicial application and interpretation of the law 
as well as of the parties confronting during the trial; 
 To account for the societal context, in which any legal reasoning develops; 
 To adapt to the different values identified in each phase of the argumentation. 
Pragmatic point of view, it highlights how the role of the court is not limited to 
delivering an opinion on the case that defines winners and losers, but it extends to 
justification of that decision in people’s eyes: it should be not only logical, but al-
so just. Judges search for the legal solution that is acceptable to the society, conse-
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quently trying to conform to what is generally considered fair and reasonable. As 
is argumentation meant to persuade its audience, so is legal argumentation specifi-
cally aimed to persuade its peculiar audience of its own correctness, fairness, and 
reasonableness.  
The legal theorist Robert Alexy has also been highly influential in argumenta-
tion theory, developing a discourse theory of legal argumentation (Alexy 1989). 
According to Alexy, practical reasoning is essentially conversational and linked to 
relations between individuals (Rotolo 1998): lastly, practical reasoning is practical 
discourse. Moreover, argumentation intends to achieve understanding and agree-
ment, and is itself the very criterion for any form of justification to be rational: it 
is the way argumentation develops, i.e., complying with precise procedural rules, 
what warrants the rationality of the process as a whole. As a form of practical rea-
soning, legal reasoning is practical discourse as well, and legal argumentation and 
justification are, thus, rational if they abide by procedure understood as prerequi-
site of correctness. 
This procedural approach to legal argumentation has exerted strong influence 
on subsequent research in AI and Law (van Eemeren et al. 2014). For example, in 
his Pleadings Game (Gordon 1993, 1995), Thomas Gordon has formalised a set of 
procedural norms for civil pleading, by combining a formal dialogue game for ar-
gumentation with non-monotonic logic. Basically, the game is a dialogical model 
of legal argumentation, which results tightly regulated by procedural rules in order 
to limit legal discretion: each party has only one reaction move to play in response 
to each statement the opponent adduces. The reasoner can also argue about the va-
lidity of rules and model exceptions. So, Gordon’s work has mainly theoretical 
aims and tries to manage and formalise arguments in compliance with a fixed pro-
cedural regulation. 
Deeply-rooted in the twentieth century, these reflections have not failed to 
dramatically contribute not only to the birth and development of argumentation as 
an independent and interdisciplinary research field, but also to reform the outlook 
on law and legal reasoning. Through the dispersive prism of argumentation, law 
can be decomposed in its building blocks: rules, agents, principles, goals, and con-
text. Cornerstone idea is that law is basically a work in progress, where every con-
tribution is valuable in order to give the best and as shared as possible solution to a 
problem. Underlying this vision, is, once again, law seen as a problem solving ac-
tivity. 
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2.2. Formal Methods for Legal Argumentation 
Expression of momentous critiques22 against classical logic and its constraints 
(Prakken 2011), the work by Toulmin, Perelman, and Alexy has outlined a clear 
picture of legal argumentation as mainly defeasible, procedural, and value-driven. 
Research and advancements in argumentation theory have thus tried to redefine 
what use of logic is possible with reference to legal reasoning. If logic studies not 
only reasoning that is logically valid, but also reasoning that is simply reasonable, 
i.e., correct in that it is plausible, probable, or justifiable, logic turns out to be use-
ful again to theoretically reconstruct legal reasoning and argumentation. The logic 
that is referred to is a logic that conveys justification, not truth (Hage 1997). 
2.2.1. Defeasibility in Law 
In legal theory, defeasibility is a property that does not relate to a univocal aspect 
of law. From time to time, it concerns legal reasoning, legal norms, legal systems, 
legal validity, legal interpretation (Brożek 2014). Though, if a common trait has to 
be detected, the property of being defeasible has to do with the fact that, from cer-
tain true premises, you can derive a conclusion that holds only provisionally: it 
can be later retracted because of new, or previously unknown, information, even if 
there was no mistake in supporting it beforehand (Sartor 2005, Grossi and Rotolo 
2011). Defeasible inference is exactly “that kind of inference in which reasoners 
draw conclusions tentatively, reserving the right to retract them in the light of fur-
ther information” (Strasser and Antonelli 2014). Defeasibility allows the cognitive 
agents to infer conclusions about the world even if they do not have complete 
knowledge of the conditions affecting their situation (Sartor 2012). 
In more detail, Prakken and Sartor (2004) distinguish three faces of defeasibil-
ity in the law:23 
 Inference-based defeasibility: legal conclusions, although, at first, correctly de-
duced and supported, cannot be derived when further pieces of information are 
included into the knowledge base;  
 Process-based defeasibility: it captures the dynamics of legal reasoning regu-
lated by procedural norms, e.g., by stating how the burden of proof needs to be 
allocated between the parties; 
                                                          
22 Critiques against the use of logic in law were however not new. In a renowned article of 1897, 
“The Path of the Law,” the US Justice O.W. Holmes observed the limits of considering the law 
as governed merely by logic. The major risk was (and is) to disregard other major forces that 
contribute to its development: context, background knowledge, beliefs, goals, and values. 
23 In what follows, the focus is mainly on the first two types of legal defeasibility, i.e., the infer-
ence-based and the process-based. 
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 Theory-based defeasibility: legal information can be explained by different 
theories that can be later abandoned for theories showing major explanatory 
force. 
Defeasibility in law often results in normative conflicts, but also, more general-
ly, mirrors the fact that legal rules are used in the context of disputes and of argu-
mentative settings, where arguments and counterarguments interact in a dialectical 
fashion (Grossi and Rotolo 2011). It has already been mentioned the relevance of 
Pollock’s work in developing the idea of defeasible reasoning in even more gen-
eral terms (Pollock 1995). He has not just provided examples of defeasible infer-
ences (perception, memory, induction, statistical syllogism, and temporal persis-
tence), where “prima facie reasons” may turn out not to support adequately the 
conclusion, he has also introduced the notion of defeater (van Eemeren et al. 
2014). If reasons are the premises that defeasibly imply the conclusion, the de-
feater is the reason that somehow prevents the reasoner from drawing that conclu-
sion: rebutting defeater, if it is a reason for the contrary conclusion; undercutting 
defeater, if it attacks the link between reasons and conclusion. The concept of un-
dercutting defeater has followed closely behind Toulmin’s key insight on the pos-
sibility of rebuttal in everyday reasoning (Prakken 2005). Prakken (2011) has then 
built on these concepts adding the notion of undermining defeater, which is meant 
to attack the premises or assumptions of an argument. This model has been largely 
explored and applied by the AI and Law community for it suits the dynamics of 
legal reasoning and argumentation. 
2.2.2. Different Layers in Legal Argumentation 
Observing legal reasoning through the lenses of argumentation means to recognise 
at least three layers of legal arguments: the logical layer, the dialectical layer, and 
the procedural layer (Prakken and Sartor 2002, Grossi and Rotolo 2011). 
The logical layer looks at what logical language L underlies legal arguments: 
legal arguments can thus be seen as proofs in L. Grossi and Rotolo (2011) hold 
that legal arguments can be arguably conceived of in two ways: 
 As based on a monotonic consequence relation, so that non-monotonicity 
would result from the interactions among arguments: the exchange between ar-
guments and counterarguments is what makes the system non-monotonic;  
 As based on a non-monotonic logic: the argumentation system is but an alterna-
tive way to derive conclusions in that logic. 
In fact, non-monotonic logic, mainly developed by AI scholars, formally cap-
tures defeasible inferences. Such logic allows for expressing lack of monotonicity: 
a conclusion following from certain premises does not necessarily follow when 
other premises are added. Reiter’s default logic is a type of non-monotonic logic 
(Reiter 1980), where conclusions are inferred on the basis of default rules. He 
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provides for a default theory that is a pair [W, D] where W is the background theo-
ry and formalises the facts about reality that are known for sure, in this way taking 
into account domain-specific information (Prakken 2011), and D is the set of de-
fault rules. A well-known example of default rule concerns the possibility, when-
ever x is a bird, to assume that x can fly, because birds typically fly (D). Though, 
there exist birds that do not fly, e.g., penguins or ostriches, or that are temporarily 
impeded from flying, e.g., because they have a broken wing (W). The occurrence 
of one of such cases, included in the background theory, prevents the reasoner 
from deriving the conclusion by default. So, in case x is a bird, we conclude by de-
fault that it flies. However, once we have evidence that x is a penguin, we cannot 
assume the truth of the default conclusion. In other words, there are justifications 
that make the conclusion inconsistent with current beliefs included in W: penguins 
do not fly. To formalise the same situation, classical logic would require defining 
all the possible exceptions in the rule: something that is not only almost impossi-
ble in reality, but that also hugely increases the computational complexity of such 
a formalisation. In the end, it is but a matter of choice about how to better repre-
sent legal knowledge (Brożek 2014), and defeasible reasoning seems to be better 
formalised by non-monotonic logic. 
AI and Law scholars have applied non-monotonic techniques to address norma-
tive conflicts as conflicts among arguments (Prakken and Sartor 2002). Following 
Pollock’s formulation, legal arguments are thus rebutted, undercut, or undermined, 
respectively depending on whether contrary conclusions are presented, the (defea-
sible) inference rule does not adequately support the conclusion, or its assump-
tions are attacked. Moreover, conflict resolution in law involves domain-specific 
criteria: these are usually general principles (e.g., lex specialis, lex posterior, and 
lex superior), or case- or context-specific principles that aim at promoting, or de-
moting, certain goals involved in legal rules application. AI and Law systems need 
to embed such principles if their target is to reproduce how legal experts reason in 
front of normative conflicts. Legal experts not only normally deal with those crite-
ria, but are also trained to weigh them depending on many concurrent factors: pri-
vate interests, constitutional and fundamental rights, general purposes of the legal 
system. 
Wondering whether or not non-monotonic logic and techniques are enough to 
represent such a complex reasoning scenario leads to the dialectical layer of legal 
arguments. The dialectical layer exactly focuses on when legal arguments conflict, 
how they can be compared, and what legal conclusions are better supported and, 
eventually, justified (Grossi and Rotolo 2011). 
AI research has greatly contributed to a deeper understanding of the function-
ing of argumentation and of the way arguments attack one another. Dung’s ab-
stract argumentation framework constitutes a fundamental step in this direction 
(Dung 1995): not only has it given rise to abstract argumentation (van Eemeren et 
al. 2014), but also it has shown that non-monotonic logics can be converted into 
argument-based systems (Prakken and Sartor 2002). Essentially mathematical, 
Dung’s work has laid the groundwork also for many developments in AI and Law 
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research on legal argumentation, in particular by providing for both a conceptual 
framework where to study the reciprocal interactions among legal arguments, and 
a model useful for reasoning about the law (Prakken and Sartor 2015). 
The attack relation among arguments is central to his analysis: Dung overlooks 
the inner structure of arguments, i.e., their premises and conclusion, for consider-
ing just in which way arguments attack each other. The attack relation is seen as a 
formal, mathematical relation, and its graphical representation coincides with di-
rected graphs: arguments are the nodes, and edges indicate that an argument at-
tacks the other. 
The notion of abstract argumentation framework (AF) grounds the whole for-
mal model: an AF is a pair (A, D), where A is a set of arguments, and D  A x A is 
a binary relation of defeat. D(A, B) means that A defeats B. Additionally, A strictly 
defeats B if A defeats B while B does not defeats A. 
In his famous paper, Dung describes some further notions. In particular, a set of 
arguments is admissible, if the following two properties hold at the same time: 
 the set is conflict-free: the arguments belonging to the set do not attack each 
other; 
 each argument is acceptable with respect to the set: the set contains at least one 
argument that defends the first argument from the attack by another argument 
external to the set. 
Different semantics (complete, preferred, stable, grounded) have also been pro-
posed to compute the sets of arguments, called extensions, that can be accepted or 
not in a given AF. Different semantics bring about different ways to interpret the 
AF (van Eemeren et al. 2014), which can be condensed in the skeptical/credulous 
dichotomy. In this sense, Pollock’s notion of defeat has helped to clarify the rela-
tive strength of two conflicting arguments, but it has left us blind to the whole pic-
ture: how legal arguments interact in the broader framework of a complex argu-
mentation process, which argument wins in the end, whether there may even exist 
a winning strategy for its participants, in the language of game theory. Dung’s AF 
and semantics have filled the gap and have been used to study how a legal argu-
ment relates to all possible arguments, and whether it is justified (i.e., it survives 
all attacks), defensible (i.e., it leaves the dispute undecided), or overruled (i.e., it is 
defeated by a justified argument) within the argumentative framework. Also, such 
extensions of Dung’s AF benefit from capturing the complex reasoning patterns 
(Grossi and Rotolo 2011) that are relevant for reasoning with evidence in law. 
Consider, for instance, reinstatement: an argument A1 is attacked and defeated by 
an argument A2, but it may be reinstated if another argument A3 attacks and de-
feats A2. Imagine that Tom was killed and Dick was charged with the murder. 
Chris argues that Dick is innocent (A1), whereas Harry testifies that he actually 
saw Dick killing Tom (A2). Another witness then comes into play and testifies that 
Harry has some issues against Dick so that Harry’s testimony is not credible (A3). 
This reinstates the original argument about Dick’s innocence (A1). Such argumen-
tation logics based on Dungs’s AF and semantics have proved useful for model-
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ling legal reasoning. They recognise that legal reasoning hinges on arguments and 
consists of building them, of linking them through inference rules, of attacking 
them appealing to counterarguments, and of settling their conflicts (Prakken 
2010). 
Last but not least, the procedural layer emphasises the dynamic aspects of law, 
that is, how conclusions are reached in the context of legal disputes. Both civil and 
criminal disputes are governed by rules of procedure, stating what moves, and 
when, the parties can make during the unfolding of the proceedings. This central 
feature of law and legal reasoning was firstly highlighted by Robert Alexy, as ex-
plained before. His work has strongly inspired that AI and Law line of research 
committed to reproducing legal reasoning into dialogue games: in those games, 
rules identify what moves (e.g., claiming, challenging, or conceding) participants 
have at their disposal, when those moves are legitimate and with what effects for 
the parties, and, lastly, when the dispute ends. Moreover, the procedural layer calls 
attention to the allocation of the burden of proof. Not only the concept itself of 
burden of proof is a challenge to logicians (Prakken and Sartor 2009), but also the 
fact that its allocation concerns both the dialectical and the procedural layer makes 
its modelling a complex endeavour (Prakken and Sartor 2004). Proponent/plaintiff 
and opponent/defendant have usually different burdens of proof, and this dynam-
ics is well represented in basic dialogue protocols with two players (Grossi and 
Rotolo 2011): the first is required to support the claim with at least one justified 
argument for winning the dispute, the later suffices to propose a defensible argu-
ment capable of weakening that claim. 
Non-monotonic logics, abstract argumentation, and dialogue games have en-
couraged logic, law, and legal reasoning to meet halfway, trying to overcome cri-
tiques and doubts of the past. However, such formalisations still run the risk of 
oversimplifying legal reality because of the abstractness of their logical assump-
tions and concepts. Facing the big challenge of being adherent to law as a real-life 
phenomenon, the AI and Law community has gradually resorted to argumentation 
(or argument) schemes. Originally investigated in argumentation theory, argument 
schemes have been more and more regarded as the possible missing link between 
the formal realm of logic and AI, and the real world of common-sense knowledge 
and practical reasoning, of which legal reasoning is a form (Prakken 2005, Walton 
et al. 2008). 
3. Argumentation Schemes 
Argumentation schemes are patterns of reasoning (Walton et al. 2008). If Dung’s 
argumentation framework (1995) abstracts from the content of arguments, argu-
ment schemes, conversely, specify the meaningful reasons that lead to the conclu-
sion: such feature is considered crucial to a complete formalisation of argumenta-
tion (van Eemeren et al. 2014). Therefore, the argument schemes approach, where 
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validity is no more a matter of form, connectives, and quantifiers, but rather of 
content, offers invaluable help to logic, still charged with excessive formalism and 
disconnection from reality when it comes to modelling practical reasoning, such as 
legal reasoning. 
Argument schemes owe their good fortune in primis to argumentation theory. 
In particular, Toulmin (1958), acknowledged for distinguishing among claim, da-
ta, warrant, backing, and rebuttal in his argument scheme, is also credited a broad-
er remark: by appreciating that, within any argument, different parts play different 
roles, he contributed to realise that each argument has its own specific standards of 
evaluation (Prakken 2005). In other words, depending on the type of assertions the 
argument conveys, it is possible to attack it in different ways. Critical questions 
(CQ) are the tools for accomplishing the task of attacking the argument and each 
argument scheme has its own critical questions. The nature of critical questions is 
debated (Walton et al. 2008), but replying negatively to them often corresponds to 
identifying counterarguments and exceptions and makes argument schemes defea-
sible. Besides, argument schemes are defeasible also because competing applica-
tions of the same or another scheme may contradict them. 
Hinging mostly on non-deductive reasoning, argument schemes have contribut-
ed to the analysis of informal fallacies, recently an area of vibrant philosophical 
and mathematical research (Hansen 2015). Further, the argument schemes method 
looks promising to tackle some problems AI faces when modelling how artificial 
agents reason in a real world setting and are supposed to successfully deal with 
uncertainty and incompleteness of information (Walton et al. 2008). In this re-
spect, argumentation and argument schemes could turn out helpful for they are fo-
cused on defeasible reasoning, they are dialogue-based, and, interestingly, they of-
fer implementable techniques. 
3.1. Features, Insights, and Applications 
Argument schemes are usually framed by and develop within dialectical/dialogical 
contexts: conceptually, there are a proponent and an opponent, the first asserting a 
claim, the second variously challenging it through critical questions. Establishing 
a claim, weakening its supporting reasons through counterarguments and excep-
tions, and defending and reaffirming the opening claim, all require for balancing 
several elements. 
Consider the simple version of the argument from expert opinion scheme (Wal-
ton et al. 2008, p. 14): 
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A. 
Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A (in domain S) is true (false). 
Conclusion: A may plausibly be taken to be true (false). 
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Compared with other versions of the same scheme, this form has the merit of 
showing “how argument from expert opinion works as a fast and frugal heuristic 
in everyday thinking” (Walton 2010a, p. 164): in ordinary situations, we often 
jump to a certain conclusion through shortcuts of many kinds, such as the idea that 
if it is an expert opinion, it is necessarily correct and we can safely base our deci-
sions or actions on it. The reasoner, who is putting forward the argument from ex-
pert opinion, needs to pay attention not to incur the fallacy of the argumentum ad 
verecundiam, or appeal to authority, in the form of inappropriate argument from 
expert opinion. For instance, this may occur when the argument is proposed in 
such a way that the opponent feels threatened and does not advance the needed 
critical questions, consequently treating the argument as a deductively valid argu-
ment (Walton and Koszowy 2016), or when the cited authority is not an expert or 
his/her expertise pertains to another field. 
The presented version of argument from expert opinion hides an implicit condi-
tional premise (Walton and Reed 2002, p. 2):  
Conditional Premise: If source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition 
A and E says that A is true then A may plausibly be taken to be true (false). 
It is thus possible to see the “structural resemblance” (Verheij 2003, p. 170) be-
tween this argument scheme and the deductive scheme of modus ponens presented 
above: as modus ponens is expressed in the form of premises and conclusion, so is 
the argument from expert opinion. Argument schemes are generally seen as rules 
and correspond to rules of inference in logics. However, argumentation schemes 
are often defeasible, context-dependant, and only pragmatically valid. For exam-
ple, in the argument from expert opinion, experts are fallible and may be wrong 
regarding the concrete case, or their opinion may be falsified by new information: 
its conclusion is always just tentatively drawn. So, the argument from expert opin-
ion, as many other argument schemes, follows the pattern of defeasible modus po-
nens (Walton 2010a, p. 165): 
If A then (defeasibly) B 
A 
Therefore (defeasibly) B 
Besides, pragmatic validity implies that the argument schemes that do not re-
produce deductive forms of reasoning are acceptable depending on the context and 
on the specific, even contingent (Verheij 2003) circumstances of their application. 
This property meets the needs of modelling concrete argumentative situations that 
are very common in human reasoning but that “have proved troublesome to view 
deductively” (Walton 2010a, p. 160). Many lists of argument schemes have been 
presented over the years,24 but none of them can claim to be exhaustive. In this re-
gard, it does not even exist a standard criterion for establishing if a pattern of rea-
soning is acceptable as argumentation scheme. As a result, an infinite range of ar-
gument schemes could be enumerated, at least theoretically, and their acceptability 
                                                          
24 See, for example, Walton et al. (2008). 
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verified from time to time on the basis of their contextual relevance (Verheij 
2003). As open tools of analysis, argument schemes are thus potentially applicable 
to whatever knowledge domain. Additionally, they can either be used as patterns 
for reconstructing arguments (e.g., they can detect implicit premises, as the next 
subsection shows) or as generators for constructing new arguments (Gordon and 
Walton 2009). 
3.1.1. Critical Questions 
Argument schemes are combined with a set of critical questions, which are usually 
included in the definition of argument scheme. 
Consider what critical questions Walton et al. have identified for the cited ar-
gument from expert opinion (2008, p. 15): 
CQ1–Expertise Question: how credible is E as an expert source? 
CQ2–Field Question: is E an expert in the field that A is in? 
CQ3–Opinion Question: what did E assert that implies A? 
CQ4–Trustworthiness Question: is E personally reliable as a source? 
CQ5–Consistency Question: is A consistent with what other experts assert? 
CQ6–Backup Evidence Question: is E’s assertion based on evidence? 
Critical questions depend on the content and type of the sentences that compose 
the reasoning pattern, in turn defined by the context in which the parties are argu-
ing. In our example, the argument is reasonable if certain “contextual factors” 
(Wagemans 2011, p. 333) concerning the expert, the delivered opinion, and the re-
lation existing between the expert opinion and the claimed field of expertise are 
actually present. In particular, the expert should be a credible source (CQ1) in the 
specific field of expertise of A (CQ2) and personally trustworthy (CQ4), his or her 
assertions should imply A (CQ3), he or she should deliver an opinion that is both 
consistent with what other experts maintain (CQ5) and based on evidence (CQ6). 
CQ1, CQ2, CQ3, CQ6 could be modelled as implicit premises, or assumptions, of 
the argument (Walton and Gordon 2009), and are considered sufficient to refute 
the claim if not adequately replied to, shifting the burden of proof from the re-
spondent to the proponent. Differently, CQ4 and CQ5 requires that the respondent, 
questioning both the expert’s trustworthiness and the consistency of his or her as-
sertions, backs them with proper evidence. So, he/she should present evidence that 
the expert is untrustworthy and indicate the different opinions other experts in the 
field have expressed (Walton 2010a). 
Notably, these critical questions only refers to the argument from expert opin-
ion. In this respect, consider also the different argument from analogy together 
with its critical questions (Walton et al. 2008, p. 56, version I, and p. 315): 
Major Premise (or Similarity Premise): Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2. 
Minor Premise (or Base Premise): Proposition A is true (false) in case C1. 
Conclusion: Proposition A is true (false) in case C2. 
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CQ1: Is A true (false) in C1? 
CQ2: Are C1 and C2 similar, in the respects cited? 
CQ3: Are there important differences (dissimilarities) between C1 and C2? 
CQ4: Is there some other case C3 that is also similar to C1 except that A is false (true) in 
C3? 
Critical questioning arguments from analogy means to investigate whether sim-
ilarity and differences exist among the cited cases and whether it is possible to es-
tablish comparisons with other, ignored cases: the abovementioned questions on 
experts and their opinions are absolutely irrelevant. Identifying the types of sen-
tences that characterise an argument scheme is therefore a necessary step for ana-
lysing argument schemes in general (Verheij 2003). 
Three further observations naturally follow. 
Firstly, the field-dependency of critical questions grounds the concept of validi-
ty of argumentation schemes (Prakken 2005): validity is not understood in a strict-
ly logical sense, but, broadly, in terms of reasonableness and persuasive strength 
of the argument. That is why different arguments require different standards of 
evaluation. Critical questions, thus, play a key role in evaluating arguments. If 
evaluation generally intends to establish whether an argument, fitting a precise ar-
gument scheme, is strong or weak, how to better accomplish this task is object of a 
lively debate in the AI and Law community. A feasible solution is represented by 
the reformulation of argument schemes in an argumentation framework, so that a 
computational model is then available to evaluate the argument-scheme approach. 
As for informal logic, the usual approach to argument evaluation consists of inves-
tigating three main aspects (Walton et al. 2008): a) whether the premises are ac-
ceptable; b) whether the premises are relevant in sight of the conclusion; c) 
whether the premises provide for sufficient support for accepting the conclusion; 
c1) if other and better reasons exist in favour of the opposite conclusion. 
Second observation is that, even if field-dependency boosts difference between 
critical questions pertaining to different argument schemes, some degree of simi-
larity can be nevertheless distinguished. Each argument scheme is challenged in 
its premises and conclusions: the former always need to be true, well supported, 
and justified, whereas the latter always need to resist to contrary reasons or differ-
ent conclusions (Verheij 2003). Thus, there exist questions that are common to 
every argument scheme as for the function they accomplish within the scheme, 
and this is linked to the fact that critical questions fulfil many tasks with reference 
to argument schemes: some represent premises of the scheme otherwise left im-
plicit, some identify exceptions that could prevent the scheme from operating, 
some indicate other possible reasons or arguments against the conclusion of the 
argument. 
Thirdly, critical questions determine whether an argument scheme is appropri-
ate in a concrete case by investigating whether its conditions are relevant to its use 
and ends. Relevance is a sort of transverse issue: argumentation theory wonders 
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about its definition,25 AI studies if and how it is possible to express this property 
formally and treat it computationally, law also has extreme interest in better defin-
ing what can be labelled as relevant for the purposes of well-supported judicial 
opinions and lawyer’s argumentative strategies. So, even if analysing the concept 
of relevance is not the object of the present thesis, relevance is not exempt from 
our discourse, for its implicit role in identifying conditions of argument schemes. 
3.1.2. AI and Law Perspective on Argument Schemes Formalisation  
Argument schemes are, technically, rules of inference of a logical system (Verheij 
2003, Prakken 2005, Walton et al. 2008, van Eemeren et al. 2014): informal ar-
guments can be instantiated into logical inference rules by seeing the relation be-
tween premises and conclusions in terms of conditional rules. It is worth noting 
that the obtained rules are generally defeasible since deductive arguments are one 
of the several possible types of arguments, and not even the most recurring in or-
dinary argumentation. Prakken (2005) refers to Horty’s attempt to formalise some 
argument schemes as instances of the defeasible modus ponens (Horty 2001): 
P 
If P then usually Q 
Therefore (presumably), Q 
However, the defeasible modus ponens is still excessively abstract with its log-
ical language and it does not preserve the vocation of argument schemes of main-
taining nuances of meaning while reproducing the reasoning process (Prakken 
2005). Moreover, when approaching an informal argument scheme, there are parts 
that are general, and basically function as ordinary rules of logical inference, but 
there are also parts that are strictly context-specific and, as such, determined by 
the content of the sentences they consist of: it is on this blurred line that abstract 
logic and contextual logic would distinguish from each other (Verheij 2003). 
Argumentation schemes hence show an inner contradiction. On the one hand, 
their underlying logical form allows for expressing them in logical language, on 
the other hand, that same formalisation puts in danger their most significant fea-
ture, i.e., the capacity to transmit meaningful reasons. Formalisations run the risk 
of losing those details that field-dependency of argument schemes offers, for ex-
ample in the form of distinct critical questions. Once more, logic has the oppor-
tunity to rethink itself, its methods, and its purposes, for encompassing the enrich-
ing specificity of argumentation schemes, and not stumbling upon the shortages of 
formalism.  
In line with this vision, argumentation logic makes use of non-monotonic tech-
niques that allow to express exceptions, disagreement, and uncertainty. Argument 
schemes can thus be embedded in such argumentation framework (Prakken 2005), 
                                                          
25 See for example Walton (2004). 
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where, defined as trees including both deductive and defeasible inferences, argu-
ments can be attacked also on the defeasible inference step. Rebuttals, undercut-
ters, and undermining defeaters are adequate tools for the formalisation: according 
to Prakken, who has further improved this AF in ASPIC+ (Prakken 2010, Prakken 
et al. 2015) by formalising argument schemes for factor-based reasoning, a) argu-
ment schemes can be modelled as the “prima facie reasons” dear to Pollock; b) 
whenever the application of a scheme results in contrary conclusions is nothing 
but an instantiation of rebuttal; c) negative replies to critical questions corresponds 
to undercutters, which actually highlight exceptional conditions. 
Feasible path, argumentation logic clearly expands upon the issue of distin-
guishing what relations form and content have within argument schemes. Addi-
tionally, such an abstract AF is capable of dealing with conflicts among argu-
ments, first establishing criteria to assess which argument is strong enough to 
prevail in the dialectical relation (e.g., by modelling preference rules), then defin-
ing the defeasible validity of arguments, often understood in game-theoretic terms: 
an arguer has a defeasibly valid argument, whenever he or she has a winning strat-
egy. “Tree of trees” in Prakken’s words, argument-based logic gives a useful rep-
resentation of ordinary argumentation. 
3.2. Argument Schemes for Legal Reasoning 
The law has been a natural landing place for such efforts in argument-based mod-
elling of practical reasoning: its unique connection with argumentation theory and 
its regular reliance on common-sense knowledge and defeasible patterns of rea-
soning have made it a favoured area of investigation, with both theoretical and ap-
plicative aims. Moreover, legal reasoning is a cognitive activity that develops in 
compliance with recurring argument schemata, where reasons and conclusions ex-
press the mental states of a rational reasoner (Sartor 2005, 2012). Such schemata 
can be examined individually, like building blocks of legal argumentation as a 
form of correct ratiocination, and collectively, in their relation with one another. 
Legal argument schemes can for instance be identified referring to the stage of 
reasoning they pertain to (Prakken 2005). Legal reasoning would actually consist 
of four main stages.26 Consider that the following order is not strictly consecutive: 
 Evidence: this stage aims to verify the occurrence of the alleged facts. It focus-
es on two main questions and identifies where the burden of proof lies: is there 
evidence supporting the factual allegation? Is the collected evidence sufficient 
to draw a well-supported conclusion?  
 Classification/interpretation: legal rules are usually expressed in general terms, 
for both practical and political reasons.27 But under those general rules, facts 
                                                          
26 In legal theory, there are other subdivisions: e.g., see that proposed by Wahlgren (2000) and 
presented in chapter 1. 
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need to be ascribed and interpretation is exactly the activity that allows for at-
tributing meaning to the rule’s conditions and for deciding whether the rule in-
cludes the facts. 
 Rule validity: the rule is legally valid in that it comes from a legally recognised 
source of law.  
 Rule application: at this stage, legal experts verify whether the rule must be ap-
plied to the concrete case, or whether there exist circumstances preventing its 
application (e.g., an exception occurs, another piece of law prevails in the nor-
mative conflict, or a superior principle states that the rule is unfair or unjust). 
In what follows, two argument schemes are specifically considered: argument 
from precedent and argument from rule application, which mirror the traditional, 
but more and more imprecise, distinction between common law and civil law sys-
tems. Interestingly, both schemes show that the stages of legal reasoning are not 
strictly sequential, as already noted; rather, they mostly overlap and intertwine in 
the reasoning flow, and this is particularly evident in the analysis of the argument 
from precedent, where issues of validity and evidence mix with the goal of rule 
application. Additionally, the interpretive stage functions as an umbrella, covering 
and sustaining all other stages; for this reason, its in-depth analysis is postponed to 
the next section. 
3.2.1. Argument from Precedent 
The argument from precedent in law is based on the more general argument from 
analogy, one of the fundamental forms of ordinary reasoning, and implies to rea-
son with similarities between legal cases. Arguing with cases is typical of com-
mon law countries, where the doctrine of stare decisis28 is in force. This doctrine 
states that judicial precedents have binding authority: lower courts should abide by 
the rule drawn from a case that is similar to the new case and that has already been 
decided by a higher court. 
The stare decisis principle is one of the possible answers to the problem of le-
gal certainty, the protection of which is a pillar of the rule of law. For their part, 
civil law countries have pursued legal certainty by undertaking the huge effort of 
codifying, ideally, all that could be codified. In fact, codifications guarantee not 
only that for every problem there exists a correspondent legal solution in the form 
of a piece of legislation, but also that judicial discretion is limited: in Montes-
quieu’s words, judges are mere bouche de la loi, the mouthpiece of the law. Both 
                                                                                                                                     
27 From a merely practical perspective, conceiving of laws that include every hypothetically pos-
sible circumstance not only goes far beyond imagination, but also would not be an economical 
solution in terms of legal efficiency. Politically, a consensus on every factual hypothesis could be 
difficult to achieve, and general rules allow for future informal expansion of the law. 
28 The whole Latin maxim is “stare decisis et quieta non movere.” Its translation into English 
usually sounds as follows: “to stand by decisions and not disturb the undisturbed.” 
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targets have been only partially accomplished: normative gaps remain unavoida-
ble, and interpretation often ends up expanding the role of judiciary. In common 
law systems, legal certainty is rather protected by following rules extracted from 
legal cases superior courts had previously ruled on. In particular, courts build their 
motivations around two components, i.e., ratio decidendi and obiter dictum. The 
ratio decidendi, “court holding” in the USA, provides lower courts with the bind-
ing rule, namely, the legal principle that determined the judgment. What falls out-
side the ratio decidendi is obiter dictum and consists of incidental and/or collateral 
statements that do not have any binding authority. Obiter dicta may exert persua-
sive force on following opinions, mainly depending on how prestigious the court 
deciding the case is. Lower courts firstly identify the ratio decidendi of a case and 
abstract the legal rule from its own decisional context, a far from trivial task. Sec-
ondly, they have to establish if the selected rule has binding authority since not all 
rationes decidendi become binding precedents for future similar cases. In some 
way, prediction is how the stare decisis doctrine conceives of the law: previous 
decisions are of utmost significance as they allow for performing reliable predic-
tions on the law content in future legal cases. But precedents’ binding authority is 
not absolute: if the court shows, through the distinguishing technique, that the new 
case is dissimilar from the previous one in significant respects, it can disregard the 
precedent. 
In AI and Law, case-based reasoning systems, such as HYPO (Ashley 1991), 
CATO (Aleven 1997), and all the research triggered by those first works (e.g., 
Bench-Capon et al. 2013, Prakken et al. 2015), have modelled this reasoning pat-
tern, which is complex for two main reasons. First, those computational models 
should be able to compare cases in terms of similarity between them. Similarity 
has to be also relevant, and relevance is an extremely elusive concept, as we have 
stressed above. Secondly, the systems should measure in what respect and how 
much two cases are similar. To put it differently, similarity among cases shifts the 
burden of proof between the parties, and each is required to prove how much simi-
lar two cases are, or whether and how the new case distinguishes itself. 
HYPO addresses the issues with dimensions and factors. A dimension is a le-
gally relevant aspect of the case; it can be pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant (factor), 
depending on the value that it takes on a scale. Case-based reasoners have usually 
a dialectical structure: opposite arguments confront and require to be balanced. 
Logical argument game (Prakken 2005), HYPO consists of a three-ply argumenta-
tion: three moves are possible (plaintiff-defendant-plaintiff) and, at the end, a 
winner is identified. HYPO allows for using the distinguishing technique and for 
finding counterexamples to arguments. 
Applying an argument-scheme approach to reasoning and arguing with cases, 
an argument scheme suitable for reasoning with precedents is formulated by build-
ing on the basic version of the argument from analogy: 
ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY (Walton et al. 2008, p. 315) 
Similarity Premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2. 
Base Premise: Proposition A is true (false) in case C1. 
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Conclusion: Proposition A is true (false) in case C2. 
 
ARGUMENT FROM PRECEDENT (Walton 2010b): 
Previous Case Premise: C1 is a previously decided case. 
Previous Ruling Premise: In case C1, rule R was applied and produced finding F. 
New Case Premise: C2 is a new case that has not yet been decided. 
Similarity Premise: C2 is similar to C1 in relevant respects. 
Conclusion: Rule R should be applied to C2 and produce finding F. 
Critical questions challenge rule applicability, similarity between cases, and its 
relevance for the comparison. They also explore the possibility of finding stronger 
similarities with other cases ruled differently, or, simply, of distinguishing the pre-
sent case so to prevent the application of the rule. 
Apart from the specificity of comparing cases in terms of relevant similarities, 
it seems possible to connect argument from precedent to another key argument 
scheme for law, i.e., argument from rule application. Indeed, applying the argu-
ment from precedent scheme results, in the end, in applying a rule, even if rules 
are identified not among a written body of law, but are extracted from a previous 
case that is relevantly similar to the case yet to be decided. This remark could al-
low for inferring that legal reasoning, however it is performed, is generally meant 
to solve legal problems through the application of rules to facts, and that, for this 
reason, it is essentially rule-based. 
3.2.2. Argument from Rule Application 
Applying a legal rule to the facts is central to the law as a problem solving activity 
(Prakken 2005), both in common law and civil law countries. Much about the na-
ture of rules, their application, and interaction has been told in AI and Law com-
munity (Gordon and Walton 2009): 
 rules have properties, mainly regarding their validity (e.g., date of enactment), 
which are better expressed by terms than by logical formulas, and which imply, 
whenever a rule is applied, to reason about them; 
 rules are defeasible, are subject to exceptions, and can conflict with each other; 
 normative conflicts can be effectively addressed by reasoning about them with 
priority rules (e.g., lex superior, lex specialis, lex posterior); 
 rules are exclusionary29 for they undercuts other, theoretically applicable rules;  
 sometimes, it is necessary to reason with invalid rules: if admissible,30 retroac-
tive reasoning exactly requires to apply rules that are not valid anymore (they 
may have been, explicitly or implicitly, suppressed by a subsequent rule). 
                                                          
29 In Reason-Based Logic (Verheij 1996, Hage 1997), rules are exclusionary as well, in that they 
include not only reasons to support their conclusions, but also reasons against the application of 
the principle underlying the rules. In other words, principles are replaced by rules. The meaning 
of ‘exclusionary’ is thus quite different.  
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Argument-based logic has modelled this kind of reasoning and has dealt with 
norm conflicts (Prakken and Sartor 1996, 1997), with reasons and principles (Ver-
heij 1996, Hage 1997), with purpose (Berman and Hafner 1993), with values 
(Bench-Capon et al. 2013). 
A possible argument scheme for reasoning with rules looks as follows: 
ARGUMENT FROM ESTABLISHED RULE (Walton et al. 2008, p. 343) 
Major Premise: If carrying out types of actions including the state of affairs A is the 
established rule for x, then (unless the case is an exception), x must carry out A. 
Minor Premise: Carrying out types of actions including state of affairs A is the established 
rule for a. 
Conclusion: Therefore, a must carry out A. 
This scheme seems to resemble the basic functioning of schemes for practical 
reasoning, where an action is tied to specific consequences, bad or good, and 
agents reflect on their actions in sight of those future consequences. Such resem-
blance does not surprise since legal reasoning is normally considered as a form of 
practical reasoning. Moreover, this link to practical reasoning further implies that 
reasoning with rules often means reasoning with the different goals they could be 
achieving, and with the principles that ground them. So, critical questions need to 
assess which exact content the rule has, whether the rule conflicts with other rules 
and is maybe overridden by one of them, and, finally, whether the concrete case 
instantiates an exceptional circumstance allowing for not complying with the rule. 
4. Argumentation-Based Approach to Legal Interpretation 
Interpretation is one of the stages of legal reasoning as well as a form of reasoning 
itself. In AI and Law, Prakken (2005, p. 314) has defined it “a very hard research 
problem,” and not by chance. Always bearing in mind Alf Ross’ distinction be-
tween interpretation as activity and interpretation as outcome (1959), applying the 
law to concrete cases calls for a multifaceted interpretive activity:  
 The piece of legislation is interpreted to derive the applicable norm: this first 
interpretation leads to the definition of the conditions of applicability of the 
rule, that is, its ‘scope,’ borrowing Hage’s words;  
 Subsuming the facts of a case under the rule is the interpretative act that practi-
cally verifies whether the scope of the rule includes specific factual situations 
and allows for its correct application: the interpreter’s task is difficult due to the 
large gap between the facts of a case and the abstract nature of legal concepts 
(Prakken 2005, p. 314); 
                                                                                                                                     
30 Retroactive reasoning is usually not admitted in criminal law, unless the new law is favourable 
to the defendant (favor rei). In Italy, both principles are derived from article 25 of the Constitu-
tion (see footnote no. 3). 
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 Choosing among different possible interpretations is an interpretive act as well, 
even if it is a special one, defined ‘second-order’ (MacCormick and Summers 
1991), or meta-interpretation, for it does not aim to attribute some kind of 
meaning to the words of the rule, but to reason about how and why to select 
one meaning instead of another. 
It is worth noting that, in sight of the interpretive activity, the text of the law, 
i.e., the provision, distinguishes itself from the meaning that the interpretation at-
tributes to it, i.e., the norm. Such (not merely) terminological distinction is main-
tained throughout the whole thesis, as specified in the introductory chapter. 
Much AI and Law research has been committed to modelling arguments for in-
terpreting legal concepts and the fact that normative conflicts often result from 
conflicts among different interpretations has further promoted this research trend. 
In particular, argument-based approaches to legal interpretation have been exten-
sively explored. They actually account for the connection existing between inter-
pretation and justification: not only courts’ interpretation of a statute justifies the 
way they apply it in a case, but also the very choice of a specific interpretation 
needs a justification. In other words, arguments justify both the application of the 
rule and the interpretation itself, expressing what gives justificatory power to that 
interpretation. Starting from such remarks, in 1991, Neil MacCormick and Robert 
Summers collected several country-specific studies on statutory interpretation, and 
conducted a significant comparative investigation on the topic. They aimed at 
promoting a general theory of interpretive arguments, believing that interpretive 
arguments are the “elements of rational justification within practical reasoning 
about issues of law” (MacCormick and Summers 1991, p. 511). 
According to them, each interpretive argument can be formulated in terms of a 
mode of interpretation that should be adopted in case certain circumstances hold: 
“If interpretive conditions c exist, then statutory provision p ought to be interpret-
ed in manner m” (id., p. 515). Canons of interpretation are thus expressed in a 
conditional form, as an ‘if-then’ rule. 
As also listed by Sartor et al. (2014), eleven types of interpretive arguments re-
sulted common to all the countries reviewed, and they are: 
 Argument from ordinary meaning: if a statutory provision can be interpreted 
according to the meaning a native speaker of a given language would ascribe to 
it, it should be interpreted in this way, unless there is a reason for a different in-
terpretation; 
 Argument from technical meaning: if a statutory provision concerns a special 
activity that has a technical language, it should be interpreted in the appropriate 
technical sense, as opposed to ordinary meaning; 
 Argument from contextual harmonization: if the statutory provision belongs to 
a larger scheme in a statute or set of statutes, it should be interpreted in light of 
those; 
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 Argument from precedent: if a statutory provision has a previous judicial inter-
pretation, it should be interpreted in conformity with it; if courts are organised 
hierarchically, lower courts must conform to the judgements of higher ones; 
 Argument from analogy: if a statutory provision is similar to provisions of other 
statutes, it should be interpreted in order to preserve the similarity of meaning, 
although it provokes a departure from the ordinary meaning; 
 Argument from a legal concept: if the general legal concept has been formerly 
identified and elaborated by the doctrine, it should be interpreted in such a way 
as to maintain a consistent use of the concept through the system as a whole; 
 Argument from general principles: whenever general principles are applicable 
to the statutory provision, one should favour the interpretation that most com-
plies with these general legal principles; 
 Argument from history: if the statute has been interpreted for a period of time 
following the historically changed understanding of a peculiar point, its appli-
cation to a case should be interpreted pursuant to this historically evolved un-
derstanding; 
 Argument from purpose: if a purpose can be ascribed to a statutory provision, 
the provision should be interpreted in a way compatible with the purpose; 
 Argument from substantive reasons: if there exists some goal that can be con-
sidered as fundamentally important to the legal system, and if the goal can be 
promoted by one rather than another interpretation of the statutory provision, 
the provision should be interpreted in line with the goal; 
 Argument from intention: if a legislative intention concerning a statutory provi-
sion can be identified, the provision should be interpreted in line with that in-
tention. 
They were then grouped into four categories: 1. linguistic arguments (argument 
from ordinary meaning; argument from technical meaning); 2. systemic arguments 
(argument from contextual-harmonization; argument from precedent; argument 
from analogy; logical-conceptual argument; argument from general principles of 
law; argument from history); 3. teleological/evaluative arguments (argument from 
purpose; argument from substantive reasons); 4. ‘transcategorical’ argument (ar-
gument from intention). 
Before them, Giovanni Tarello (1980), an Italian jurist, had proposed another 
list of interpretive arguments, which, after influencing Perelman’s work, has been 
also considered by Sartor et al. (2014): 
 Argument a contrario: if a legal statement says “If A then B,” then the interpre-
tation “If A or C then B,” where C is not entailed by A, should be excluded; 
 Analogical argument: if there are entities that are not literally included in the 
scope of a legal statement but are relevantly similar with other entities literally 
included, the legal statement should be interpreted as including the first;  
 Argument a fortiori: if a term in the statement, which apparently identifies a 
single class of subjects or acts, can be extended to other subjects or acts be-
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cause these deserve to a larger extent that normative qualification, it should be 
interpreted in the extended version; 
 Argument from completeness of the legal regulation: if an interpretation creates 
a gap, it should be excluded; 
 Argument from the coherence of the legal regulation: if interpretations of dif-
ferent legal statements make them conflict with one another, those interpreta-
tions should be neglected; 
 Psychological argument: if the actual intent of the lawmaker can be identified, 
the legal statement should be interpreted accordingly; 
 Historical argument: if the legal statement can be given a meaning already 
used in other statutes regulating the same topic, that meaning should be main-
tained; 
 Apagogical argument: if an interpretation generates an absurdity, it should be 
disregarded; 
 Teleological argument: if it is possible to identify a rational purpose from the 
goals and interests supposedly promoted by the law, the legal statement should 
be interpreted in such a way as to promote that purpose; 
 Parsimony argument: if an interpretation is redundant, this should be excluded, 
on the assumption that the lawmaker does not make useless normative state-
ments; 
 Authoritative argument: if an authoritative judicial or scholarly subject has al-
ready promoted an interpretation, this should be supported; 
 Naturalistic argument: if the legal statement can be interpreted in such a way as 
to align it with human nature, that interpretation should be supported; 
 Argument from equity: If an interpretation is unfair or unjust, it should be ex-
cluded (and vice versa); 
 Argument from general principles: if suggested interpretations are compliant 
with (incompatible with) general principles of the legal system, they should be 
supported (excluded). 
Sartor et al. (2014) note that the two categorisations complement each other: 
Tarello mainly focused on the reasoning steps constituting the interpretive argu-
ments, whereas MacCormick and Summers stressed what inputs bring about inter-
pretive arguments. In fact, the latter wished to identify where each interpretive ar-
gument draws its justificatory force from and, ultimately, what important values 
permeate our legal systems. They claimed that “values form the ultimate level of 
justification and of interpretative arguments and of other underlying directives of 
interpretation” (MacCormick and Summers 1991, p. 532): the more interpretive 
arguments are based on values of legal and constitutional order,31 the more they 
can exert justificatory force. Consider, for example, the strong “prima facie” justi-
ficatory force that linguistic arguments show in all the systems covered by the 
                                                          
31 In their study, it has been shown that a consensus across systems about general values of legal 
order can be identified (Summers and Taruffo 1991). 
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comparative study: this would be rooted in the idea that legislation comes from an 
authority that lawfully promulgates and enacts the law on behalf of the (majority 
of the) people. Applying and abiding by the literal text of legislations thus mean 
respecting democracy, separation of powers, and the rule of law. 
Additionally, they noticed that a model for arguing with interpretive arguments 
should take into account that: 
 Occasionally, just one interpretive argument is used in the interpretation: that 
single interpretive argument is capable of exerting sufficient justificatory force 
to promote the application of the rule; 
 More frequently, to achieve the goal of supporting a specific interpretation of 
the law, interpretive arguments are considered jointly (e.g., systemic arguments 
often concur to support a particular interpretation that is expression of values or 
principles); 
 When various interpretations are possible and each of them is theoretically ap-
propriate, conflicts may arise. 
The last bullet item refers to the necessity of modelling argumentation in pres-
ence of interpretive conflicts, which is a form of second-order, or meta-, argumen-
tation. Multiple argument forms are involved in arguing with such conflicts: not 
only the different interpretive canons that can all be hypothetically applied, but al-
so rules of preference, which will eventually solve the conflict, establishing priori-
ties among the various possible interpretive outcomes. A possible ordering among 
canons of interpretation looks as follows: 1) linguistic arguments, 2) systemic ar-
guments, 3) teleological arguments; each next step is reached only if there are rea-
sons to abandon the previous level (MacCormick and Summers 1991, p. 531). In-
tentions may then intervene at any level to identify those values the legislator has 
supposedly held as fundamental: the argument from intentions, ‘transcategorical’ 
for this reason, may confirm a first ordering of the involved interpretations or, 
contrarily, show reasons to leave it. 
4.1. Arguing with Interpretive Canons 
Interpretive canons are those rules that have to be applied for interpreting statutes. 
Usually, legal systems not only provide for lists, more or less complete, of such 
canons of construction,32 but also establish priorities among them.33 Besides, Su-
perior Courts are often charged with deciding on the interpretation of controversial 
                                                          
32 For instance, articles 1362–1371, Italian Civil Code list the interpretive criteria to be applied 
for interpreting contracts: such list represent a guideline not only for the parties, but also for the 
judge on the occasion of dispute resolution. 
33 As mentioned in chapter 1, in Italy, article 12 of the preliminary dispositions to the Civil Code 
establishes a hierarchy between canons of interpretation. 
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pieces of legislation, and with fostering an as uniform as possible interpretation of 
the law,34 which is one of the pillars of legal certainty. 
To appreciate how interpretive canons function, consider the argument form 
ordinary meaning, as presented by MacCormick and Summers (1991, p. 513): a 
statutory provision can be interpreted according to the meaning an ordinary speak-
er of the language would ascribe to it as its obvious meaning, unless there is ade-
quate reason for a different interpretation. Interpretive arguments seem to show 
recurring structural elements (Sartor et al. 2014): 
 There is an expression E, the meaning of which is doubtful; 
 This expression occurs in a document D (e.g., a statute, or a contract); 
 E has a setting S that is relevant for interpreting it (e.g., ordinary language, 
technical meaning, precedent); 
 E in D would fit this setting S by having interpretation I; 
 E ought to be interpreted as I if all the previous elements are satisfied. 
Sartor et al. (2014) recognise the following pattern of interpretive argument: 
If expression E occurs in document D, E has a setting of S and E would fit this setting of S 
by having interpretation I, then, E ought to be interpreted as I. 
Each interpretive argument is a pattern of reasoning in the form of ‘if-then’ 
rule, licensing a deontic interpretive claim (‘ought/ought not’). In so doing, it aims 
at supporting certain interpretations, and relates to other interpretive arguments ei-
ther supporting their interpretive conclusion (aggregation of arguments), or attack-
ing it. In an abstract argumentation framework such as ASPIC+ (Prakken 2010), 
canons of interpretation are seen as defeasible rules, so that their conclusion, i.e., 
E ought to be interpreted as I, can be abandoned in presence of better-supported 
interpretations. The AF includes both strict and defeasible rules expressed in an 
underlying logical language L, and preferences between those rules are expressed 
by formulas like r1 > r2, establishing which interpretive argument prevails in the 
attack. Attacks occur in the standard three ways: by producing a counterargument, 
i.e., rebutting it; by denying that the interpretive argument holds in the present 
case, i.e., undercutting it; by claiming that one of the antecedents of the argument 
does not hold, i.e., undermining it.  
Rotolo et al. (2015) have refined such argument-based model of legal interpre-
tation, by presenting a logical machinery, based on deontic defeasible logic, for 
modelling interpretive arguments. They build on the next basic intuitions: 
 Interpretive canons are represented as defeasible rules: their antecedent condi-
tions can be of any type (assertions, obligations, etc.), and their conclusion is an 
interpretive act that leads to interpret a provision n in a certain way as a result. 
 Interpretation is both the activity that ascribes the meaning to a provision n (A-
interpretation), and its outcome, corresponding to the meaning obtained by ap-
plying that interpretive canon (O-interpretation). 
                                                          
34 For Italy, see footnote no 7. 
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 It can be established a standard priority relation over interpretation rules, so 
that it is possible to handle and solve conflicts occurring among interpretive 
canons (e.g., Rule 1 > Rule 2); it is worth noting that a ranking between inter-
pretive rules can be useful also in absence of a proper conflict, so that the inter-
preter is aware of what canons should be preferably applied in general (for in-
stance, if both the ordinary meaning canon and the systemic canon give the 
same interpretive result, the first should be normally used to justify the inter-
pretation). 
 Both A- and O-interpretation can be admissible, if it can be proved by a defea-
sible interpretive rule, or obligatory, if it is the only admissible interpretation of 
n; note that this intuition develops the claim that an expression E in a document 
D (e.g., a statute) ought, ought not, may or may not be interpreted in a specific 
way (Sartor et al. 2014). 
 A provision n can be abstract, if its logical structure is not analysed, or struc-
tured, if it corresponds to a linguistic sentence having the structure of a rule 
a1,…, an ⇒ b; along with this distinction, the authors propose two options for 
modelling interpretive arguments. 
Following the same line of research, Walton et al. (2016) have further consid-
ered some contested cases of statutory interpretation. Not only have they proposed 
the distinction among positive and negative interpretive arguments, but have also 
identified some critical questions: 
CQ1: What alternative interpretations of E in D should be considered? 
CQ2: What reasons are there for rejecting alternative explanations? 
CQ3: What reasons are there for accepting alternative explanations as better than (or 
equally good as) the one selected? 
Arguing with different interpretations has also been viewed through the lenses 
of practical reasoning: interpretations promote certain applications of the law that 
are seen as actions with possibly good or bad consequences. Thus, a value-based 
approach (Bench-Capon 2003), already used to address the issue of interpreting 
statutes with purposes, can turn out useful (Atkinson and Bench-Capon 2007, At-
kinson et al. 2005): Dung’s abstract AF is extended by providing each argument 
with a value that it promotes and by ordering all the values. The system resolves 
the attack relation among the conflicting arguments by comparing the value pref-
erence they support. An argument scheme for practical reasoning that can reason-
ably be applied to legal interpretation is also identified: 
In the current circumstances R 
Action A should be performed 
To bring about new circumstances S 
Which will release goal G 
And promote value V 
Critical questions challenge the truth of the circumstances, explore the credibil-
ity of the imagined consequences, look for alternative ways to promote the same 
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value, investigate potential disadvantages linked to the action (e.g., demotion of 
other important values), and, finally, put to the test the legitimacy of the value. 
Also factor-based reasoning, as developed in CATO (Aleven 1997), has been 
combined with an argument-based approach (Prakken et al. 2015). The ASPIC+ 
framework is the formal setting for the comparison between two famous cases of 
US trade secret law, Mason v. Jack Daniels Distillery35 and M. Bryce & Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Gladstone.36 The comparison is accomplished through the identifica-
tion and use of factors (expressed, e.g., in the following form: F6 Security-
measure (p), where p stands for ‘pro-plaintiff factor’) drawn from the cases. Ar-
guments are then constructed with those factors, and comparisons are modelled in 
terms of similarity or distinguishing. As a result, a directed graph in Dung-style 
AF is obtained. 
5. Conclusions 
The chapter has presented the theoretical background of the thesis, and has intend-
ed to show that: 
 Legal reasoning is mainly defeasible in kind and grounded on arguments: so, 
argumentation theory methods can be suitably tested on it, in turn acquiring 
beneficial viewpoints on how arguments work in practical settings; 
 Logics, if understood broadly as the study of reasoning that is correct in that it 
is rationally justified, can also be conveniently used to study legal reasoning, 
despite the usual critiques against formal methods applied to law: argumenta-
tion logics supports such statement; 
 In particular, argumentation schemes prove useful in order to examine legal ar-
gumentation, even if from an informal perspective, for they allow to keep track 
of the reasons underlying the reached legal conclusion. 
The second section has illustrated what an argument is and what kinds of ar-
guments exist, emphasising the close connection between argumentation and de-
feasible reasoning. Besides, argumentation theory has independently and informal-
ly studied arguments and argumentation, but it has been enriched by contributions 
from philosophy, AI, and also law. Taking into account the essential theoretical 
influences exerted by the works of Toulmin, Perelman, and Alexy, the AI and Law 
community has mostly focused on formalising the many instantiations of legal de-
feasibility. It is worth recalling Dung’s abstract argumentation framework, which 
has fundamentally contributed to the study of the attack relations between argu-
ments and continues to ground several AI and Law works.  
                                                          
35 Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So. 2d 130 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). 
36 M. Bryce & Associates, Inc. v. Gladstone, 107 Wis. 2d 241 (1982). 
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After considering formal studies of legal argumentation, the attention has been 
then brought on the content of arguments, examining argumentation schemes and 
taking the argument from expert opinion as main example. Acting as missing link 
between formal methods and practical reasoning, argument schemes allow the rea-
soner to express and maintain the specific-domain reasons behind the achieved le-
gal conclusions. Such field-dependency is particularly evident in critical ques-
tions, which constitute the method for evaluating the correctness of the reasoning 
unfolded through them: depending on the scheme, critical questions indicate how 
the parties may weaken their counterparty’s reasoning. Some cross-similarities are 
identifiable in all critical questions: there are always questions that generally un-
dermine the conclusion, or the inference between premises and conclusion, or the 
starting assumptions. Clearly, they resemble the role played by counterarguments 
and attack relations also in abstract argumentation frameworks. Section 3 ends 
with two argumentation schemes that are central to the law, i.e., argument from 
precedent and argument from rule application. 
Finally, the chapter introduces the topic of legal interpretation, one of the trick-
iest research problems linked to legal reasoning as well as leitmotiv of the thesis. 
The concept of canon of interpretation is explained, and a correspondence is estab-
lished between its if-then form and the usual form of arguments and argumenta-
tion schemes. The legal theoretical works conducted by Tarello and MacCormick 
and Summers on interpretation help to situate the basic functioning of canons of 
interpretation within legal argumentation, judicial justification, and law applica-
tion. On these premises, the chapter analyses the argumentation scheme for statu-
tory interpretation and its implementation, and presents other formal approaches to 
legal interpretation. 
In closing, it should be said that the picture taken of argumentation theory, ar-
gumentation schemes, and legal interpretation has ended up showing a gap in the 
literature with reference to argument-based approaches to legal interpretation. If 
MacCormick and Summers (1991) have edited a wide-ranging comparative analy-
sis of modes of interpretation, identifying common traits among different system 
when interpreting legal rules, an area has so far remained under investigated, both 
from a merely legal theoretical and formal/informal perspective, that is, how na-
tional courts should apply foreign interpretative canons. We know from the intro-
ductory chapter that domestic courts are more and more engaged in such interpre-
tive endeavour in private international law cases, when the law to be applied may 
be a foreign rule. The present report on the state of the art has revealed that if legal 
interpretation has been quite extensively studied through the use of formal and in-
formal argumentation methods, providing tools also to address normative con-
flicts, legal interpretation of foreign law by domestic courts has been disregarded, 
remaining an unexplored field in spite of its growing practical relevance. So, ma-
jor efforts should be put not only into bridging the gap between facts and legal 
concepts in domestic legal interpretation (Prakken and Sartor 2015), in order to 
guarantee its realistic formal representation, but also into examining how different 
legal systems interact on the level of interpretation. 
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Chapter 3: Introducing Private International 
Law 
   
1. Going Back to the Law 
Legal systems may appear as isolated structures that work quite smoothly within 
their own borders, offering suitable legal solutions to problems, and avoiding dis-
harmonies as much as possible. Though, separation between normative systems is 
just a fiction: always more often, private relations are featured by transnational el-
ements and legal experts end up dealing with legislations, concepts, and principles 
extraneous to their professional education and experience.37 Coordinating legal 
systems and avoiding conflicts among them is an overriding aim for lawmakers: 
private international law (or conflict of laws) is exactly the branch of law that 
identifies the court competent to hear and rule the case, and makes it possible to 
apply, within the territory of the state, the law of a foreign state. 
However, even if jurisdiction and choice of law mechanisms avoid such first 
conflict among states in private international law contexts, foreign law application 
by domestic judges raises thorny questions, ranging from the theory to the practice 
(Basedow 2014): from to what extent national courts should import and apply for-
eign legal rules, to the status of foreign law once it accesses the domestic system, 
to the concrete possibility for national courts to be acquainted with and interpret it 
properly, up to the impact foreign law has on the recipient system. 
In particular, how domestic courts manage, firstly, to know and, then, to inter-
pret the relevant foreign law is at the core of any possible cross-border legal rea-
soning as well as the trickiest challenge such reasoning poses to domestic systems. 
Lacking awareness of, and insights into, the natural context of foreign rules, courts 
run the risk of misunderstanding their original meaning and misinterpreting them 
(Bogdan 2012): the examination of some private international law decisions has 
actually shown that foreign rules have often been applied incorrectly by national 
judges (Jänterä-Jareborg 2003). An as faithful as possible application of foreign 
law not only serves the interests of the forum country in seeing cross-border con-
tractual and family relations function smoothly (Bogdan 2012), but also those of 
the parties in obtaining certain and predictable legal outcomes (Kiestra 2014). 
                                                          
37 Even if it is not the focus of the present thesis, consider also the growing impact of interna-
tional law on domestic law (see, e.g., Björgvinsson 2015), speaking of which it has been said that 
“[…] we should no longer think of domestic law as particularly self-contained” (Bermann et al. 
2011, p. 950 – Schippele). 
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In the overall picture of the thesis, this chapter follows the introduction of ar-
gumentation theory and argument schemes as valuable tools to address the theo-
retical and practical challenges posed by legal reasoning and interpretation to any 
reasoner. Also the present chapter has an introductory character with respect to the 
legal field we are considering, i.e., private international law, mainly as experi-
enced in continental Europe. As such, it presents its main questions, features, and 
critical issues, without disregarding the many changes it has been going through 
lately. Still, no in-depth examination of EU or of any of its Member States conflict 
of laws is carried out: aim of the following analysis is rather to make the reader 
both acquainted with the fundamentals of private international law, and aware of 
its actual challenges, while offering some theoretical guidelines and perspectives. 
Thus, the chapter logically precedes the next one on the Italian reformed system of 
private international law, as outlined by law no. 218/1995, in the broader frame-
work of EU regulations and international treaties. Note that some basic concepts, 
e.g., public policy exception and overriding mandatory rules, are left to be exam-
ined in that chapter. The next pages maintain a mainly theoretical approach and 
focus on legal reasoning and interpretation, central themes of the thesis. 
Keeping in mind these reading guidelines, we explore the topic with three main 
sections. Section 2 is about the basics of private international law and introduces 
its fundamental components (i.e., conflict rules, connecting factors), central ques-
tions, and objectives. We pay special attention to the issue of ascertainment of for-
eign law, given its nature of prerequisite to any foreign law application. Section 3 
examines the present sources of conflict of laws: EU regulations and international 
treaties play by now a growing role in regulating private international law matters, 
and have been correspondingly reducing the applicative scope of inner provisions. 
Finally, section 4 reviews possible theoretical perspectives on private international 
law. Firstly, it presents the deep changes occurred both in US and in EU conflict 
of laws. Secondly, it comments upon some AI and Law approaches to the analysis 
of conflict of laws and, in general, of legal pluralism: in fact, the theoretical analy-
sis of both topics has profited from logic and argumentation. 
Before continuing, we should consider a terminological observation: the term 
‘forum’ always refers to the domestic legal system, be it its court system or its 
substantive law, which, in Latin conflict of laws terminology, is also called lex 
fori. Other terminological clarifications are in the text. 
2. The Concept of Private International Law 
Private international law, or conflict of laws, is defined as the branch of law that is 
meant to assist domestic courts in deciding cases which present one or more for-
eign elements (Rogerson 2013). It deals with private-law relations and civil pro-
ceedings that have international connotations (Bogdan 2016), and is composed of 
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the principles, customs, or agreements that regulate the juridical relations between 
individuals and companies governed by the law of different states.38 
The use of the adjective ‘international’ should not be confused with its use in 
‘public international law,’ casting doubts on the very nature of private internation-
al law. Private international law is private law for it concerns private relations 
among citizens or companies; but, those relations have an international character 
since they present some link with more than one country. Originally, each state 
equipped itself with a body of private international law and decided to what extent 
it would acknowledge the law of other states, allowing it to access the domestic 
legal system and to substantially regulate the particular case in front of the nation-
al court. Gradually, it has become terrain of international and supranational legis-
lative production; still, international is not the source of the law, rather, the nature 
of the private legal relation conflict of laws rules refer to. On the contrary, public 
international law is the law of the international “community of states” (Conforti 
2014) and consists of customary law, common to all nations around the world (jus 
gentium), peremptory norms (jus cogens), and rules included in international trea-
ties (jus inter gentes), entered into by sovereign states for regulating their conduct 
and the relations among them, or, exceptionally, with natural or juridical persons. 
In short, private and public international law are rules of different legal systems. 
Consider a request of dissolution of marriage between partners of different citi-
zenships, or the regulation of a supply contract stipulated by companies seated in 
different countries, or of a tort committed in a country other than that where the 
parties habitually reside: these are the kind of international situations private in-
ternational law rules. In fact, in each of them, more than one legal system could be 
competent to hear and decide the case and also to provide for the applicable law: 
in front of many substantive private laws, which one should indeed regulate the re-
lation and possible dispute from a substantial standpoint may thus be unclear. So, 
a system for allocating disputes in front of the proper jurisdiction, for identifying 
the relevant law, and for establishing at what conditions a foreign judgment may 
be recognised, is required. Such system, i.e., private international law and its con-
necting factors,39 is often grounded on the prominent idea that cross-border private 
cases should be governed by the legal system, with which they present major con-
nections. 
Conflict of laws is then usually composed of: 
 Rules of jurisdiction that determine the competence of the national court to 
hear and decide a case: note that, when the court decides that it is competent to 
rule the case, it usually follows the procedural rules of the forum (Bogdan 
2016); 
                                                          
38 Confront legal dictionaries: e.g., Braudo S, Droit International Privé, Dictionnaire du droit 
privé, http://www.dictionnaire-juridique.com (accessed on 19/08/2016). 
39 Connecting factors are introduced in the next subsection 2.1. 
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 Choice of law rules, or conflict rules, selecting the appropriate rules of a system 
of law, domestic or foreign, which the competent court should apply in hearing 
and deciding the case; 
 Rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign 
courts or of awards of foreign arbitrations. 
Judicial cooperation raises other procedural questions, such as the cross-border 
service of legal documents or the acquisition of evidence, which may be consid-
ered a residual part of conflict of laws, but with extreme practical importance, 
mostly within the EU (Kramer 2014). 
 2.1. Conflict Rules and Connecting Factors 
Conflict rules are those rules of private international law that identify the legal 
system the substantive law of which governs the case in front of the national court: 
they can ultimately allow courts to apply foreign law in the national proceedings. 
Also called choice of law rules, they are often considered procedural rules, or 
formal rules, for they do not directly establish the substantive result of the dispute; 
but, they simply refer to other substantive rules, which, in turn, will determine that 
result. Note that the identified substantive law can be inner or foreign, depending 
on what facts feature the case and on how the court categorises them. 
An example of conflict rule is article 20 of the Italian law no. 218/1995, on the 
legal capacity of physical persons: “The legal capacity of physical persons is gov-
erned by their own national law.”40 This is a typical case of bilateral conflict rule: 
von Savigny’s legacy,41 bilateral conflict rules treat the law of the forum and the 
foreign law equally, at least in principle. Conflict rules may also be unilateral, just 
defining the applicative scope of the national law: lawmakers normally introduce 
both bilateral and unilateral rules. But, noticeably, the savignian approach contin-
ues to prevail in codifications of private international law, e.g., within the frame of 
EU integration (Bogdan 2012).  
Starting from the conflict rule, the identification of the applicable law is an in-
terpretative act performed by domestic courts. It consists of two successive steps, 
through which judges identify where the particular case has its “centre of gravity:” 
 Qualification; 
 Identification of the connecting factor. 
The qualification step aims to include the facts of the case under a precise, ab-
stract legal category. The court usually qualifies the legal categories through the 
                                                          
40 Our translation. 
41 Chapter 4 illustrates that the Italian legislator was influenced by both von Savigny and the ju-
rist Pasquale Stanislao Mancini to mainly opt for bilateral conflict rules. 
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lenses of the law of the forum. Other theories require that qualification occurs ac-
cording to the lex causae, i.e., the law of the foreign legal system, or to some form 
of comparative analysis (Bogdan 2012). Still, the fact that conflict rules are, first-
ly, inner law makes legal experts prefer to interpret them according to national in-
terpretive criteria. However, also classifying a cross-border legal case according to 
purely national categories is troublesome: apparently similar categories can prove 
distinct from one another in meaning and application, depending on the legal order 
of reference; then, qualification could result even impossible in case of unknown 
legal institutions. Consider for example the problem of qualifying a same-sex civil 
partnership in a state that neither admits civil marriages of same-sex couples nor 
provides for a regulation of civil partnerships broadly understood. 
Rogerson (2013) lists two other possible situations: 
 the national law and the foreign law stress the relevance of different connecting 
factors with reference to the same particular case: such problem is better known 
as renvoi, in French language, and refers to the question whether the law of the 
foreign legal system, which the domestic private international law identifies, is 
to be understood as the substantive law or the choice of law rule of the foreign 
country; renvoi is preferably excluded nowadays, for example in the EU regu-
lations, as it is explained in the next chapter; 
 the legal issues at stake may contextually belong to different categories, regu-
lated by different conflict rules: for instance, this frequently occurs in succes-
sions, where, besides the issue of transmission of property of real estate (the 
connecting factor is usually the place of seat of the real estate), there may be 
the need to verify the degree of kinship of the supposed heir. 
For better qualifying facts and categories in light of the inner law, some correc-
tives have been proposed: firstly, the identified legal category should not resemble 
the corresponding category of national law, but should refer to larger categories 
that are common to all legal systems; secondly, after identifying the legal category 
and, thus, the relevant foreign law, the applicable provisions should be specifically 
drawn from it (double qualification): accordingly, conflict rules recall the foreign 
law as a legal order. It is worth mentioning that national judges perform qualifica-
tion also when the relevant rules of private international law are included in EU 
regulations or international treaties: in such cases, the legal categories will refer to 
those different levels of law. 
Conflict rules, besides abstractly describing the facts included in their applica-
tive scope, stress which element of the case, extraneous to the national system, is 
relevant to identify the foreign legal system: that element connects the events not 
only with the national legal system, but also with one or more other systems. For 
instance, according to the UK conflict of laws, one example of choice of law rule 
and related connecting factor is the following: “the formal validity of a marriage is 
governed by the law of the place of celebration” (Rogerson 2013, p. 265). Once 
the concrete legal relation has been qualified as ‘marriage,’ the court should inves-
tigate where the marriage was celebrated for finally identifying the applicable law. 
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Another example is given by the regulation of filiation by Italian law no. 218/95 
(article 33): the connecting factor is the citizenship of the supposed son or daugh-
ter. 
Main connecting factors thus refer to the citizenship, domicile, or nationality of 
the parties, to the place where the obligation was stipulated or the event took place 
(as in case of marriage), to the place of the damage (as in tort law, e.g., where the 
car accident happened), to the place where the real estate is located, to the will of 
the parties. The last factor, expressing the freedom of choice of the parties as for 
the law to be applied to them, is generally favoured in commercial relations and 
contractual obligations not only by national but also EU conflict rules, as article 3 
Regulation no. 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) 
shows. 
So, conflict rules allocate the particular case to a specific legal system on the 
basis of the spatial location of some element held decisive by the lawmaker of pri-
vate international law.  
2.2. Ascertaining the Content of the Foreign Law 
By coordinating legal systems that are involved in a cross-border relation or trans-
action, private international law is primarily meant to avoid conflicts among their 
courts and laws, all supposedly competent to decide the case: the identification of 
the applicable law should dissolve further problems. Though, after legally qualify-
ing the dispute, choosing the most suitable connecting factor, and localising the 
relevant foreign law, domestic courts face the need to ascertain the content of that 
foreign law, and to understand and correctly apply it. A sufficient ascertainment of 
its content is actually an undisputed requisite for the application of the foreign law 
in cross-border cases (Esplugues et al. 2011) as well as the ultimate test bed for 
the very existence of private international law (Lalani 2016, Verhellen 2016). 
So, the task of ascertaining the content of the relevant foreign law continues to 
strongly challenge national courts. In every jurisdiction, the system of justice has 
an integrated, complex structure, consisting of procedural and substantive laws, 
legal methodology, a court system, a specific organization of legal professions, a 
legal education system, and a linguistic community of reference (Basedow 2014). 
Faced by the necessity to apply and interpret foreign law, domestic courts are un-
likely to have adequate information, language skills, and time, for conceiving of a 
comprehensive outlook on the foreign legal system and safely ascertaining its con-
tent on their own. Also, indirectly acquiring such knowledge is expensive, both in 
terms of time and cognitive resources deployed by the courts, and does not guar-
antee reliable and up-to-date information on the “living” foreign law. Private in-
ternational law, thus, risks to be frustrated in its implementation and raison d’être 
and the inability to access the foreign law opens the door to escape mechanisms to 
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resort to the law of the forum (Verhellen 2016), for example through as an unjusti-
fied use of the public policy clause. 
Effective and efficient systems of private international law should ideally guar-
antee the least burden for domestic courts in accomplishing this heavy task. In this 
respect, legal systems put at the courts’ disposal different mechanisms for ascer-
taining the content of the foreign law and provide alternatives in case of unascer-
tainable foreign law, depending on whether they apply conflict rules and, as a con-
sequence, the relevant foreign law ex officio, or only if the parties require it. Such 
central distinction between ex officio application and application in consequence 
of the parties’ pleading resembles civil law and common law diverse approach to 
private international law. The former, like Italy after the promulgation of law no. 
218/1995, normally opt for the ex officio application. Foreign law is seen as law 
and is governed by the principle iura novit curia: courts are obliged to know its 
content and need to take it into account without express request from the parties. 
In order to fill the knowledge gap and increase the possibilities to access the con-
tent of the foreign law, they can resort to any source, even informal ones, foreign 
law experts included, even if this is a typical tool to ascertain facts in trials, as it is 
better clarified in chapter 4 with reference to the Italian legal system. Additionally, 
the decision on questions of law taken by the lower court may be overruled on ap-
peal (Hausmann 2008). 
Differently, in common law countries, like the UK (Crawford and Carruthers 
2011) or Australia (McComish 2007), courts apply the foreign law only if the par-
ties plead and prove it. As any other question of fact, failure to prove its content 
results in dismissal of the claim based on it (Rotem 2014). Besides, statements of 
fact made by lower courts are usually binding on the court of appeal: potential er-
rors in its application or interpretation are errors of facts. Referring to the Austral-
ian conflict of laws, McComish (2007, p. 401) notes that conflict rules are no 
doubt justified by international comity and the need to avoid extreme forum shop-
ping practices; still, they do not allow an automatic application of the foreign law, 
which remains a choice of the parties in their particular case. 
 Beyond the classic dichotomy between foreign law as a question of fact or as a 
question of law, many states in practice swing between the two, e.g., Scandinavian 
countries, considering foreign law a sort of tertium genus. Such different attitudes 
have emerged also in the comparative work supervised by Esplugues et al. (2011), 
whose study has not failed to reveal that courts often merge the three approaches 
in the legal practice. So, the application of the foreign law in private international 
law cases often proves inconsistent with the underlying theoretical approach. Con-
sider, for instance, the situation in the USA. Even if in 1966 the Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 44.1 established that “the court's determination must be treated as 
a ruling on a question of law,” in practice foreign law has been treated as a hybrid 
ever since, not only at the federal level (Cheng 2010): the parties are usually re-
quired to prove its content and if no sufficient evidence is provided, this may be a 
cause for dismissal; also, foreign law is commonly proved thanks to the interven-
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tion of experts in trials (Wilson 2011). Proposing to treat scientific facts as foreign 
law in US trials, Cheng succinctly compares them as follows: 
Approaching them as factual questions neglects their status as generalized inquiries 
subject to external verification. Approaching them as legal questions ignores judges’ 
profound lack of expertise and experience in the substantive areas (2010, p. 110). 
Still, it is worth mentioning that US judges are sometimes not keen on appoint-
ing foreign law experts, instead favouring a personal but disputable ascertainment 
of the relevant foreign law. Paradigmatic in this sense is the Bodum case (2010):42 
on that occasion, two out of three judges opted not to resort to the expert testimo-
ny to acquire knowledge of the applicable French law and preferred to base their 
decision on documents concerning the relevant foreign law, available in English in 
the USA. Note that the French law had been chosen by the parties: when the par-
ties choose the law governing their cross-border relation, they supposedly expect 
that the law is applied and interpreted as it is in its country of origin (Basedow 
2014). By sharply criticising such judicial refusal and the consequent misapplica-
tion of French law, Legrand (2013) maintains that, even if national courts are 
doomed not to bridge the distance between them and their foreign colleagues 
when applying foreign provisions, their cognitive deficit can no doubt profit from 
the experts’ job.43 Foreign law should be interpreted as it is lived and experienced 
in the foreign country, not as it is understood in the domestic country,44 often rely-
ing on accessible, but dubious translations of legislative documents, not officially 
validated by the competent foreign authorities and filtered through naïve national 
perspectives. According to Legrand, reading the foreign law through domestic pa-
rameters (e.g., terms, categories, or concepts) does not account for the inescapable 
relation between the law and the place where it was promulgate and, in so doing, it 
also deceives into thinking that the local law is equal to the foreign law in so many 
respects, that the expert opinion is not necessary. 
Yet, also taking advantage of experts in trial is not so neutral a play. First, ex-
perts are not immune to mistakes and misunderstandings. Besides, they are often 
selected among comparatists. Still, comparative law and private international law 
have distinct perspectives: the former draws comparisons between legal systems, 
by highlighting similarities and differences, and studies possible mutual influences 
from a mainly theoretical standpoint; the latter concretely requires judges to apply 
foreign law instead of inner law to decide the case and, in so doing, to use foreign 
rules of interpretation and application. If anything, comparison is a by-product of 
                                                          
42 Bodum USA Inc. v La Cafetière Inc., 621 F 3d 624 (2010). 
43 Referring to the Bodum case and paraphrasing Samuel Beckett, Legrand states: “[…]while the 
judges were destined to fail to bridge the epistemological gap between Chicago and Paris, they 
had at their disposal intellectual resources allowing them to ‘[f]ail better’.” (2013, p. 350) 
44 In this respect, the author talks about “French-law-as-it-is-lived-in-France,” that is, the law the 
parties were presumably expecting to be applied to their relation, opposed to “French-law-as-it-
is-apprehended-in-the-United-States,” i.e., a misrepresentation of that law through local criteria 
(2013, p. 349). 
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foreign law application. However, comparative law, by proposing distinct scholar-
ly approaches to the possibility of knowing and understanding foreign law, con-
tributes to stress what main pitfalls judges may incur when applying foreign law. 
Firstly, even if knowledge of the relevant foreign law is a prerequisite for any 
comparison between legal systems as well as for foreign law application, it is un-
certain if the comparatist can effectively acquire such knowledge. In this respect, 
Legrand (2012) talks more comfortably about shaping one’s own belief on the for-
eign law: indeed, comparatists operate a selection of foreign legal materials, arbi-
trarily considered relevant and authoritative, and construct their opinion (“narra-
tion,” “imagination”) on what they believe foreign law is, instead of a faithful 
replication of what foreign law actually is. 
Secondly, provided that foreign law is adequately accessed and identified, it is 
unsure if comparatists can understand it and, if so, what guarantees such under-
standing. According to functionalism (Michaels 2008a), all societies would basi-
cally face equivalent problems, so that laws would functionally aim to react to and 
solve those problems. In such a view, understanding foreign law is possible: dif-
ferences in solutions between laws and legal systems are seen in the (functionalist) 
perspective of identical (or similar) goals to reach. It is easy to see that any idea of 
legal transplants (Watson 1974), of borrowings between systems, up to that of uni-
form law(s) are grounded in the functionalist method.  
Contrarily, Legrand (2006) maintains that attention should be paid to the singu-
larity of law. If every law is situated in place and time and has a specific historical 
and socio-political context, manifest in real world circumstances, disregarding 
such contextual factors implies an “erasure of significance” (p. 524) of the legal 
text itself in the name of functional commonalities. Accordingly, foreign law 
could not be understood in universal term. Besides, legal systems do not speak a 
common language, so that a proper dialogue between them is not conceivable ei-
ther (Legrand 2012). Rather, their interrelations resemble a negotiation. Not by 
chance, Legrand defines the comparatist’s tasks in terms of temporary achieve-
ments, reached by changeable mappings built over the systems of reference, trying 
to account for both commonalities and singularity, within a “third space,” as the 
ensuing citation makes it clear. 
In the third space, there takes place an articulation projecting meaning beyond any 
signification obtaining in the situated laws themselves. The third space can properly be 
regarded as effectuating an othering of those laws beyond any simple logic of exclusion or 
inclusion of them. In effect, the third space introduces another other to the comparison-at-
law (when it comes to comparison, one plus one makes three). (2012, p. 39) 
As a result, foreign law knowledge would indeed imply production of meaning, 
in the “trialectical dialectic” starting from the laws and their comparison, and ar-
riving to a third (both conceptual and epistemic) space.45 
                                                          
45 It is worth noting that Legrand’s opinion resembles Troper’s idea on meta-concepts (2012) as 
the only way to compare constitutional systems. 
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From whatever angle we look at its ascertainment, foreign law seems to build 
walls around courts. Also, whether we consider foreign law proper law or fact, it 
is a peculiar specimen of its kind: as law, it cannot be known by judges, it needs to 
be ascertained resorting to typical fact finding tools, and it leaves room for disre-
garding it in favour of the law of the forum; as fact, once proved by the interested 
party, it is used by the court to decide the case. Additionally, it is doubtful whether 
foreign law, once acquired by the court, becomes integral part of the domestic le-
gal system, or, rather, it remains foreign law within the recipient system, a sort of 
detachment of the foreign normative system. The answer differently impacts on 
the way how national courts interpret it, i.e., according to national or foreign in-
terpretive canons, provided that the latter can be likewise acquired. The first solu-
tion presumes a substantial identity between national and foreign law: in compli-
ance with this presumption, in common law systems, when the foreign law cannot 
be proved, the local law replaces it without particular concerns about their differ-
ences. The second solution is more typical of question-of-law models. For exam-
ple, Italian private international law no. 218/1995 expressly provides for the inter-
pretation of the relevant foreign law using foreign interpretive canons. 
2.2.1. Tools to Access the Foreign Law 
Concretely accessing the content of foreign law is a tangible barrier for the full 
operation of private international law. When searching for the foreign law, nation-
al courts end up confronting the structural and substantial distance between sys-
tems of justice and laws. Despite the growing number of cases requiring the appli-
cation of foreign law, uncertainty about it, also due to limited resources, continues 
to afflict domestic judges, as also revealed by Verhellen (2016) in a recent survey 
conducted among Belgian courts in cross-border parentage cases, and it some-
times actualises in “reason based on foreign law inadequately proved” (Lalani 
2016). It is worth mentioning that, in the face of any contrary expectation, judges 
often assess on a case-by-case basis whether they have satisfactory knowledge of 
both foreign law’s content and its interpretation in the country of origin: if they 
find this is not the case, courts usually resort to national law. 
Acknowledging the difficulties parties and courts encounter in cross-border lit-
igation also within the borders of the European Community, in 2001, the Council 
established the European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters (EJN-
civil),46 in operation since 1
st
 December 2002, to “improve, simplify and expedite 
effective judicial cooperation between the Member States” (with the exception of 
Denmark, not adopting the Decision). The EJN-civil mainly functions through 
                                                          
46 Council of the European Union Council Decision of 28 May 2001, establishing a European 
Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters. OJ L 174, 27/06/2001, pp 25–31. 
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Contact Points, one for each Member State,47 and an information system accessi-
ble to the public.48 At present, it is possible to contact EJN-civil Contact Points by 
filling a form that is available from the EJN-civil portal.49  
Establishing the EJN-civil, the Council intended to meet scholarly expectations  
of adequate communication between Member States: Remien (2001, p. 79) had for 
example proposed to install a “preliminary reference procedure,” through which 
domestic courts, facing cases involving the application of another Member State’s 
law, could consult an equivalent court from that state for ascertaining the foreign 
law’s content; such opinion would have not been legally binding, but could have 
exercised a persuasive authority on the deciding court. However, Bogdan (2016) 
notes that the EJN-civil has simplified the exchange of information among courts 
and the access to the foreign law and its ascertainment, whereas Verhellen (2016) 
shows concerns regarding the ability to keep the ambitious promise of guarantee-
ing update and reliable legal information to its users at any moment in time. 
Over the years, also the international community has looked for viable solu-
tions to this thorny problem. In 1968, the European Convention on Information on 
Foreign Law (so called London Convention) was signed within the scope of the 
Council of Europe.50 Its contracting parties specifically undertook “to supply one 
another with information on their law and procedure in civil and commercial fields 
as well as on their judicial organization” (art. 1). The Convention has tried to regu-
late many aspects of the judicial inter-state communication: from the role of re-
ceiving and transmitting agencies, which are the state bodies respectively appoint-
ed to receive and act on questions from abroad on the forum law, and to accept 
and transmit requests of information on foreign law (often, the two agencies coin-
cide), up to the content of such requests and replies, and the management of costs. 
Despite its potentially global coverage, the London Convention has remained lim-
ited in its resources (Jänterä-Jareborg 2003) and mostly unknown by judges (Ver-
hellen 2016). 
Not surprisingly, the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), 
the world organization for cross-border cooperation in civil and commercial mat-
ters, has promoted the international cooperation in finding a global answer to this 
common problem, organising studies and experts’ meetings on the topic, in strict 
collaboration with the European Commission.51 In March 2009, its Permanent Bu-
                                                          
47 Art. 2, par. 2, provides for the possibility to designate more contact points in special cases of, 
e.g., existence of separate legal systems, or peculiar distribution of jurisdiction. 
48 The EJN-civil portal (http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/index_en.htm) will converge into the EU 
e-Justice portal (https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_ejn_in_civil_and_commercial_matters-21-
en.do) (both website last accessed on 24/11/2016). 
49 https://e-justice.europa.eu/contactPoint.do (last accessed on 11/11/2016). 
50 Council of Europe, ETS no.062, London, 07/06/1968. 
51 See the Joint Conference of the European Commission and Hague Conference on Private In-
ternational Law, held in Brussels, from 15 to 17 February 2012 (https://www.hcch.net/en/news-
archive/details/?varevent=248, last accessed on 24/11/2016). 
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reau released a series of preliminary documents52 addressing the issue. By recog-
nising that the procedures of the London Convention were time-consuming, that 
online sources were more and more preferred by legal operators when acquiring 
the foreign law and that, in general, legal information was increasingly digitised, 
cross-border administrative and legal cooperation was considered an essential step 
towards a facilitated access to foreign law content. Ultimately, such strengthened 
cooperation should even prevail over the laborious and complex attempts to har-
monise the different existing systems of private international law. 
Predictably, the computerisation of legal information has indeed greatly ad-
vanced, so that legal materials are by now more easily available to the public, 
mainly free of charge, through a simple Internet access. It can be expected that, in 
a near future, most legal information will be accessible online in digital format. In 
a scenario as such, the Hague Conference could be the ideal candidate both for 
coordinating all the governments and legal information institutes’ efforts towards 
the digitalisation of laws and for providing for standards and guiding principles to 
develop a common instrument to collect and share information. In this line, in 
February 2012, the HCCH meeting53 concluded that: 
 Globalisation, migration, and cross-border trade were consistently intensifying 
the need to access foreign law; 
 An effortless access to foreign law was an element of access to justice in gen-
eral as well as a pillar of the rule of law, both fundamental components of the 
EU system of justice; 
 Only global cooperative mechanisms could offer adequate common solutions; 
 Information and Communication Technology (ICT) proposed powerful tools to 
make foreign law available in private international law disputes and relations.  
In 2014, the HCCH issued another preliminary document54 and provided a 
summary of EU legal information solutions, i.e., ELI55 and ECLI,56 on the devel-
opment of which the EU hoped for greater collaboration with the HCCH itself. 
                                                          
52 Prel. Doc. no. 11A, “Accessing the content of foreign law and the need for the development of 
a global instrument in this area – A possible way ahead”; Prel. Doc. no. 11B, “Report of the 
meeting of experts on global co-operation on the provision of online legal information on nation-
al laws (The Hague, 19-21 October 2008)”; Prel. Doc. no. 11C, “Compilation of responses to the 
questionnaire of October 2008 for the meeting of experts on global co-operation on the provision 
of online legal information on national laws (The Hague, 19-21 October 2008).” 
53 See footnote no. 51. 
54 Prel. Doc. no. 14 (April 2014). 
55 ELI stands for European Legislation Identifier and is a “semantic web solution enabling direct 
access to specific national legislation through a structured, flexible identifier” (Prel. Doc. no. 14, 
3). More at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Ajl0068 (last ac-
cessed on 25/11/16). 
56 ECLI stands for European Case Law Identifier and is a “system for improving case law acces-
sibility on the internet” (Prel. Doc. no. 14, 13). Its website (accessed on 25/11/16) is https://e-
justice.europa.eu/content_european_case_law_identifier_ecli-175-en.do. 
73 
Yet, contrarily to its own past trend and to an unchanged need for tighter coopera-
tion on the topic (Verhellen 2016), in 2015, the HCCH decided to remove from its 
agenda “the topic of accessing the content of foreign law, with the understanding 
that this issue may be revisited at a later stage.”57 
Counterintuitive move, it even contrasts ongoing advancements in digitisation 
of legislations and case law, fostered by the Semantic Web revolution. In fact, law 
is currently seen as a promising field for applying Natural Language Processing 
techniques, modelling ontologies, and formalising rules and special reasoning pat-
terns. Taking into account Semantic Web standards,58 such methods exactly aim to 
automate the access to legal content. Conceivably, thus, artificial systems in future 
could assist legal professionals also with the retrieval of relevant foreign legal ma-
terials, referring to the metadata featuring that content. 
2.3. Objectives 
It is a fact that movements of people have increased, and so has the degree of eco-
nomic integration among different countries. Thus, if foreign elements in legal re-
lations were once exceptional occurrences, today lawyers and judges face them on 
a daily basis. Along with such reality-driven necessity, other complementary rea-
sons force states to adopt rules of private international law (Kiestra 2014). 
Firstly, private international law rules guarantee legal certainty in cross-border 
legal relations. Legal certainty is one of the fundamental components of the na-
tional rule of law, in that it protects the individuals from discretionary decisions of 
judicial or administrative authorities. In the context of private international law 
cases, legal certainty takes on the form of meeting as much as possible the reason-
able expectations of the parties as regards the law that will regulate their relation. 
In other words, when engaging in a legal relationship however featured by a for-
eign connection, the parties should know in advance the court of which state will 
decide any eventual dispute arising between them, and which substantive law will 
apply to their case. Neglecting such reasonable expectations would bring about in-
justice as well as a distrust of states. 
Secondly, private international law should assure the international harmony of 
decisions: its fundamental objective, in von Savigny’s view. Accordingly, given a 
private law case, presenting links with two or more states, it should be decided in 
the same way in all the different states (Mayer 2013). 
Thirdly, the openness towards the law and the decisions of other states favours 
the interests of the domestic legal system: international legal cooperation and legal 
                                                          
57 Proc. Doc. no. 1 (Dec. 2015), Conclusions and recommendations of the Council on General 
Affairs and Policy of the conference (24-26 March 2015), 11. 
58 See for example the OASIS Legal Rule ML project (website last accessed on 25/11/16): 
https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/legalruleml/charter.php. 
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stability increase the chances that international commercial contracts are conclud-
ed, with advantageous economic repercussions for the state that accepts to apply 
foreign laws, or to recognise foreign decisions within its territory. Bogdan (2016) 
observes that this is mostly evident within the European Union: the principle of 
mutual recognition pursues the objective of legally and economically integrating 
its Member States, preventing that the two freedoms of establishment and of 
movements of people, goods, services, and capitals are pre-empted.  
3. Legal Sources: a Changing Scenario 
Originated as far back as in the Ancient Rome, private international law tradition-
ally forms part of national law, authorising and regulating the (possible) use of the 
foreign law by and within domestic legal systems in private law cases with a for-
eign or cross-border element. 
Yet, in a more and more globalised legal world, states haves soon perceived as 
impelling the need for harmoniously handling the same relationship in all the dif-
ferent legal systems involved, for recognising judgments of other states on the ba-
sis of precise standards, and for guaranteeing beneficial legal conditions to com-
panies engaged in transnational transactions. A tight international cooperation in 
conflict of laws matters could also avoid the practice of forum shopping, occurring 
when the parties present their cross-border case in front of the court that will most 
likely provide for a positive judgment (Mosconi and Campiglio 2015). Thus, in 
the last years, conflict of laws has been the result not only of the usual domestic 
law-making process, but also of international and European law-making proce-
dures: many bilateral and multilateral agreements have been concluded, and now 
international treaties represent a distinct and pervasive legal source of private in-
ternational law.59 
In particular, EU Member States and citizens have been witnessing the gradual, 
but persistent Europeanisation of private international law. The EU legislative ac-
tion in the field is contributing to the legal integration among Member States with-
in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) of the EU, provided for by 
article 67 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
Therefore, a complete framework of the sources of private international law for 
EU Member States includes: 
 Domestic sources of law: e.g., law no. 218/1995 in Italy; 
 International sources, even if the expanded EU competence in negotiating trea-
ties with third countries for and on behalf of its Member States is correspond-
ingly reducing their relative power (Mosconi and Campiglio 2015); 
                                                          
59 From a constitutional law perspective, international law and EU law rules access the Italian le-
gal system, either by virtue of constitutional reference (art. 10, par. 1; art. 11; art. 117, par.1), or 
of ratification orders, which usually attribute the status of laws to treaties. 
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 EU sources.60  
External sources have not failed to impact on the provisions of private interna-
tional law promulgated by national lawmakers: inner laws have been not only in-
fluenced in their content, but have also seen their role reduced in scope and mar-
ginalised in relevance. Although growingly compressed, national legislations have 
survived: international and EU private international law provisions are still mainly 
sectorial and leave normative gaps that are often filled by domestic provisions. 
3.1. International Treaties and EU Private International Law  
Over time, states have signed many international treaties concerning private inter-
national law, realising that an as much uniform as possible legal treatment of 
cross-border disputes is necessary for promoting legal certainty, predictability of 
judicial decisions, as well as national economic interests. Some international or-
ganisations support the states in preparing, negotiating, and drafting such treaties 
(Mosconi and Campiglio 2015), such as the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law (HCCH), the International Commission on Civil Status (ICCS), and the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law was established as the first 
world organization for cross-border cooperation in civil and commercial matters in 
1893. Today, 80 states plus the EU (defined as “Regional Economic Integration 
Organisation”) are part of the Hague Conference61 and several conventions have 
been developed, covering many areas of law: from international family law and 
children rights,62 to international commercial law,63 up to general legal cooperation 
and litigation (Kiestra 2014). Besides, it is worth reminding that the HCCH is also 
playing a precious role in improving the access to the content of foreign law,64 one 
of the trickiest aspects for properly implementing private international law, along 
with the domestic interpretation of the applicable foreign provisions. 
However, international treaties have an important limit: whenever a new Party 
accesses the agreement, the other Contracting Parties have to sign it again, further 
                                                          
60 Consider that EU law takes various forms (directives, regulations, recommendations and opin-
ions, as provided for by article 288 TFEU) and engages with national laws in different ways: for 
a thorough analysis of the issue, see for example Craig and de Búrca (2015). 
61 More at: https://www.hcch.net/. 
62 For example, the Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction; or the Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, 
Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Pro-
tection of Children. 
63 See the Convention of 22 December 1986 on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods. 
64 See sect. 2.2.1. in this chapter. 
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slowing down an already compound procedure. Such limits have been faced also 
when the European Community (after the Lisbon Treaty, European Union) took its 
first steps towards a common regulation of private international law. After the ne-
gotiation and signature of international tools (as the 1968 Brussels convention, on 
the judicial competence and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial 
matters, and the 1980 Rome convention, on the applicable law in contractual obli-
gations), which officially inaugurated the judicial cooperation in civil matters 
within the Community, it was only with the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, on 1 May 1999, that the Communitarian lawmaker acquired competence in 
private international law, and, with supranational actions, began to overcome the 
international law mechanisms. 
Since then, and especially after the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU legislative 
competence has been supported by many policy and legislative actions, and EU 
private international law has widely developed. The TFEU includes Article 81 
(former Article 65, Treaty establishing the European Community–TEC): at the 
first paragraph, it states that EU judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-
border implications should conform to the principle of mutual recognition of 
judgments and may entail the adoption of measures for the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States. 
Even if this is not the place to list all the EU regulations65 in force, let us recall 
at least four of them, given their importance: 
 Regulation (EC) no. 44/2001, the Brussels I Regulation:66 it replaced the 1968 
Brussels Convention, concerning jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters. It establishes the so called Brussels 
Regime, according to which the domicile of the defendant generally determines 
which court has jurisdiction in a given case (article 2, par. 1, Brussels I, and ar-
ticle 4, par. 1, Regulation no. 1215/2012, the Brussels I bis, a recast adopted in 
2012). 
 Regulation (EC) no. 2201/2003, the Brussels II Regulation,67 regarding matri-
monial and parental responsibility matters. 
 Regulation (EC) no. 864/2007, the Rome II Regulation:68 it regulates choice of 
law in non-contractual obligations, and includes special rules for product liabil-
                                                          
65  Regulations have general application, are binding in their entirety, and directly applicable in 
all Member States (article 288 TFEU). 
66 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. OJ L 12, 16/1/2001, pp 1-
23. 
67 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental re-
sponsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000. OJ  L 338, 23/12/2003, pp 1-29. 
68 EC Regulation No. 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II). OJ L 199, 31/07/2007, pp 40-49. 
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ity, damage caused by unfair competition, environmental damage, infringement 
of intellectual property rights, and damage caused by industrial action. 
 Regulation (EC) no. 593/2008, the Rome I Regulation:69 it absorbs the above-
mentioned 1980 Rome convention, and deals with choice of law in contracts. It 
also presents special rules for choice of law in consumer contracts, employment 
contracts, and insurance contracts. 
Both Rome I and Rome II consider the habitual residence as the main connect-
ing factor for identifying the applicable law, even if Rome II uses also many fac-
tors of objective nature depending on the type of obligation concerned (e.g., the 
law of the place where the damage has occurred, ex article 4, par. 1). Besides, they 
both provide for some flexibility, whenever the case presents stricter connections 
with another state. This element of flexibility has been object of interpretive dis-
cussions, as it will be clarified under section 4.2.2. of this chapter. 
Notably, the EU legal experience is unique in the world. In fact, the progressive 
Europeanisation of the law (among which, private international law) is not simply 
meant to reach the aforementioned general objective of international legal cooper-
ation, but is part of a wider political project: the full European integration. Legal 
harmonisation and uniformity thus show not just a mere quantitative dimension, 
expanding on many levels and areas of the law, but also a dominant qualitative as-
pect (Franzina 2010): European legal pluralism, embodied in the legal traditions of 
each Member State, is being ordered while protecting a common heritage of val-
ues and pursuing precise larger goals. 
4. Outlining Theoretical Perspectives 
Fundamental area of the law for states, international and supranational organisa-
tions, individuals, and companies moving and acting in the global arena, private 
international law raises important theoretical questions. 
At first sight, it is arguable that the very idea underpinning conflict of laws is 
counterintuitive. In fact, given that no moral or international obligation exists that 
forces domestic legal systems to apply foreign law, and considering that each legal 
order is a complete legal universe in itself, the basic question is whether national 
courts actually need private international law at all (Bogdan 2012): would it not be 
easier for judges to apply their own law in every case? In this respect, McComish 
claims as follows: 
When foreign law is applicable, one must always bear in mind that it is applicable only 
because, and only to the extent that, the law of the forum permits it to be so. (2007, p. 
401)  
                                                          
69 EC Regulation No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I). OJ L 177, 4/07/2008, pp 6-16. 
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Any theoretical approach to conflict of laws starts from here, and tries to untie 
the knot of sub-questions such first remark inevitably brings about: 
 What is the identity of private international law, its raison d’être (Mills 2013)?  
 To what extent domestic courts should acknowledge and apply the foreign law? 
It is worth noting that the receptive attitude of the domestic legal system is not 
really towards the other state, the law of which has to be applied, rather to-
wards the parties, who have precise expectations as for the law applicable to 
their relation (Basedow 2014). 
 How should alternative interpretations of private international law rules (Dung 
and Sartor 2011) and of foreign law be considered? 
The section is divided into two parts: the first presents some major theories that 
have developed in this field over the years and how legal theorists have been ac-
knowledging the deep changes in private international law; the second accounts 
for how logics and argumentation have so far helped to investigate legal pluralism 
and conflict of laws. 
4.1. Theories, Revolutions, and Prospective Developments 
Theories of private international law have differently explained why legal systems 
should acknowledge, and then apply, laws of other legal systems, and to what ex-
tent they should do so. 
European private international law owes to the thinking of Friederich Carl von 
Savigny (1869), who intended it mainly as a way to order the international power 
of states, variously allocating their regulatory authority in case of private-law rela-
tions involving more legal systems. In his opinion, since any legal system is equal-
ly entitled to be applied, domestic courts should indifferently apply foreign law or 
national law, just depending on where the particular case has its centre of gravity. 
This open attitude will eventually promote not only legitimate international rela-
tions between states, but also harmonious judicial decisions. 
Historically, such understanding of conflict of laws has contrasted with the the-
ory of vested rights, according to which domestic courts would not apply the for-
eign law, but simply recognise the consequences of foreign provisions within the 
domestic system (Mills 2013). Basically, this theory accepts that each state has the 
power to impose its rules of conduct, whenever transactions or other events occur 
in its own territory: once the last event of the occurrence takes place on the territo-
ry of that state, its parties acquire vested right under the law of that jurisdiction 
(Wasserstein Fassberg 2015). Main purpose of the theory is reconciling the princi-
ple of territoriality of law with the need for private international law. 
The vested rights approach has long characterised the US conflict of laws. In 
particular, the 1934 First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, influenced by the work 
of Joseph Beale (1935), codified that approach into the classical scheme of choice 
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of law rule, composed by the abstract identification of the legal category and the 
connecting factor, as presented in previous section 2.1. 
American legal realists, with their anti-formalist attitude and attention to judi-
cial practices, sharply criticised the First Restatement, ending up substantially de-
stroying it and favouring the so called American conflicts revolution. Legal real-
ism reacted against any formalistic approach to the law, believing that applying 
the law is an indeterminate activity, that the law is an empirical phenomenon that 
cannot be completely studied with logical tools, that judicial practice involves bal-
ancing policies and facts, and, finally, that the law is essentially a prediction start-
ing from judicial cases (Holmes 1897). Choice of law rules exerted a formidable 
attraction on this school of thought and vested rights theory soon became the pre-
ferred object of its critiques: rights in cross-border relationships are relative, and 
so the applicable rules, despite the abstractedness of conflict rules. Besides, judges 
in private international law cases are often guided by considerations of facts and 
policies that go beyond the mere application of legal rules.  
The American conflict revolution has had the major merit of putting conflict of 
laws theoretically closer to the real practice of law as daily performed by judges. 
Local law theory, backed by Cook (1942), originated exactly from observing that 
national judges, when deciding private international law cases, usually apply their 
own law. Opposing the vested rights theory, a right exists only if the court decides 
to enforce it, also considering facts and policy, so that the foreign law has no nor-
mative force of its own within the domestic system. On the same line of stressing 
the importance of policy analysis in deciding private international law case, other 
approaches focused on the need to weigh the competing interests at stake, on a 
case-by-case basis: the “opposed governmental interests” approach (Currie 1963); 
the substantive results theory (Cavers 1965); the comparative impairment theory 
(Baxter 1963), aimed at considering the negative impact that not applying the law 
of a state would have on its interests; “choice-influencing considerations” (Leflar 
1966), which listed some factors, such as predictability of results or advancement 
of forum governmental interest, to consider when identifying the applicable law. 
But, in the end, legal realists proved incapable of proposing a satisfactory alter-
native methodology (Wasserstein Fassberg 2015), leaving room for a highly dis-
cretional approach to private international law. In each case, judges should thus 
assess all the competing interests and objectives in order to determine the applica-
ble law (Mills 2013). The 1971 Second Restatement partially codifies this theoret-
ical approach: starting from the rule, according to which applicable should be the 
law of the state presenting the most significant relation with the case, its section 6 
lists some principles and factors to consider in the identification, expanding judi-
cial discretional powers in the matter. 
In the last fifty years, also the European continent has been witnessing changes 
in private international law that have been defined revolutionary: a new revolution 
(Michaels 2008b), compared to the twentieth-century US conflict revolution. Still, 
the EU has never needed to contrast theories similar to the US theory of vested 
rights. Moreover, private international law has always been deeply different in the 
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USA and in Europe: US conflict of laws has mostly been inter-state conflicts with-
in the federal system, whereas private international law in European countries has 
been facing the challenging interactions between distinct legal systems, each with 
its own history and traditions (Wasserstein Fassberg 2015), accomplishing the task 
in often very dissimilar ways. For example, it is worth mentioning the case of UK, 
which has represented the common law approach to conflict of laws in Europe. 
Such approach is particularly careful to guarantee justice and fairness in cross-
border cases, where justice is understood in pragmatic terms, as expression of the 
international need for fair treatment in private transactions between individuals. 
Though, transposing the general concept of justice in conflict of laws context rais-
es doubts, regarding which idea of justice should be considered, and in accordance 
to which set of domestic law rules, procedural and substantive (Mills 2012). 
However, the real revolutionary (or, better, evolutionary, for it has never shown 
that character of violent disruption with the past, which is typical of revolutions) 
passage in Europe was represented by the progressive shift from substantial diver-
sification of private international laws in the different European states, with a mi-
nor harmonising activity led by the HCCH, to always greater forms of legal inte-
gration, unification, and harmonisation, under the aegis of the EU (originally, the 
European Community). 
Such transformations have not only impacted on the sources of law, but also on 
its functions, paving the way for a renewed “public dimension” of private interna-
tional law understood as a form of public ordering of regulatory authorities (Mills 
2012). In fact, the EU sees conflict of laws as crucial to achieve the broader politi-
cal, economic, and legal European project: consequently, EU conflict of laws has 
gradually complied with those objectives. That is also why Michaels has identified 
three persistent features of EU private international law, making it “European, 
regulatory, and mediatized” (Michaels 2008b, p. 1641): 
 Federalisation: it is accomplished by the promulgation of regulations oriented 
towards a unifying codification of the matter. This codification aims to over-
come the fragmentation of choice-of-law regimes, to allocate regulatory com-
petence from the centre, and to pursue the substantive EU policies (e.g., envi-
ronmental protection in Rome II, or consumer or employee protection in Rome 
I); the European Court of Justice (ECJ), then, monitors that regulations are ap-
plied in a predictable and uniform manner. 
 Contitutionalisation: mutual recognition, non-discrimination among EU citi-
zenship, and human rights play a growingly significant role. 
 Pluralisation of methods: on the one hand, there is a differentiation between in-
tra-EU conflicts, where the international focus is maintained and the law of 
Member States is equally relevant, and conflicts with third countries, where the 
EU law is, on the contrary, unilaterally preferred; on the other hand, EU private 
international law appears more and more as a combination of two methods, the 
classical choice of law method, and a new method governing states’ regulatory 
interests and private rights with regard to EU law and its four basic freedoms. 
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According to Mills (2009), EU private international law would thus seem to be 
oriented towards a public understanding of conflict of laws, embodying “a global 
system for the pluralist international ordering of private law” (Mills 2012, p. 25). 
From an US perspective, an interesting theoretical reply to the changing legal 
scenario is embodied by the cosmopolitan pluralist choice-of-law approach (Schiff 
Berman 2012). Such approach acknowledges that, nowadays, people are often af-
filiated to many states and communities, and that provisions of multiple systems 
may apply to different parts of a cross-border dispute and may even be merged to 
account for the variety of normative systems involved in the legal relationship. 
Therefore, the determination of the normative system(s), the substantive law of 
which should lawfully be applied, needs to be conducted a priori, but, differently 
from what commonly happened under the First Restatement and the vested rights 
theory, it should not derive from merely territorial arguments. On the other hand, 
Schiff Berman emphasises that also the theory of governmental interests has given 
a too narrow definition of state interests, neglecting that nation states may benefit 
from being part of the global system. As a result, states should address the choice-
of-law question from this broader perspective, pursuing state interests that over-
come the simple interests of its citizens and considerations of national legislative 
policy. In fact, a cosmopolitan pluralist approach to conflict of laws should in-
clude a larger series of governmental interests deriving from its participation to the 
“interlocking world system of transnational regulation and multiple community af-
filiation” (id., p. 257). 
Schiff Berman concludes that such cosmopolitan pluralist approach allows do-
mestic courts to consider a variety of choice of law sources, ranging from domes-
tic legislations and international treaties to various forms of soft law (e.g., norms 
of behaviour promulgated by non-governmental organisations). It substantially en-
tails that courts behave “as international and transnational actors who are engaging 
in an international dialogue about legal norms” (id., p. 266). It can be objected that 
this judicial dynamism would end up reducing predictability of legal norms as 
well as legal certainty in cross-border private law relations. Though, uncertainty is 
not a novelty in choice of law context, and is intended to gradually diminish with 
the growing practice of the new method, at least according to the author’s opinion. 
4.2. Reasoning with Multiple Normative Systems 
Private international law, with its ever-growing practical importance, has interest-
ed also the AI and Law community, which has contributed to improve both theo-
retical and logical understanding of how different normative systems interact. 
4.2.1. Pluralist Logic for Legal Pluralism 
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Given that legal pluralism, not only in the form of conflict of laws, but also of in-
ternational and transnational laws as well as subnational laws, is by now a fact in 
our interconnected and interdependent world, Sartor (2005) proposes to use a plu-
ralist logic for enabling a reasoner to handle, in a unitary reasoning process, inter-
actions between different legal systems. 
Objective of this logical approach is modelling how distinct normative systems 
may disregard legal qualifications provided for by other legal systems, or, on the 
contrary, be open to and use them as premises for further inferences. In the pro-
posed logical language, the symbol ʘ is an abbreviation for ‘relatively to,’ and the 
formula φʘS means that proposition φ holds relatively to the normative system S. 
The running example is represented by the interaction between the Italian law and 
the law of Catholic Church, i.e., Canon law, regarding marriage. 
Bearing in mind that, for reason of simplicity, some normative conditions have 
been ignored, let us consider the two following provisions, respectively of Canon 
and Italian law, on the intentions of the spouses to get married (id., p. 661): 
ʘCatholic 
FORANY (x, y) 
IF [x and y declare that they intend to be married] 
AND [a priest proclaims that x and y are married] 
THEN
n
 [x and y are married] 
 
ʘItalian  
FORANY (x, y) 
IF [x and y declare that they intend to be married] 
AND [the city major proclaims that x and y are married] 
THEN
n
 [x and y are married] 
In addition, Italian law states that, if two people are married according to Can-
on law, they are married also according to the Italian legal system: 
ʘItalian  
FORANY (x, y) 
IF [x and y are married]ʘCatholic 
THEN
n
 [x and y are married] 
With regard to the previous rule, it is worth noting that a proposition of a legal 
system can include propositional constituents that hold relatively to a different 
normative system, e.g., relatively to S1, and the fact that antecedent A holds rela-
tively to S1 determines consequent B relatively to S2: 
(IF AʘS1 THEN B)ʘS2 
In the marriage example, if John and Mary are married according to the Canon 
law, they are also automatically married for the Italian law. 
Italian law provides also for a provision that allows a married couple to divorce 
and terminate their marriage: 
ʘItalian  
FORANY (x, y) 
IF [x and y are married] 
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THEN
n
[x and y can divorce] 
Then, absolute and relative endorsements of a proposition are defined: 
 when reasoners are absolutely endorsing a proposition, they are not considering 
any specific point of view, and can use that proposition in any inference, unless 
there are reasons not to use it (in this sense, they are defeasibly universal); 
[John and Mary declare that they intend to be married] ʘabsolute 
 on the contrary, relative propositions refer to those propositions endorsed in re-
spect to a particular point of view, e.g., system S1; this is normally the case for 
normative propositions: 
ʘItalian  
FORANY (x, y) 
IF [x and y declare that they intend to be married] 
AND [the city major proclaims that x and y are married] 
THEN
n
 [x and y are married] 
Relative and absolute propositions may be combined in the reasoning process, 
as shown in the example below, where it is also clear that relative conclusions can 
be derived from absolute conditions: 
(1) [John and Mary declare that they intend to be married] ʘabsolute 
(2) [a priest proclaims that x and y are married] ʘabsolute 
(3) ʘCatholic 
FORANY (x, y) 
IF [x and y declare that they intend to be married] AND 
[a priest proclaims that x and y are married] 
THEN
n
 [x and y are married] 
_______ 
(4) [John and Mary are married] ʘCatholic 
Starting from such considerations on absolute and relative endorsements, Sartor 
identifies three reasoning schemata for pluralist legal reasoning, drawing a parallel 
with the logic of beliefs in multi-agent framework: 
 relativisation: when a proposition is absolutely endorsed, it can be defeasibly 
endorsed also with reference to any specific point of view, e.g., a legal system; 
Reasoning Schema: Relativisation 
(1) believing that Aʘabsolute 
__________ IS A DEFEASIBLE REASON FOR 
(2) believing that AʘS 
 relativised detachment: if reasoners relatively endorse both the conditional and 
its antecedent, they can relatively endorse the consequent as well; 
Reasoning Schema: Relativised detachment 
(1) believing that (IF A1 AND … AND An THENn B)ʘS 
(2) believing that (A1)ʘS,…, (An)ʘS  
______________IS A DEFEASIBLE REASON FOR 
(3) believing that (B)ʘS 
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 relativised syllogism: such schemata obtains combining relativisation with the 
usual logic specification; 
Reasoning Schema: Relativised syllogism 
(1) believing that 
(FORANY (x) IF A1 AND … AND An THENn B)ʘS; 
(2) believing that (A1[x/a])ʘS,…,(An[x/a])ʘS 
______________IS A DEFEASIBLE REASON FOR 
(4) believing that (B[x/a])ʘS 
Combining the rules of each legal system, relative and absolute propositions, 
and the described reasoning schemata, the reasoner is now able to perform a plu-
ralist reasoning, as in the following example (id., p. 667): 
1. [John and Mary declare that they intend to be married] ʘabsolute 
2. [John and Mary declare that they intend to be married] ʘcatholic 
<from 1, by relativisation> 
3. [a priest declares that John and Mary are married] ʘabsolute 
4. [a priest declares that John and Mary are married] ʘcatholic 
<from 3, by relativisation> 
5. ʘCatholic 
FORANY (x, y) 
IF [x and y declare that they intend to be married] AND 
[a priest proclaims that x and y are married] 
THEN
n
 [x and y are married] 
6. [John and Mary are married]ʘCatholic 
 <from 2, 4, 5 by relativised detachment> 
7. ʘItalian  
FORANY (x, y) 
IF [x and y are married]ʘCatholic 
THEN
n
 [x and y are married]ʘItalian 
8. [John and Mary are married]ʘItalian 
 <from 6 and 7 by relativised detachment> 
9. ʘItalian  
FORANY (x, y) 
IF [x and y are married]ʘItalian 
THEN
n
 [x and y can divorce]ʘItalian 
10. [John and Mary can divorce] ʘItalian 
<from 8 and 9 by relativised detachment> 
Sartor’s work thus shows that it is possible to have a pluralist logic for reason-
ing with legal provisions coming from different normative systems. 
Also Hage (2015) explores the chance to use a pluralist logic for addressing le-
gal pluralism. For his purposes, conflicts among rules arise when more legal rules 
coming from different normative systems are all applicable to the same case, but 
with incompatible legal consequences: the typical situation governed by private 
international law rules. In particular, he considers that:  
 From a strictly logical perspective, there is no contradiction, nor inconsistency, 
if distinct legal systems regulate the same situation in different ways: legal sys-
tems are separated by definition; so, whether or not different legal consequenc-
es apply to the same case depending on where it will be eventually ruled is log-
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ical-indifferent; though, from the standpoint of individuals and companies, a di-
lemma exists, since they are subject to different legal outcomes and have to de-
cide which they should be compliant with. In a practical reasoning sense, the 
two legal systems are no more separated: they both provide reasons for action. 
 Private international law traditionally avoids inter-systemic conflicts to occur 
through conflict rules: conflict rules are rules that regulate and limit scope con-
ditions of national rules, identifying not only which court of which state has ju-
risdiction and is competent to decide the cross-border case, but also which sub-
stantive law, national or foreign, applies to the case. Conflict rules are scope-
defining rules: they determine when national legal rules have to be applied, i.e., 
when no foreign rule is applicable to the case. 
 Once it has accessed the domestic system, the foreign law may be acknowl-
edged different status, depending on how that legal order applies and interprets 
it in practice: legal systems tackle the issue either by merely referring to the 
law of the other state or by incorporating it in the domestic legal system. In the 
first case, the recipient system treats the foreign law as a matter of fact, also in 
trial, and conflicts are avoided because the content of the recipient system 
adapts to the content of the foreign one. Differently, incorporation guarantees 
that the foreign law becomes integral part of the domestic law, thus recognising 
it the character of a matter of law: this identifies one system as the only rele-
vant to rule the particular case. 
In such context, the task of logics would not be to solve conflicts, but to outline 
“a conceptual framework that clearly defines when a rule conflict occurs and 
which tools are available to avoid these conflicts or to deal with them.” In particu-
lar, non-deductive logics may help to formulate theories of private international 
law thanks to its analytical power. In the paper, it is not presented a precise logical 
model of the pluralist legal reasoning in private international law. Yet, referring to 
Glenn’s research (2014) on the concept of sustainability of diversity in law, Hage 
seems to suggest that a “multivalence thought” is the only one able to encompass 
interactions among legal traditions and levels of laws beyond the borders of nation 
states, up to cross-references among courts of different legal systems. 
4.2.2. Modular Argumentation 
Developing the idea of logic for interactions among distinct normative systems, 
Dung and Sartor (2011) propose a logical analysis of private international law 
based on modular argumentation. They take contract law cases as main examples. 
Noting that conflict of laws is the legal technique deployed by legislators to co-
ordinate different normative systems without imposing a hierarchy among them, 
they believe it uniquely provides lawyers and judges with tools to understand “the 
ways in which each system takes into account the existence, the content and im-
plications of other systems” (id., p. 234). Besides, private international law inter-
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actions are inter-systemic in kind for they occur between different legal systems, 
the coexistence of which is guaranteed by jurisdiction and choice of law mecha-
nisms. Such mechanisms make certain that the case is allocated to a precise court 
and that the legal system according to which the case must be ruled is determined. 
So, not only conflict of laws does not impose any overarching regulation, but also 
it does not establish priority relations between the systems involved in the cross-
border case. 
Starting from such premises, they assume the existence of different legal sys-
tems L1, L2,…Ln, and model each Li as including: 
 ChJur(Li): a set of choice of jurisdiction rules, establishing whether courts of Li 
can hear and decide the case; 
 ChComp(Li): a set of choice of competence rules, establishing which particular 
court of Li can decide it; and 
 ChLaw(Li): a set of choice of law rules, identifying which substantive law, of Li 
or of another legal system, the court has to apply. 
For reason of simplicity, public policy, renvoi, and forum non conveniens, a 
common law principle according to which a court can discretionally neglect to 
hear the case in favour of another court, are explicitly not considered. 
Based on Dung’s formal argumentation framework (1995), modular argumen-
tation allows for representing legal knowledge in separate modules that can be re-
ferred to, with apposite queries, whenever a specific issue requires it. Thus, the 
components of private international law, the different national laws that can be 
identified, as well as the doctrines can be adequately represented through distinct 
modules. Dung and Sartor’ modular logic focuses on the level of the definition of 
jurisdiction and competence of the domestic court, and on that of the identification 
of the applicable law, and prefers a credulous reasoning. The latter actually ena-
bles the reasoner to consider all the outcomes that can be possibly derived from 
the available legal knowledge, in terms of doctrines and alternative conclusions, 
without prejudicially blocking any of them as it would happen in a sceptical ap-
proach. 
Let us briefly show how such modules practically work, and how they can be 
used to convey different doctrines for the interpretation of a provision. First con-
sider the brusselsConventionMod, one of the five modules identified by Dung and 
Sartor (2011, p. 247). It defines jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters under 
the Brussels Regime established by the already mentioned Regulation (EC) no. 
44/2001, Brussels I, in EU Member States. Two provisions are specifically con-
sidered: article 2, according to which the defendant’s domicile in a contracting 
state determines the jurisdiction of the courts of that state; article 5, establishing 
two correctives to this connecting factor, the first in favour of the different place 
of performance of a contract, the latter in favour of the place, where the harmful 
event took place in matters relating to torts. 
Module brusselsConventionMod 
hasJurisdiction(Country) ← 
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defendantHasDomicileIn(Country), 
contractingState(Country). 
hasJurisdiction(Country) ← 
contractDispute, placePerformance(Country). 
hasJurisdiction(Country) ← 
tortDispute, placeHarmfulEvent(Country). 
The module operates, through a call, whenever the court of a contracting state S 
needs to verify whether it has jurisdiction for the case C: 
call(brusselsConventionMod + Case(C), hasJurisdiction(S)) 
If the answer to the call is positive, the court of S has jurisdiction over the case 
C; otherwise, it rejects the case. 
Let us now have a closer look at how the same method is then used for repre-
senting alternative interpretations of one provision, specifically article 4 of the 
Rome convention (1980).70 According to such provision, when the parties have 
not chosen the applicable law, the contract is governed by the law of the country 
with which it is most closely connected. Par. 2 presumes that “the contract is most 
closely connected with the country where the party who is to effect the perfor-
mance which is characteristic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the 
contract, his habitual residence.” Par. 5 establishes that such presumptive connec-
tion “shall be disregarded if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the 
contract is more closely connected with another country.” 
Dung and Sartor (2011, p. 254) identify a predicate for representing the hy-
pothesis when the presumptive connection with the country of the performer’s res-
idence is overridden: 
overriddenConnViaPerformerTo(Country) 
The doctrine (Hill 2004) presents at least two alternative interpretations of the 
par. 2 presumption, respectively the weak presumption theory and the strong pre-
sumption theory. According to the former, the connection with the country of the 
performer’s residence is overridden whenever other factors (e.g., the place where 
the contract was stipulated) show a stronger connection with a different country. 
This is the corresponding module: 
Module weakPresViaPerformerMod 
overriddenConnViaPerformerTo(Country) ← 
moreConnectedToContract(Country’, Country). 
moreConnectedToContract(Country’, Country) 
degreeOfConnectionTo(Country’, X) 
degreeOfConnectionTo(Country’, Z) 
X > Z. 
                                                          
70 The 1980 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, or the Rome Con-
vention, has been substantially replaced by Regulation (EC) no. 593/2008. 
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On the contrary, the strong presumption theory states that the connecting factor 
can be overridden only exceptionally, when it is completely insignificant in the 
particular case. 
Module strongPresViaPerformerMod 
overriddenConnViaPerformerTo(Country) ← 
insignificantConnectionViaPerformerTo(Country). 
Finally, the two doctrines are inserted in the module corresponding to the Rome 
convention application, i.e., romeConventionMod: the application of the doctrines 
will solve the predicate overriddenConnViaPerformerTo(Country), depending on 
which one it is assumed and called. 
Dung and Sartor have revealed the major role played by interpretation also in 
private international law as in any other rule application and form of legal reason-
ing. The case of alternative interpretations of the same international or suprana-
tional provision, a frequent occurrence in the application of EU regulations in the 
different Member States, shows that even the adoption of the same conflict of law 
rules does not completely avoid the possibility of applicative mismatches. Moreo-
ver, even if the issue of different interpretations of the foreign provision within the 
domestic system is not explicitly taken into consideration in the analysis, it is ar-
guable that modules can be implemented to express such different interpretations 
of substantive laws, national or foreign. 
5. Closing comments  
Before moving to the analysis of the Italian system of private international law, let 
us summarise the key contents of the present chapter. 
First, in our more and more globalised and pluralist legal world, private inter-
national law still represents the chief doorway through which foreign law accesses 
domestic legal systems. As such, it lends itself to examine some typical challenges 
judges face in foreign law application, among which the ascertainment of its con-
tent and its interpretation. But, as other fields of law, also conflict of laws has been 
lately going through significant changes, both in its sources and in its theoretical 
understanding. The US and EU “conflict revolutions” exactly illustrate that strong 
modifications are affecting private international law all over the world. 
Secondly, those changes have been proven to promote pluralist approaches to 
private international law, both in the jurisprudence and among AI and Law schol-
ars. In detail, legal theory and AI and Law have tackled conflict of laws with dif-
ferent goals, the former meant to theoretically justify the application of laws out-
side their country of origin, the latter aimed at identifying correct standards for 
legal reasoning in pluralist contexts. Though, they have both ended up adopting a 
pluralist method and, each from its own peculiar perspective, have greatly in-
creased the interest in the normative interactions in conflict of laws settings. 
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The chapter has thus not only introduced private international law as an inde-
pendent field of law interested by strong normative and theoretical changes, but 
also presented emergent logical perspectives that formalise how courts should ap-
ply rules of other legal systems and conflict rules. Sartor (2005) and Dung and 
Sartor (2011) have actually demonstrated that legal reasoning in pluralist contexts 
can be logically correct, and that it is possible to reason with alternative interpreta-
tions, formalising them with modular argumentation. Such research progresses re-
veal an important gap in the AI and Law analysis of legal reasoning triggered by 
choice of law: how domestic courts should concretely apply and interpret the rele-
vant foreign provisions is still an open research question. In fact, interpretation of 
inner law has been extensively investigated from informal and formal standpoints, 
as illustrated in the previous chapter, whereas, corresponding efforts have not been 
put in studying interpretation of foreign rules by domestic judges, even if, from a 
practical point of view, the occurrence is far from being rare. 
In the next chapter, we better describe the normative contours, within which 
courts accomplish their interpretative task in private international law disputes. As 
anticipated, the focus is on the Italian legal order, even if, with due modification, 
the theoretical model we propose later on in the thesis is conceptually extensible 
to any legal system, facing foreign law application. In addition, since foreign law 
knowledge and interpretation are critical to a proper implementation of conflict of 
laws, attention is maintained on both issues in the next chapters. Then, provided 
that legal pluralism and Europeanisation affect law in general and private interna-
tional law in particular, courts, in case of interpretive incompatibility or doubts, 
should now balance mere nation state interests and parties’ private interests also 
with EU and international objectives. This perspective is further explored in the 
following chapters 4 and 5, which precisely aims to provide domestic courts with 
an argument-based framework for foreign law interpretation and application. 
  
90  
  
91 
Chapter 4: The Italian Legal Scenario 
  
1. Taking a Step Forward 
Private international law has turned out to have lately significantly transformed, 
diversifying its sources on many legal levels, orienting itself towards greater forms 
of international harmonisation and uniformity, and assisting to the rise of public 
and pluralist approaches to its theoretical understanding. In particular, the EU has 
steadily moved towards the full legal integration among its Member States, pro-
moting many regulatory efforts also in conflict of laws. The present chapter takes 
the required step forward in order to appreciate how the Italian system of private 
international law has reacted to these changes and how its courts have been conse-
quently applying foreign law within a (partially) renewed normative context. 
The chapter develops around three main keystones. Firstly, it accounts for what 
consequences EU regulations have had in Italy. Since a regulation is a binding leg-
islative act, directly applicable in its entirety across the EU (article 288, TFEU), 
Member States are obliged to comply with them, thus reducing the living space of 
their national systems of private international law. Thus, also Italian conflict of 
laws, reformed in 1995 with law no. 218, is being further reshaped in alignment 
with fundamental EU law principles, such as the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, and the free movement of goods, persons, services, and 
capitals, and is being diminished in its scope by EU private international law rules.  
Secondly, the chapter introduces some of the general rules, established by law 
no. 218/1995, which Italian courts still follow when dealing with cross-border dis-
putes, even if they are by now often supported by corresponding EU rules. Notice-
ably, they are often in contact with interpretative criteria of other normative levels: 
for example, EU regulations are interpreted according to EU law canons of inter-
pretation, and their correct and uniform application is in turn controlled by the 
ECJ. Besides, national judges continue to struggle with the acquisition of foreign 
law and, mostly, with its correct application and interpretation: article 15, law no. 
218, states that domestic courts, dealing with the foreign rule, should use foreign 
canons of interpretation to apply it. Additionally, public policy and overriding 
mandatory rules wield a lasting power in safeguarding the coherence of the do-
mestic system, even though both concepts have changed over time. 
Thirdly, the chapter acknowledges that, irrespective of the sources of conflict 
rules, foreign law application and interpretation is the fulcrum of private interna-
tional law, and begins to explore how interpretive doubts and conflicts are likely 
to occur in practice. Conflict of laws challenges domestic judges to apply and rea-
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son with many kinds of rules: choice of law rules may derive from national, inter-
national, or EU sources; the proceedings are in most cases regulated by national 
procedural rules; eventually, in case conflict rules refer to it as the relevant law in 
the concrete case, courts will apply foreign law. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the characteristics of the 
reform of Italian private international law as accomplished by the cited law no. 
218/1995, paying close attention to how EU private international law regulations 
have been influencing it. Section 3 breaks down the general part of the Italian pri-
vate international law, especially focusing on some rules and on the mode of oper-
ation of both public policy and overriding mandatory rules. It illustrates the case 
of punitive damages, a foreign legal institution traditionally rejected as contrary to 
Italian public policy: the example shows that the contact with foreign systems may 
open the discussion on inner legal institutions and principles, and even influence, 
in future, the evolution of inner law. Section 4 delves into the central issue of for-
eign law application. Accordingly, it is first described art. 14 and the mechanisms 
it arranges to assist the court in acquiring and accessing the foreign law content, 
developing a topic already discussed in the previous chapter. The reader is intro-
duced to trial consultancy and expert opinions as civil procedure tools that possi-
bly increase the chances to acquire satisfactory knowledge of foreign law. Some 
issues will be then specifically addressed in the next chapter. Section 4 also dis-
cusses the content of art. 15, both as formulated by the lawmaker, and as read by 
the Supreme Court over the years. In the end, this general provision is the entrance 
door for interpretative mismatches and incompatibilities.  
2. The Reform of Italian Private International Law 
Only in 1995, the Italian legislator unified all the national measures of private in-
ternational law under a unique statute, law no. 218.71 Before that date, several pro-
visions concerning different aspects of private international law were scattered in 
just as many different laws: e.g., articles 17-31 of the preliminary dispositions to 
the civil code, or articles 2505 and 2509 of the civil code. Moreover, at the time, 
the European Community was far from being the point of normative reference that 
it later became, also in conflict of laws matters: the 1968 Brussels and 1980 Rome 
conventions, then in force, still embodied a typically international law approach. 
Law no. 218 abrogated some of those dispersed rules and, with an all-inclusive 
perspective (Mosconi and Campiglio 2015), determined the scope of Italian juris-
diction, established the criteria to identify the relevant law, and regulated the effi-
cacy of foreign judgements and deeds (art. 1). The law was revised in 2013, with 
another statutory law, no. 154, modifying articles 33, 35, and 36, and introducing 
art. 36 bis, all rules regarding children rights, filiation and parental relationship.  
                                                          
71 Law no. 218, 31 May 1995. 
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The reform tried to organise a chaotic legal scenario, building on the thought of 
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, as both the codification in 1865 and that under fascist 
period in 1939-42 had previously done. In his renowned lecture held in 1851 at the 
University of Turin,72 the Italian jurist theorised that, in private international law 
disputes and relations, individuals should be subject to the law of their nationality. 
In fact, if the state is an artificial entity, created by politicians and statesmen, the 
Nation, in contrast, is the only real and permanent entity, naturally yielded by his-
torical events and, as such, logically preceding the state (Nuzzo 2012). Mancini 
also proposed that the parties should be free to choose the applicable law that reg-
ulates their contracts and obligations. Finally, he acknowledged the usefulness of 
international treaties in conflict of laws matters (Mosconi and Campiglio 2015). 
The 1995 reform recognised the law of the state, the citizenship of which the 
individual holds, as main connecting factor. Citizenship was considered the closest 
legal concept to the idea of nationality supported by Mancini: that was a necessary 
deviation for implementing his theory. Besides, the connecting factor of citizen-
ship allowed Italy, initially a country of massive emigration flows, to maintain a 
link with its citizens around the world. Nowadays, the Italian socio-economic situ-
ation has profoundly changed and immigration to Italy has strongly increased. 
Thus, citizenship has ended up requiring courts to frequently apply foreign laws: 
these are often religious laws73 and their application ultimately prevents Italy from 
integrating immigrants through the application of domestic law (Mosconi and 
Campiglio 2015). Although in the Mid-Nineties society was already oriented in 
this direction and other criteria, e.g., the domicile, could have proven more benefi-
cial in the long term, the lawmaker decided to comply with the old view. 
As for the general theoretical perspectives on private international law, and for-
eign law application in particular, the Italian legislator has opted for a universalist 
approach that handles the law of all the legal systems involved equally, at least in 
principle, in line with Mancini’s and von Savigny’s visions. Accordingly, domes-
tic courts are obliged to know, or get acquainted with, the content of the foreign 
provisions, applying them by referring to the canons of interpretation of the for-
eign legal system, a theoretical imperative that is not easily complied with, from a 
practical standpoint. Such open attitude is embodied by bilateral and neutral con-
flict rules, through which the law of the forum and the law of the foreign country 
are indifferently applied, depending on the concrete facts of the case. 
The reference to the spatial location of (some elements of) the case has thus 
been usually preferred over alternative methods. Still, the legislator has also, on 
the one hand, empowered the court to assess, in certain situations, with which state 
the case presents significant or prevalent connections (e.g., the prevalent location 
of the matrimonial life provided for by article 29, par. 2, law no. 218/1995, in case 
the spouses either have different citizenships or multiple citizenships in common), 
                                                          
72 Title of the lecture was Della nazionalità come fondamento del diritto delle genti. 
73 Most immigrants come from Muslim countries, where it is possible that religious laws like 
Sharia are in force. 
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and, on the other hand, it has enabled the parties to freely opt for the preferred law 
in contractual matters (now, covered almost entirely by EU regulation provisions, 
which however mainly provide the parties with the same freedom of choice). 
2.1. Impact of EU Conflict of Laws 
Role and importance of the law no. 218/1995 have dramatically decreased in con-
sequence of the advent of EU private international law. Especially after the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty and the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been attributed a 
standard competence in the matter, only limited by the general principles of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality, as any other EU legislative power (van Calster 
2013). The present section aims to account for the impact EU conflict of laws ex-
erts on Italian private international law, referring to the previous chapter as for the 
historical path that led to the actual legal scenario. The ambitious goal of a unified 
applicable law in the EU territory is being pursued by harmonising not only Mem-
ber States’ substantive laws (as happened, for instance, for consumer protection 
law), but also, and probably even more successfully, conflict rules, so promoting, 
in cross-border legal disputes, major predictability of the competent court and ap-
plicable law. Van Calster (2013) reports that EU private international law regula-
tions prevent Member States from referring to their national law also when it 
comes to solving preliminary issues, which, mainly considered as procedural ques-
tions, were usually subject to domestic provisions. For example, article 10, par. 1, 
Rome I regulation states that the existence and validity of a contract is determined 
by the law which would govern it under the Regulation if the contract were valid. 
A similar move aims to further restrict the applicative scope of national laws. 
Promulgated just before the normative explosion triggered by the Amsterdam 
Treaty, law no. 218/95 does not mention EU private international law regulations. 
Yet, it includes article 2, saying that the statute does not undermine the applicative 
operation of the international agreements Italy is part of. Observe that such provi-
sion is merely descriptive in kind (Mosconi and Campiglio 2015): the obligations, 
which the Italian government takes on internationally, are imperative for the state, 
including its courts, immediately after the order of execution, that is, a special act, 
normally included in the law ratifying the treaty, which makes it valid and effec-
tive over the Italian territory (Conforti 2014). Moreover, after the constitutional 
law no. 3/2001, modifying art. 117 of the Italian Constitution, the domestic legis-
lative power has to be exerted in compliance with the obligations deriving from 
international treaties. International rules, once accessed the domestic legal order 
through the order of execution, should thus prevail over national rules. In addition, 
consider that they are mostly special for the matters governed, or the categories 
they refer to: in particular, international conflict rules are considered special and, 
as such, override merely national provisions in the same matter. Confronted with a 
cross-border case, Italian courts should thus firstly ascertain whether there exists 
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an international treaty governing the specific matter, and, if so, whether it is still 
valid or it has ceased to exist. 
EU law is worth a separate discourse. Alongside international obligations, arti-
cle 117 recognises also the role of the Communitarian legal system (after the Lis-
bon Treaty, the EU): its rules as well usually prevail over national law. Such prev-
alence is due to the significant transfer of sovereignty from the Member States to 
the EU, defined as a supranational organisation: in Italy, the sovereignty transfer is 
constitutionally sanctioned by article 11. In particular, the ECJ has developed the 
principle of primacy of EU law in case of conflict with inner laws, interpreting it 
in the sense that EU law always takes precedence over domestic rules. But Mem-
ber States condition EU law supremacy to the compliance with national constitu-
tional law. So, considering together articles 11 and 117, par. 1, of Italian Constitu-
tion as well as article 288 TFEU on the direct applicability of regulations in their 
entirety, it can be easily deduced that EU private international law, mainly embed-
ded in regulations, prevails over Italian provisions of conflict of laws, as expressed 
by law no. 218/1995, provided it is compliant with the fundamental principles es-
tablished in the Italian Constitution. 
Furthermore, Italian law needs to be generally interpreted according to the 
principles of EU law: so, even rules of domestic private international law that still 
operate are not spared (Bogdan 2016). Two important principles that the interpret-
er needs to consider are the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
and the freedoms of movement. According to art. 18 TFEU, any discrimination on 
grounds of nationality is actually prohibited within the scope of application of the 
EU Treaties. So, EU citizens in similar situations cannot be treated differently on-
ly by reason of their nationalities (so, citizenships). Following the interpretation of 
the principle by ECJ,74 any different treatment between EU citizens, even though 
formally operated on account of a criterion other than citizenship, is prohibited if 
it has the practical result to discriminate among citizens of different nationalities. 
Such understanding of the principle of equality is common also in national law 
(Bin and Pitruzzella 2014): similar situations have to be treated similarly, while 
different situations differently, unless there exist objective reasons that justify a 
diversified approach. Still, reading domestic private international law through this 
lens could raise doubts about citizenship as main connecting factor: in succession 
and family law matters, it is the preferred link, and its application could be seen as 
an automatic violation of the prohibition (Bogdan 2016). As long as succession 
and family law were excluded from the Communitarian competences, no problem 
occurred; though, they are now a fully-fledged part of it, so that the ECJ should 
soon cast light on the issue. Bogdan (2016) argues that, until then, citizenship 
should probably not be automatically rejected since even the Brussels II regulation 
grounds jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality of the spouses (article 3). 
The other general principle necessarily affecting the remainder of national con-
flict of laws is the respect for the freedom of movement that, within the EU territo-
                                                          
74 Mund & Fester v. Hatrex, Case C-398/92, [1994] ECR I-467. 
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ry, concerns goods, persons, services, and capitals, and mainly meets the needs of 
internal market and fair competition. Accordingly, Member States should not im-
plement any restrictions capable of hampering this freedom. In EU private interna-
tional law, such principle has been translated into the country-of-origin principle, 
or mutual recognition, which could be seen as the European version of the vested 
rights theory (Mosconi and Campiglio 2015). The principle states that the legal 
status or relation validly recognised in the country of origin should be recognised 
also in the country of destination, mostly in the areas of administrative licences 
and personal status: the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice 
should promote trust in other Member States’ laws that results in recognising as 
lawful and admissible what other states legally define as such, and in avoiding to 
act in such a way to impede the law of the country of origin (Bogdan 2016), unless 
there are important reasons to make the law of the country of destination prevail 
(e.g., public policy considerations). 
So, not only EU legislative production in conflict of laws has ended up gradual-
ly consuming the applicative scope of domestic provisions, requiring that national 
judges ascertain, before referring to their own law, if EU conflict of laws rules ex-
ist and govern the particular case, but also its leading principles are shaping and 
modifying their interpretation and application, imposing to read all national legis-
lation as respectful of EU principles and policies. 
Let us now briefly consider one further topic, regarding the interpretation of in-
ternational and EU private international law rules by domestic courts. It is an ab-
solutely relevant issue for it impacts on how courts qualify legal categories and 
concepts, essential interpretative act for private international law application. As 
provided for by article 2, par. 2, law no. 218, international treaty provisions should 
be interpreted according to their own interpretive criteria. Practically, national 
judges have to verify whether the treaty possibly includes any explicit direction 
for its interpretation. Otherwise, articles 31-33, Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1969), establish both general and special rules of interpretation as well as 
specific recommendations for the common case of treaties authenticated in two or 
more languages. Lastly, it is not infrequent that domestic courts refer to the case 
law of courts of other contracting parties to check how the same treaty provision, 
clause, or term has been interpreted, and tend to conform to that interpretation 
(Ward 2007). Similar cross-references are no doubt favoured if the courts share 
the same language. 
Differently, EU private international law is interpreted through EU law princi-
ples. Additionally, ECJ plays a vital role: the Luxembourg court has the last word 
in all the interpretive issues that arise from the application of EU Treaties and EU 
law. Article 19, par. 3, Treaty on European Union (TEU), states that the Court 
gives “preliminary rulings, at the request of courts or tribunals of the Member 
States, on the interpretation of Union law or the validity of acts adopted by the in-
stitutions.” So, domestic courts refer to the ECJ also whenever facing interpretive 
doubts regarding EU conflict of laws regulations, a mechanism that fosters uni-
formity in interpretation across all Europe. 
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3. General Provisions of Law no. 218/1995 
The third part of law no. 218/95 includes some dispositions that could be applied 
to any conflict rule, whatever its source (national, international, or European), by 
reason of the typical issues they face. In fact, they address the following questions, 
which challenge any system of private international law: 
 Does the conflict rule refer to foreign substantive law or foreign private inter-
national law? (art. 13); 
 How does the court know foreign law? What if the court is incapable of ascer-
taining its content? (art. 14); 
 How should the relevant foreign law be applied by domestic courts? (art. 15); 
 What happens if foreign law contrasts with public policy? (art. 16); 
 Are there inner laws that prevail over application of conflict rules? (art. 17). 
Previous sections have described that, over the years, international and EU con-
flict of laws rules have more and more marginalised domestic private international 
law. It has been further highlighted that international treaties and EU regulations 
should be applied as uniformly as possible: hence, regarding the mentioned gen-
eral matters, national courts should preferably refer to the relative dispositions in-
cluded in the international instrument they are applying. Still, it is arguable that, if 
the specific international treaty, or EU regulation, has not expressly provided for 
such issues in its text, the court can resort to the general provisions of law no. 218 
(Mosconi and Campiglio 2015). This frequently happens, for example, in case the 
public policy exception is raised, because international or EU tools usually do not 
regulate what consequences such exception has. 
In what follows, we compare the concepts of renvoi (art. 13), public policy (art. 
16), and overriding mandatory rules (art. 17), replying to three of the listed ques-
tions, with the corresponding formulations in EU regulations. Such double analy-
sis accounts for the prevalence and pervasiveness of EU private international law, 
while appreciating how the concurrence between national and EU law impacts on 
the content of common notions. The remaining questions, respectively addressed 
in articles 14 and 15, are discussed separately in the next section 4 since they cru-
cially pertain to the core of the present thesis. 
3.1. Renvoi 
Renvoi is a French term that alludes to a peculiar question underlying private in-
ternational law: do conflict rules refer to substantive law of the foreign legal sys-
tem or, rather, to the foreign legal system as a whole and also to its own conflict 
rules? In the second case, choice of law rules of the foreign legal system could in 
turn refer to the law of the nation state (remission), or of a third state (transmis-
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sion), as the law applicable to the particular cross-border relation or dispute (van 
Calster 2013). 
Courts wonder about considering renvoi mostly when the foreign conflict rule 
remits the case back to the law of the forum: facing a similar circumstance, the na-
tional judge could apply his/her own law, without struggling with the application 
of foreign legal rules (Bogdan 2012). But renvoi is theoretically and practically 
troublesome in that, potentially, it is never-ending exactly when it refers back to 
the law of the forum because, if it is applied consistently, the reference back is but, 
again, a reference to the conflict rule of the forum (Mosconi and Campiglio 2015), 
in a vicious circle. 
The problem of renvoi originates from a famous case, Forgo v. Administration 
des domain, decided by the French Court of Cassation in 1882, and concerning the 
inheritance of a Bavarian citizen, who died in France without holding the French 
citizenship nor having his domicile there, but owning many assets in the French 
territory. Abiding by the Bavarian substantive law, some maternal relatives would 
have inherited his estate. Differently, the French law did not consider them suc-
cessors, so the French state could inherit his assets. The normative contrast be-
came evident as the French conflict rule identified the Bavarian as the applicable 
substantive law, whereas the Bavarian conflict rule rejected the particular case in 
favour of the French law. On that occasion, the Cassation Court accepted the re-
mission, and decided that the French state should appropriate the inheritance. 
The attitude towards renvoi varies from country to country. Italy has opted for 
its conditioned acceptance. Firstly, article 13 states that the conflict rule reference 
to the foreign law is to be understood as a reference to the foreign private interna-
tional law only in two cases, both aiming to avoid the vicious circle of unceasing 
back and forth references: when the foreign conflict rule refers to a third state that 
in turn accepts the renvoi, or when it remits the case to the law of the forum. Sec-
ondly, some exceptions are articulated: renvoi does not work when the parties 
have freely chosen the applicable law to their contractual relation, when it is a 
matter of formal validity of acts, and in non-contractual obligations. Additionally, 
in filiation matters, courts should consider renvoi only in case it points to legisla-
tions that favour the establishment of parental relations (so called principle of fa-
vor filiationis) and guarantee a stronger protection of the rights of the children. Fi-
nally, whenever an international convention applies, judges should abide by the 
relative disposition concerning the topic. 
Notably, in respect to renvoi, EU regulations have generally opted for rejecting 
it. For instance, article 20 of Rome I regulation excludes it, stating that “the appli-
cation of the law of any country specified by this Regulation means the applica-
tion of the rules of law in force in that country other than its rules of private inter-
national law, unless provided otherwise in this Regulation.” Article 24 of Rome II 
regulation almost mirrors this sentence. 
The decision to exclude renvoi is probably a “sound approach” (Bogdan 2012, 
p. 210) for it is more consonant with the general idea underpinning conflict rules: 
private international law primarily expresses the interests of the legal system that 
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has promulgated it. Thus, if the legislator, both domestic and EU, has considered 
relevant a precise connecting factor for identifying the legal system more connect-
ed to a case, it is highly probable that such reference is meant to identify the sub-
stantive law of that legal system, i.e., the valid foreign law that, in the interested 
area, defines and regulates rights, duties, and behaviours. 
3.2. The Public Policy Exception 
Public policy (ordre public in French) aims to protect the inner coherence and the 
core values of the law of the forum. As such, it is emblematic of the tension, typi-
cal of conflict of laws, between openness towards other legal orders and need to 
defend basic principles of domestic systems. In particular, public policy is called 
into question whenever the foreign law to be applied, or the foreign judgement to 
be recognised, can produce effects that are unacceptable in many respects from the 
viewpoint of the legal system of destination. Legal systems can provide for the 
public policy reservation explicitly or implicitly, and the relative exception could 
even be raised without any expressed statutory provision, as a sort of general prin-
ciple of law acknowledged by all nations (Bogdan 2012). 
In Italy, article 16, par. 1, law no. 218, states that the foreign law is not applied 
if its effects are contrary to the public policy (ordine pubblico). The legal doctrine 
has long debated about the difference existing between “inner” public policy, 
which would include all the mandatory rules of the legal system, and “internation-
al” public policy,75 instead referring to a broader set of fundamental principles and 
values, characterising the ethical, legal, political, and economic order of the na-
tional system in a given historical moment (Mosconi and Campiglio 2015). 
In earlier days, courts read public policy as corresponding to the “inner” public 
policy: every time the applicable foreign rule was merely different from an imper-
ative inner provision, it was considered contrary to public policy and, thus, reject-
ed. For instance, according to foreign law, the legal age is achieved at the age of 
17, whereas, according to a mandatory Italian rule (art. 2, civil code), it is lawfully 
achieved only at 18.76 In this way, public policy was mostly used to apply inner 
law also in situations where foreign provisions were not really threatening the do-
mestic system. Public policy has thus advanced towards a gradual restriction of its 
applicative scope, and has included only general, societal values that are protected 
by the legal system as a whole in a precise historical moment (so called ‘interna-
tional’ public policy). By systematically overviewing legislations and constitu-
                                                          
75 ‘Inner’ and ‘international’ public policy translate the Italian expressions ordine pubblico inter-
no and ordine pubblico internazionale. In the end, the second, larger concept prevailed in private 
international law matters, as also recognised by Cass. 6/12/2002 no. 17349. 
76 We will resort to this example, drawn from Mosconi and Campiglio (2015), also in chapter 5. 
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tional provisions, it is possible to identify those values that are actually challenged 
by the contact with other legal systems in cross-border relations. 
Finally, the concept has ended up referring also to fundamental values, princi-
ples, and goals that pertain to other legal systems, such as the EU or the interna-
tional community. So, public policy includes also the multilevel protection of fun-
damental rights, as developed in Europe (Zuffi 2014).77 Some judgements issued 
by the European Court of Human Rights in family matters78 have contributed to 
the idea that public policy should refer to those values that are shared by the ma-
jority of European countries, so to possibly conceive of a communitarian public 
policy. Yet, this opinion is not unanimously accepted: Bogdan (2012) illustrates 
that no such thing as international,79 or European, public policy actually exists for 
even EU regulations refer to the “public policy of the forum,” as states for exam-
ple article 21 Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations, 
reminding to the public policy of the state. Also Mosconi and Campiglio (2015) 
believe that public policy does not have a merely international connotation totally 
disregarding national features. But, however understood, a conceptual expansion 
has indeed concerned public policy, progressively making it more difficult for 
domestic courts to raise the relative exception and reject the foreign law. 
Courts play an important role in safeguarding the public policy: since no com-
plete list of potentially dangerous cases exists, judges enjoy a large margin of dis-
cretion in assessing if public policy is in danger in the concrete case. In practice, 
they fill the normative void, ascribing a meaning to public policy firstly by reason 
of the time of adjudication: in fact, public policy is not only spatially, but also 
temporally located. Then, in order to avoid a disproportionate use of the excep-
tion, they need to focus on those effects that are “manifestly incompatible:” the 
mere difference of legal solutions between the two systems does not instantiate in-
compatibility, if core values of the system are not undermined. Otherwise, the es-
sence of private international law would be frustrated. In other words, public poli-
cy should be considered the last remedy, useful when no other legal solutions are 
available. Also, its excessive use would amplify unpredictability and lack of uni-
formity, as highlighted by Bogdan (2012). 
National courts usually apply the public policy exception ex officio. Exception-
ally, Brussels I and Brussels I bis regulations require that it is raised by the party 
obtaining the processual benefits from its use: such provisions meet the need of 
creating an integrated legal framework, where judgements are automatically rec-
ognised in all the Member States. 
Public policy functions in a negative way: once the exception has been raised, 
it prevents the court from applying the foreign law supposedly contrary to it, so 
                                                          
77 See Cass. 26/11/2004 no. 22332, Cass. 19/07/2007 no. 16017, Cass. 26/04/2013 no. 10070. 
78 See for example Wagner and J.M.W.L v. Luxembourg, no. 76240/01, 28/06/2007, ECHR-I. 
79 ‘International’ here refers to a concept of public policy pertaining to the international commu-
nity, whereas ‘international’ in the distinction under footnote no. 75 refers to an enlarged concept 
of the public policy of the state in private international law context. 
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inevitably challenging the legal system about how the left normative gap should 
be filled. Since EU regulations do not provide for such situation, Member States 
are free to differently address the issue. Potentially, there is room for a different 
application of the EU instrument: each Member State has its own public policy, 
even if it is more and more composed of shared values, and regulates the conse-
quence of its functioning in different manners. The Italian legislator has opted for 
a step-by-step procedure (article 16, par. 2): in case the foreign law cannot be ap-
plied, the court applies the law identified through alternative connecting factors 
eventually provided for by the conflict rule. Lacking other connecting factors, the 
law of the forum is finally applied. 
The question about what consequences public policy has is particularly relevant 
because it could leave the door open for immediately resorting to the safe law of 
the forum, or, on the contrary, invite to investigate if the foreign law can be possi-
bly interpreted in a way that respects the core values of the legal system. Follow-
ing this line of reasoning, there have been attempts to apply the foreign law in a 
selective way, thus leaving space for those parts of the foreign provisions that are 
neutral towards public policy’ considerations (Mosconi and Campiglio 2015). 
3.2.1. The Case of Punitive Damages 
In Italy, the public policy exception has been typically raised when it came to rec-
ognise and enforce foreign judgements that inflicted punitive or exemplary dam-
ages in the area of civil liability. So far, courts’ prevailing attitude has always been 
to reject them. Though, the legal system has been lately opening to forms of dam-
ages that overcome the compensatory function commonly and uniquely attributed 
to damages and civil liability, and a recent opinion of the Supreme Court of Cassa-
tion80 goes exactly in this direction. The same Court has also lately asked to remit 
to its unified sections the question about the possibility to recognise judgements 
inflicting outright punitive damages.81 If a legal issue is considered particularly 
relevant, it can be remitted to the First President of the Court, who, in turn, evalu-
ates the chance to assign it to the unified sections for settling it definitely (article 
374, civil procedure code – c.p.c.). Such request signals that the judicial attitude 
towards punitive damages is perhaps undergoing a change. 
Let us now briefly consider what punitive damages are, if and in which way EU 
private international law has addressed them, why the Italian judiciary have con-
sistently rejected their recognition, and, lastly, if it is conceivable that a modifica-
tion may occur in the near future in the Italian legal scenario, caused by the recur-
rent contacts with other concepts of civil liability. 
By imposing considerable pecuniary sanctions, punitive damages tend to deter 
the defendant from repeating the same conduct in future. They are frequent in US 
                                                          
80 Cass., civ. sect. I, 15/04/2015 no. 7613. 
81 Cass. decree 16/05/2016 no. 9978. 
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tort law cases, particularly when it is difficult to calculate the amount of the real 
damages suffered by the plaintiff. Even if plaintiffs are then practically awarded 
sizeable monetary sums, punitive damages are not confined to compensating dam-
ages effectively suffered, but have retributive and dissuasive purposes with regard 
to the person causing the damage, purposes that, in continental Europe, are nor-
mally pursued by public law (specifically, criminal law). 
For these reasons, the original project of Rome II regulation on the law appli-
cable to non-contractual obligations included a provision, then not inserted in the 
final text, totally excluding the application of a foreign rule that provides for puni-
tive or exemplary damages for it would be contrary to the communitarian public 
policy. Such rule was in the end replaced by article 26, simply stating that the ap-
plication of a foreign provision, specified by the regulation, may be refused only if 
it is “manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the forum.” By dismissing 
the original idea, the EU lawmaker has firstly acknowledged that it is not yet pos-
sible to talk about an independent communitarian public policy, even if, certainly, 
communitarian and EU principles have been increasingly absorbed by Member 
States’ inner public policies. Further, it has concluded that Member States should 
enjoy a certain discretionary power in assessing whether punitive or exemplary 
damages are disrespectful of their public policy. In the preamble, Recital 32 refers 
to punitive damages as one of the possible “exceptional circumstances” that justify 
Member States to consider their public interest and raise the public policy excep-
tion. In this way, room is left for diversified treatments of the same situation, de-
pending on the Member State where the case is decided (Bogdan 2016). 
Until recently, in line with the European attitude, the Italian legal and judicial 
system has looked at punitive damages suspiciously: the idea of a system of civil 
liability aiming at punishing the defendant has been considered not only generally 
extraneous to its historical legal tradition, but also completely contrary to the inner 
public policy, which assigns the punitive function to other branches of law, such 
as criminal law. In case of patrimonial damages, civil liability is attributed a mere-
ly compensatory function: plaintiffs are awarded monetary sums corresponding to 
the suffered damages and, after the relative payment, they should not result en-
riched since a similar enrichment would be unjustified.82 
Notably, requests of application of foreign law providing for punitive damages, 
such as the US tort law, have yet to be put forward an Italian court. On many oc-
casions, though, domestic judges have been required to recognise and enforce for-
eign judgements including similar measures (Mosconi and Campiglio 2015). The 
Court of Cassation has long maintained the same negative approach: in 2007 and 
2012,83 both cases of liability for defective products, it refused to recognise and 
enforce the relative US opinions, mainly motivating that punitive damages irrec-
                                                          
82 These are also the main arguments of the Supreme Court against the recognition of punitive 
damages (e.g., Cass. no. 1183/2007). 
83 Cass. 19/1/2007 no. 1183 and Cass. 8/02/2012 no. 1781, both caused by defective motorcycle 
helmets in the USA. 
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oncilably conflict with the domestic system of civil liability, compensatory in 
kind, and, consequently, with its inner public policy. The plaintiffs had tried to ar-
gue that punitive damages could be assimilated to the institutions of clausola 
penale (penalty clause) or danno morale (non-material harm), both deemed as not 
merely compensatory (Sciarratta 2015). The Court rejected the argument, explain-
ing that the first is simply meant to stimulate the fulfilment of contractual obliga-
tions and to facilitate evidence in trial, whereas the latter always aims to compen-
sate a suffered damage, even if of a diverse kind with respect to patrimonial ones. 
If this has for long been the prevailing position, something is now changing. In 
2015,84 the Italian Court of Cassation recognised and enforced a Belgian judgment 
sanctioning the defaulting party with a monetary measure called astreinte. It justi-
fied such reception stating that astreinte has a coercive function, threatening con-
sequences to the detriment of the defaulting parties, whereas punitive damages 
function as proper civil punishments, often enriching the damaged party far be-
yond the economic damage actually suffered, thus remaining unacceptable in Ita-
ly. 
The recognition of astreinte has probably paved the way toward an extended 
understanding of civil liability. In fact, if its functions are both compensatory and 
coercive, we cannot rule out the possibility that, in future, punitive functions could 
be ascribed as well, also because astreinte is not so clearly distinguished from pu-
nitive damages in the Court’s opinion (Sciarratta 2015). As anticipated, the Su-
preme Court has recently required the remission to its unified sections of the issue 
of recognising foreign judgements providing for punitive damages.85 Firstly, the 
absolute rejection could be no longer justified by asserting that punitive and coer-
cive functions are excluded altogether from Italian regulation of civil liability. 
Consider for instance article 96, par. 3, c.p.c.: it allows to sanction the losing party 
in the court proceedings with a sum, so discouraging future abuses of the tool of 
civil trial. If the compensatory function of damages had been expression of a con-
stitutional principle, the Italian legislator could not have ignored it, and so article 
96 could not have been promulgated. Secondly, automatically denying recognition 
of foreign judgements including punitive damages would represent a too severe 
judicial approach: rather, the mere recognition of foreign judgments should be dis-
tinguished not only from direct application of foreign law, requiring greater forms 
of control, but also from the way courts ordinarily decide inner cases, applying 
merely national concepts and categories. 
Waiting for the relative pronouncement of the unified sections, it is legitimate 
to wonder whether the continuous contact with foreign legal systems and, espe-
cially, with different legal solutions to the same problems, does not inevitably lead 
first the courts, then even the lawmaker to consider the plausibility of new norma-
tive scenarios: the cited opinion no. 7613/2015 might open to forms of civil liabil-
ity including deterrent and punitive functions. 
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3.3. Overriding Mandatory Rules 
The public policy reservation is just one of the tools that are at the courts’ disposal 
for protecting the inner coherence of the domestic system. In fact, within most le-
gal systems, there exist rules that are considered of primary importance for the 
matter they regulate or for the rights and principles they defend, and are capable of 
prevailing over any other rule, choice of law rules included. 
Known also as peremptory norms, immediately applicable rules, lois de police 
in French, they are often called overriding mandatory rules, after the ECJ’s deci-
sion in the Arblade case86 that substantially identified them as a restricted sub-set 
of all the mandatory rules of the forum (van Calster 2013, p. 145). Contrarily to 
public policy, which is a negative corrective exception (Bogdan 2012, p. 239) to 
foreign law application and works after verifying the undesirable effects on the in-
ternal harmony of the domestic system, overriding mandatory rules function be-
forehand, preventing the very application of conflict rules. They need to be always 
applied, irrespective of the internal or international character of the case. 
Also EU private international law regulations have aligned with the ECJ’s pro-
nouncement, recognising the role of overriding mandatory rules. Consider for in-
stance article 9, Rome I Regulation: it firstly defines them as “provisions the re-
spect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public 
interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent 
that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope,” thus admitting 
their operation to the detriment of the conflict rules established by the regulation. 
Besides, it states that the application of the overriding mandatory rules of the fo-
rum cannot be limited by any regulatory provision. The third paragraph concerns 
instead the tricky issue of applying mandatory rules belonging to a third state, 
somehow connected to the case at stake: in the context governed by the regulation, 
this third state is often the place of the contractual performance. The court may 
give effects to those provisions only if they make the contractual performance il-
legitimate. Noticeably, this rule is a modified version of the one included in the 
1980 Rome Convention: its article 7 was much more open to the possibility of ap-
plying the mandatory rules of “another country with which the situation has a 
close connection.” Opposed by UK, Germany and Luxembourg, afraid of the un-
certainty it would bring about in contractual matters, the final solution was thus a 
compromise (van Calster 2013). 
As for the Italian law no. 218/1995, article 17 regulates Norme di applicazione 
necessaria, establishing their prevalence over conflict rules because of the object 
they regulate and the purposes they pursue. Generally, mandatory rules intend to 
guarantee that certain situations, connected to the Italian system, are regulated uni-
formly, even if this frustrates the private international law objective of internation-
al harmony of legal solutions. Also, unilateral conflict rules, i.e., a sub-set of self-
                                                          
86 Joined cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and Leloup, [1999] ECR I-8453. 
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limited norms that directly restrict their applicative scope (Mosconi and Campiglio 
2015), exist: they allocate certain cross-border relations in commonly sensitive ar-
eas, such as family law, directly to the law of the forum. Rules of this kind are, for 
example, articles 115 and 116 c.c., regulating the marriage respectively of Italian 
citizens abroad and of foreign citizens in the Italian territory. 
Domestic legal systems continue to have the last word as regards the protection 
of their inner coherence and fundamental values. Still, the traditional instruments 
of public policy and overriding mandatory rules require to be used more cautious-
ly than in the past: not only their use should not frustrate classic private interna-
tional law purposes, but also new general principles and policies, derived from in-
ternational treaties and EU law. 
4. Application and Interpretation of the Foreign Law 
Previous sections have aimed at framing Italian private international law in the re-
cent and pervading internationalisation and, mostly, Europeanisation of this area 
of law. In particular, it has been shown that, by now, general issues of conflict of 
laws, such as public policy and overriding mandatory rules, are regulated by both 
national and EU provisions, and that the intent to protect the inner coherence and 
values of national systems is mixed with larger objectives, shared with the interna-
tional community and EU Member States. 
However, irrespective of what conflict rules the court is applying, the actual 
application of the foreign law, identified through the suitable connecting factor, 
raises many practical difficulties. Since it is not conceivable that, normally, judges 
are familiar with a legal system other than their own, they regularly need to face 
and, if possible, overcome the obstacle of becoming acquainted with the content of 
that law. 
In the previous chapter, we have stressed that, in the end, the possibility to 
practically acquire such knowledge is highly critical to the feasibility and imple-
mentation of private international law. In the present section, we intend to account 
for what concrete steps domestic courts usually take when required to know and 
apply foreign provisions. The first part analyses article 14, law no. 218/1995: in-
terestingly, even if the foreign law is formally seen as law, domestic courts are 
supposed to adopt tools that are normally used in judicial fact finding, evidence, 
and proof in order to get informed about its content. Inevitably, how the court ac-
quires knowledge of the foreign provision ends up affecting the way the court in-
terprets and reasons about it, with consequences for the parties in the lawsuit. 
The second subsection examines the phase of proper application of the foreign 
rule, once not only has the court identified the foreign law, following the connect-
ing factor, but also it has supposedly become acquainted with its positive content. 
Further complications actually arise (Mosconi and Campiglio 2015): courts have 
to attribute the correct meaning to the foreign law, obtained through “canons of in-
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terpretation and rules of application over time of the foreign legal system” (art. 
15). It should reflect the meaning it is normally attributed to its words and con-
cepts in the linguistic and legal community of origin: reading art. 14 and 15 joint-
ly, courts should pay attention not to assign a meaning different from its original 
one (Carbone 2009). Over time, the Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) has in-
tervened to specify what principles Italian courts should follow in interpreting for-
eign provisions. 
4.1. Knowledge of the Foreign Law and the Role of Experts 
In 1995, on the occasion of the reform of the Italian system of private international 
law with the statute no. 218, the legislator opted for considering the determination 
of the applicable foreign provision a question of law, reversing the previous nor-
mative choice to treat it as a question of fact. 
Article 14 requires that the courts ascertain the foreign law ex officio, the only 
way to guarantee a certain degree of normative effectiveness to foreign law within 
national borders (Carbone 2009). Thus, the interested parties do not need to plead 
for it or present it as evidence, because domestic courts have both the power and 
the duty to determine and apply the foreign provisions in compliance with the 
principle of (aliena) iura novit curia, i.e., “the court knows the (foreign) law.” 
Theoretically, foreign law is equated with national law. It follows that article 113, 
civil procedure code (c.p.c.), stating that Italian judges are supposed to settle cases 
applying only legal rules,87 indistinctly refers to both national and foreign laws. 
Besides, a judicial opinion based on a violation or false application of the foreign 
law could be appealed in front of the Court of Cassation, according to article 360 
no. 3 c.p.c., as it would happen in case of violation or false application of a do-
mestic provision. Moreover, in case of appeal ex art. 360 no. 3 c.p.c., since the ap-
plication of the foreign law is decisive for the settlement of the case, the Supreme 
Court should not only pronounce the principle of law, but also, being a matter that 
is lodged ex officio, submit it to the examination of the parties, in compliance with 
the adversarial principle (article 384 c.p.c.).  
Still, the assimilation between national and foreign law is just “tendential,” as 
stated by doctrinal comments to article 113 c.p.c. (Comoglio et al. 2014). The 
principle of equality, which informs the Italian system of private international law 
and forces national judges to apply the foreign law not differently from Italian 
law, is basically jeopardised by the fact that the law of the forum is mostly privi-
leged by the courts. Firstly, exactly in light of lex fori, judges assess if both inter-
national harmony and inner coherence are at balance in private international law 
                                                          
87 Article 113 c.p.c. states that the judiciary generally applies legal rules to settle the case, except 
if the law allows it to decide according to equity: e.g., ex art. 1226 c.c., when the precise mone-
tary amount of a damage cannot be proved, it can be assessed equitably by the judge. 
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cases. Secondly, whenever both laws are applicable and all other things being 
equal, courts end up mostly applying inner laws. Moreover, in case it is not possi-
ble to ascertain the content of foreign law and no other connecting factor works, 
the national law is residually applied, according to a corrective mechanism pro-
vided by article 14, par. 2. 
In addition, it is factitious to think that the court could really know the foreign 
law as it knows the Italian law. Domestic judges are trained and normally spend 
their whole professional career in a specific legal order and they cannot be reason-
ably required to know and be familiar with all the remainder legal systems, often 
profoundly dissimilar in linguistic and conceptual terms. As matter stands, foreign 
law application would prove difficult, if not impossible, for the domestic court, all 
the more so if it has to be applied “according to its own canons of interpretation 
and application over time” (art. 15). 
Aiming at minimising their cognitive disadvantage, art. 14 supplies a series of 
informative tools, which favour the acquisition of foreign law, to national courts. 
Firstly, courts can profit from those informative measures, which international 
treaties and supra-national organisations put at their disposal. In this respect, the 
preceding chapter88 has accounted for the role respectively played by the 1968 Eu-
ropean Convention on Information on Foreign Law (or London Convention), the 
2001 European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters (EJN-civil), and 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), ideal candidate to 
coordinate the efforts of institutions and legal information centres towards an as-
sisted access to foreign law. 
Besides international treaties and networks, art. 14 authorises courts to consult 
the Ministry of Justice (Ministero della Giustizia) for obtaining appropriate infor-
mation through governmental channels. Moreover, judges can resort to experts or 
specialised institutions, like university professors or research centres, and, last but 
not least, the parties assist the court in identifying the foreign law and its content. 
In most cases, courts either use governmental informative channels, or nominate 
foreign law experts. Comparing those two tools, expert opinions appear to be more 
conveniently acquired, both in terms of time and of substantial help they offer: as 
shown later on, experts reply to precise queries of the judge during the proceed-
ings, whereas the Ministry of Justice provides just concise written notes, which 
take longer to be delivered. 
In Italian civil trials, opinion of experts are generally acquired through the insti-
tution of trial consultancy. In its original function, the expert assists the court in 
ascertaining facts that require to analyse particular technical or scientific issues, 
going beyond the average culture and of which judges have no specific knowledge 
(Comoglio et al. 2011). Its regulation is included in Book II, Title I, Chapter II of 
the civil procedure code (articles 191-201), precisely governing the ascertainment 
of facts and taking of evidence. But, trial consultancy is not a piece of evidence it-
self: rather, it allows the judge to acquire a technical opinion to evaluate evidence 
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already gathered by the parties, or to solve questions involving technical or scien-
tific competences, as repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court.89 It follows that 
the expert’s actions cannot fall outside of the scope of the facts of the case, both as 
presented by the parties and as supposedly proved by them according to the bur-
den of proof: as the court is subject to the limit of what has been expressly asked 
by the parties when presenting the case (art. 115 c.p.c.), so is the expert. 
By exercising its discretionary power, the court decides whether it is opportune 
to appoint an expert; in case, it proceeds with an order (art. 191). The appointed 
experts take part in the judicial hearing arranged during the first appearance of the 
parties in front of the court (art. 183, par. 7). They conduct the proper investiga-
tions, by their own or accompanied by the judge, and can be assisted by the parties 
or by experts the parties have nominated (art. 194); they finally reply to the specif-
ic queries posed by the judge, usually in the form of a written report (art. 195). 
The expert opinion is not binding in character, but instructive for the court, which 
remains peritus peritorum (literally, expert among experts) and has the last word 
on the evaluation of its outcomes: the court determines if and how to use them to 
settle the facts of the case. In this regard, it is notable the contradiction of consid-
ering judges at the same time not competent to personally evaluate the facts, but 
competent enough to assess the expert’s technical report (Comoglio et al. 2011). 
Logical errors, omissions in the investigations, and inexact application of tech-
nical rules, which may affect the expert’s opinion, do not constitute an autono-
mous reason to appeal the decision that acknowledges them, unless they funda-
mentally vitiate the motivation of that decision (Comoglio et al. 2014). According 
to the main trend in case law,90 if the court endorses the expert’s conclusions and 
no specific criticism has been raised by the parties, the decision can merely refer 
to the report, without any express refutations of the parties’ contrary positions, 
particularly if the report has already sufficiently examined them. On the contrary, 
in case the court disagrees with the expert, it should adequately motivate why the 
report is considered untrustworthy and what other elements ground the decision 
(e.g., Cass. no. 23969/2004). 
Trial consultancy has a main objective limit: it cannot concern legal evaluations 
of facts and the identification and interpretation of the law to be applied to the 
concrete case, being in force the principle iura novit curia. At a first sight, this 
should lead to reject the possibility to resort to experts to access the content of the 
foreign law. Nevertheless, interpreting art. 14, the Supreme Court91 has observed 
that national courts has the faculty to resort to experts in order to get familiar with 
the foreign law content in private international law cases, and the legal doctrine 
generally sees trial consultancy as the most appropriate solution to acquire such 
knowledge (Boschiero 1996). Also, the discussion between the appointed expert 
and the experts nominated by the parties can allow the court to evaluate which of 
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91 Cass. civ. sect. I, 09/01/2004, no. 115. 
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many possible interpretations is preferable (Carbone 2009). The underlying prin-
ciple is to increase the chances that the relevant foreign law is correctly applied: 
accordingly, judges can “resort to any means, also informal” (e.g., Cass., civ. Un. 
Sect., 07/06/2012, no. 9189), including their private knowledge (Carbone 2009), 
in order to guarantee effectiveness to the foreign law. 
At the same time, resorting to experts to apply the foreign law contributes to 
blur the line that article 14 draws between foreign law as a question of law or as a 
question of fact, a troublesome issue both in common law and civil law systems. 
Besides, the court acquires the content of the foreign law indirectly, as it is report-
ed by the expert. On the one hand, the court interprets the foreign law and moti-
vates its application; on the other hand, at least normally, it is probably ignorant of 
the original context of that law, the language in which that law is expressed, and 
its possible consequences for the domestic system. Canale (2015) addresses a sim-
ilar situation, occurring when the court does not know the content of a legal provi-
sion, because it is expressed in a technical or scientific language it does not mas-
ter, and anyway applies such content, as identified by experts, to decide the case. 
This happens more and more frequently, e.g., when the applicable law governs the 
sale of chemical products, such as pharmaceuticals, or regulates technical activi-
ties. In such cases, it is not rare that administrative bodies intervene to set stand-
ards that end up identifying the applicative conditions of laws and that cannot be 
evaluated by judges, who lack the required competences. Canale names the situa-
tion “opacity of norms:” these norms would be opaque both for the judge, substan-
tially unaware of what is applying also after the expert’s intervention, and for the 
experts, unable to assess the legal consequences of their opinions. Besides, the au-
thor affirms that the experts’ job impacts also on interpretation and decision mak-
ing, preventing judges from interpreting the law when necessary. For instance, the 
court would not be able to detect ambiguities or vague terms in the text for it is not 
able to understand the text itself completely. 
In some way, the foreign norm as well is and remains “opaque” to the domestic 
court in many respects: the court needs to be assisted in acquiring knowledge of 
foreign law content, and has a limited vision on the foreign legal system, also after 
obtaining the expert’s opinion. But, is this enough to maintain that expert opinions 
nullify the interpretive and argumentative power/duty of courts? If so, we should 
presume that, whenever the court is helped in accomplishing its task, it is de facto 
delegating its decisional power to others. Thus, when it resorts to ordinary trial 
consultancy, the court would basically abdicate responsibility for the case, instead 
of simply benefiting from a supplementary tool, provided for by the lawmaker, to 
better fulfill its obligations, in compliance with the interests of the parties. 
Similarly, we cannot deduce that the indirect (acquisition of) knowledge of the 
foreign law, even if existing and, at present, unavoidable, implies that the court 
does not interpret it. Rather, from this, it follows that its interpretive choices may 
be practically influenced by what the experts propose as foreign law. Therefore, 
the evaluation of experts assisting the judiciary in foreign law application should 
not be limited to the usual parameters, testing their personal and professional cred-
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ibility, trustworthiness, expertise and the general consistency of delivered opin-
ions. But it should also measure the coherence of the provided legal information in 
the framework of the foreign legal order (e.g., with reference to case law, or legal 
doctrine), the consistency of more possible interpretations of the foreign rule, and 
the authority and legitimacy of the sources supporting their opinions.  
  
4.2. Interpreting the Foreign Rule 
Art. 15 of law no. 218/1995 establishes that foreign provisions are applied accord-
ing to their own criteria of interpretation and application over time. Such rule di-
rectly ensues from choosing a private international law system that accepts the 
foreign law as proper law, demanding the judiciary to search for the interpretation 
methods and canons followed by their foreign colleagues. So, not only it proves 
hard for the court to get familiar with the content of the foreign law and its usual 
interpretation in the foreign country for all the reasons we have mentioned above, 
but also it opens scenarios of conflicts among interpretative traditions once, in the 
ideal situation, those canons have accessed the Italian system. In fact, if the gap 
existing between facts and legal concepts challenges the application and interpre-
tation of the law within one legal system (Prakken 2005), all the more, it challeng-
es the application of foreign law in the system of destination, requiring for com-
parisons with domestic legal concepts, categorisations, and institutions. Conflicts 
between normative systems may thus eventually emerge at the level of interpreta-
tion, as the next chapter shows in detail. 
Since doubts have soon arisen about the concrete application of article 15, the 
Supreme Court has often intervened to clarify and specify its content and function-
ing. First, it is worth noting that the interpretation guidelines there included are 
considered generally applicable: they work not only when the foreign law is iden-
tified by national conflict rules, but also when it is referred to by international 
treaties or EU regulations, the most recurrent situation nowadays.92 
The Court has also established the following directives for a correct application 
of art. 15:93 
 The foreign legal system is referred to as a whole and in as much as it is practi-
cally experienced and applied by the foreign legal experts; 
 Reference to foreign criteria of interpretation and application over time should 
not be understood as implying a strict obligation for the domestic court to ac-
quire all the possible documentation relating the way the foreign rule is always 
applied in concrete cases; 
                                                          
92 Cass., civ. sect. I, 26/10/2015 no. 21712. 
93 Cass. 26/02/2002 no. 2791; Cass. no. 21712/2015 (already cited). 
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 In particular, although domestic courts have to take action to acquire the for-
eign law content as well as its prevailing mode of interpretation, this does not 
mean that they should obtain and examine all the related case law; rather, they 
should investigate if there is a prevailing trend in foreign case law with refer-
ence to the application of that piece of law; 
 It should be read as referring to the rules that, in the foreign legal system, regu-
late entry into force of laws, their temporal validity, hierarchy among sources 
of law, interpretation of criminal and special provisions; 
 It should also be taken into account that interpretation of the foreign law cannot 
disregard public policy considerations, which now convey both internal and in-
ternational or supranational interests, purposes, and values. 
Additionally, the interpreter’s task in cross-border cases is better understood if 
the following private international law mechanisms are kept in mind. Examined, 
in a scattered way, in the preceding pages, they end up subtly, but pervasively im-
pacting on the concrete possibility of interpretive conflicts among different legal 
systems. 
First, distinct legal systems may protect the same rights as well as pursue the 
same goals differently. Not only is this phenomenon absolutely normal, for such 
differences are expression of different lawmakers, legal traditions, and linguistic 
communities, but also it cannot be removed altogether. National courts facing the 
variety between legal solutions are tempted to make use of the public policy reser-
vation, or to easily resort to overriding mandatory rules, and consequently to reject 
the foreign law. Still, different regulations do not necessarily mean them to be 
wrong or substantially incompatible with the domestic legal order, as recently re-
affirmed by the Supreme Court.94 On similar occasions, domestic courts should ra-
ther assess whether the foreign legal solution is capable of protecting the rights 
and of reaching the normative goals involved, even if in alternative ways. System-
atically disregarding the applicable foreign law in front of regulatory discrepancies 
ultimately deprives private international law of its own purpose and raison d’être. 
Also, from the perspective of globalisation of legal orders, private international 
law should favour the transnational circulation of legal rules, and not contribute to 
their further fragmentation.95 
Secondly, private international law has been touched, and transformed, by the 
dynamics of supranational and international law: today, a broad legal framework, 
variously overcoming national borders, encompasses the majority of national legal 
systems. As a result, not only conflict rules are always more often derived from 
sources other than national ones, as it has been often remarked above, but also the 
principles and peculiar purposes of other legal levels and systems influence the in-
terpretation of both foreign and national law: consider the pervasive effects of the 
EU consumer protection law, or of the European Convention on Human Rights 
                                                          
94 Cass. 15/4/2015 no. 7613.  
95 As expressed by the cited decree no. 9978/2016 of the Court of Cassation. 
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(Kiestra 2014), which has established a proper multilevel protection of fundamen-
tal rights in Europe. 
Domestic courts should enlarge their interpretive horizon, rising above merely 
national perspectives and walking previously unexplored interpretative paths as 
for legal solutions and concepts. In particular, if law application is assumed to be 
an argumentative activity that is firstly and essentially interpretative in kind, then, 
legal systems ultimately interact through interpretive arguments. Even concretely 
avoiding conflicts between different normative systems depends on how national 
judges reason in such situations: what interpretive arguments they build, how they 
decide upon potential normative gaps, clashes between principles, and vague con-
cepts, how superior principles are referred to in the cross-border decision-making. 
Apparently, both the law seen as a problem-solving activity, and the renewed plu-
ralist approaches to conflict of laws could provide for useful conceptualisations, 
putting the interpretative challenge in the perspective of what the finest legal solu-
tions are in an interdependent and globalised legal world. 
Lastly, it could be questioned whether the foreign law should be compliant with 
the constitution of the source legal system, and domestic courts should check its 
original constitutionality as a consequence. In fact, the reply depends on the type 
of judicial review existing in the foreign legal system. For example, Italian courts, 
in case of uncertain constitutionality of a piece of inner legislation that applies to a 
particular case, can interrupt the proceedings before them, and remit the relative 
question to the Constitutional Court, empowered to evaluate the constitutional 
compliance of legislative acts (art. 134, Constitution). If the Constitutional Court 
deems the rule unconstitutional, it pronounces on it with a constitutive opinion 
that has retroactive effects. In fact, unless it specifies that the pronouncement im-
pacts only on future cases starting from the one that originated the judicial review, 
the unconstitutional law is removed from the legal order as if it was never validly 
promulgated: tamquam non esset, claims the Latin brocard. 
Italy has clearly opted for a form of concentrated judicial review, which can be 
activated by courts incidentally, i.e., in trials underway, and cannot elude the role 
of the Constitutional Court, the only judicial authority allowed for ruling on mat-
ters of constitutionality. Contrarily to the concentrated one, the diffuse judicial re-
view entails that all the judiciary are authorised to invalidate laws and opinions 
held incompatible with constitutional provisions, without the need to resort to a 
superior court for solving doubts of constitutionality. The constitutional review is 
thus carried out by any court of the system, which will eventually set aside the un-
constitutional piece of law, but just in respect to the particular case. 
As a result of the distinction between concentrated and diffuse forms of judicial 
review, it is argued that Italian courts can proceed to examine the original consti-
tutionality of the identified foreign law, if the foreign legal system admits some 
type of diffuse judicial review (Mosconi and Campiglio 2015). Only afterwards, 
the court shall assess if the interpreted foreign law is compatible also with the sys-
tem of destination: public policy is partially constituted exactly by the fundamen-
tal constitutional principles of the domestic system. 
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5. Closing Remarks 
The chapter has first clarified what changes Italy has experienced in legal sources 
and in general understanding of private international law, as a result of its partici-
pation to the international community and of its membership to the EU. Domestic-
based conflict rules and connecting factors have witnessed a progressive reduction 
of their role in consequence of the EU regulatory action in this field, exercised 
with the intent of favouring the internal market and a common space of justice and 
freedom. In particular, the Europeanisation of private international law has im-
pacted on the system, resulting from the reform of the statutory law no. 218/1995. 
Despite being still in force, the conflict rules there provided for are applied just in 
case no other EU private international law rule exists. 
Acknowledging this reality, the chapter has mainly focused on how statute no. 
218 faces basic questions of private international law, and so do corresponding EU 
rules. Such questions stem from the tension that intrinsically features  private in-
ternational law: on the one hand, by recognising that the relevant law can be a for-
eign law, it opens to other legal systems, of which it acknowledges the existence; 
on the other hand, such openness allows extra-systemic elements to access the 
domestic system, raising reasonable doubts about their compatibility with the sys-
tem itself. In this scenario, both public policy and overriding mandatory rules, 
even if partly changed in content and scope, continue to protect the fundamentals 
of the domestic system. In sight of the next chapter, it is useful to recall that the 
public policy clause functions as an exception to foreign law application, whenev-
er foreign law is deemed to have negative effects on the domestic system. By con-
trast, overriding mandatory rules even prevent conflict rules from being applied: 
the legislator has already decided that a certain topic is regulated exclusively by 
inner law. In very similar terms, both institutions are provided for by the EU legis-
lator. 
The case of punitive damages has then been presented as an example of the use 
of public policy so to reject a foreign legal institution. In fact, punitive damages 
have been typically considered irreconcilably conflicting with Italian legal ap-
proaches to civil liability, so that courts have generally opposed their recognition 
with the public policy exception. But, the Supreme Court has recently challenged 
the traditional, merely compensatory function that the Italian legal order assigns to 
damages, noting that, in some cases, the lawmaker has already attributed coercive 
or sanctioning functions to damages. Even if the unified sections of the Court have 
not yet pronounced on it,96 the fact that a question as such has been posed seems to 
signal an ongoing or future change in attitudes. 
The last section has first provided for details of how Italian judges effectively 
acquire knowledge of foreign law, examining the tools that art. 14 puts at their 
disposal. Special attention has been paid to the role experts may possibly play in 
                                                          
96 Update on 19/04/2017. 
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private international law cases, upon judicial request. Then, the chapter arrives at 
the analysis of art. 15: if other general provisions of statute no. 218 have been re-
placed by corresponding international or EU rules (e.g., those providing for public 
policy), this provision is still generally applicable when it comes to applying for-
eign law in private international law cases, whatever the source of conflict rule. It 
provides for a challenging imperative: the foreign law has to be applied according 
to its own canons of interpretation and application over time. After exploring how 
it is usually read and applied in the Supreme Court’ case law, it has been argued 
that foreign law interpretation is the trickiest moment for the domestic court deal-
ing with cross-border cases. In fact, not only it requires the court to engage in a 
difficult search for those interpretation canons and methods, but also it often 
brings about interpretive uncertainties or even incompatibilities. Enlarging the in-
terpretive horizon of domestic courts would be beneficial in such situations, if on-
ly for favouring the parties’ reasonable expectations as the applicable law to their 
relation, and for honouring the participation to the international community and to 
the European Union with all its principles and goals. 
In line with the last remark, the following chapter is totally committed to ana-
lysing interpretative case scenarios in the event of foreign law application and to 
introducing an argument-based approach for facing the theoretical and practical 
problems they present. After overviewing what has already been done in the field 
of pluralist reasoning and, particularly, reasoning in conflict of laws contexts, the 
previous chapter has highlighted the lack of analysis of the interpretative reason-
ing required in such pluralist settings. In the overall framework of the thesis, thus, 
the present chapter has provided for the pillars within which the domestic court 
plays, considering that private international law is no more a merely national af-
fair. 
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Chapter 5: Arguing across Legal Systems in 
Private International Law 
 
1. Applying Foreign Law: an Uncertain, Stepwise Endeavour 
At this point of the thesis, it is arguable that, when it comes to dealing with cross-
border disputes in the European Union, national judges, lawyers, and private sub-
jects (both individuals, and companies) experience it first-hand that the normative 
framework more and more consists of interactions that apparently elude any form 
of logical thinking. Still, legal reasoning in pluralist contexts has been shown to be 
not as illogical as it may appear at first glance.97 Through the use of pluralist logic 
and argumentation, it has been demonstrated that not only standards of correct 
reasoning exist with reference to interactions between distinct normative systems 
(Sartor 2005), but also that modular argumentation can properly formalise all the 
different fragments of legal knowledge involved in such reasoning (Dung and Sar-
tor 2011). 
Though, these AI and Law works have mainly addressed how different juris-
dictions and normative systems interact and work jointly for avoiding that, when a 
cross-border dispute occurs, more legal systems are all concurrently competent. So 
far, it has been disregarded how the identified piece of foreign law should be ap-
plied and interpreted by domestic courts. In that respect, private international law 
provides an ideal test-bed to assess whether there exists some rationality while 
reasoning with, applying, and interpreting foreign provisions. In fact, through the 
described mechanisms of jurisdiction and choice of law, private international law 
may allow domestic courts to apply foreign law to the concrete case, or to recog-
nise and enforce foreign judicial measures within the territory of their legal sys-
tem. 
As a general premise, consider that the analysis developed in this chapter, even 
if based on the Italian legal scenario, is conceptually expandable to any country 
facing the challenge of applying foreign law. At its core, it intends to offer a fresh 
theoretical framework for cross-border interpretative mismatches and misunder-
standings, triggered by private international law. Article 15, law no. 218/95, ap-
plied irrespective of the legal source of the conflict rule, requires that courts apply 
foreign law “according to its own canons of interpretation and application over 
time:” thus, foreign canons of interpretation may not correspond to domestic ones, 
and conflicts of many kinds may plausibly arise. Also, it is undeniable that nation-
                                                          
97 See chapter 3. 
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al judges apply foreign law only after having ascertained, with an acceptable de-
gree of certainty, its content and, possibly, its probable interpretations. The imper-
ative of applying foreign law ex officio,98 essential to the Italian system of private 
international law,99 confronts the precondition of being aware of that law: typical-
ly, this is not the case as domestic courts are hardly familiar with foreign legal sys-
tems. Facing the issue of correctly interpreting and applying foreign law in private 
international law, it cannot be ignored that foreign law knowledge is (mostly) indi-
rectly acquired: it often implies resorting to sources, external to the proceedings, 
whose authority guarantees a fair transmission of knowledge and, then, application 
of foreign law. Different ways to account for this knowledge problem are, for ex-
ample, the appointment of foreign law experts, or the recourse to governmental in-
formative channels. Besides merely epistemic concerns, questions arise about the 
legitimacy and authority of the foreign legal content acquired, also in light of the 
constitutional provisions Italian judges have to comply with in civil trials (Como-
glio et al. 2011). In other words, the fact that domestic courts are applying foreign 
law does not exempt them from respecting their duties and the right of the parties 
to have their case fairly and legitimately decided. 
Our theoretical analysis takes advantage of argumentation theory’ tools. Gener-
ally, argumentation theory proves useful for addressing legal reasoning as a form 
of practical reasoning, as shown in chapter 2. Specifically, as regards private in-
ternational law, it can give valuable insights on the coexistence of systemic and 
extra-systemic elements in legal proceedings and judicial opinions, on the one 
hand, and on the practical acceptance of foreign elements by the recipient legal 
system, on the other, by clarifying in what ways, for what reasons, and with what 
purposes acceptance is eventually achieved and potential conflicts are faced and 
possibly solved. Also, with reference to the role played by external sources in ac-
cessing foreign law content, e.g., foreign law experts, argumentation helps identify 
what elements contribute to form the court’s belief about the law concretely appli-
cable, by setting the standards for assessing both external source’s credibility and 
its justified opinion, however expressed.100 
Before proceeding with the analysis, the following are assumed: 
 In our world, different laws and legal systems exist:101 states (often with more 
sub-legal systems), supranational systems (e.g., the EU), international treaties 
signed by states establishing the international community;102 
                                                          
98 Ascertainment of foreign law is more generally discussed in chapter 3, sect. 3.  
99 More in chapter 4, sect. 4. 
100 Here, we refer to any external source of knowledge and their different modes of expression: 
e.g., governmental channels usually express their opinion through written notes, often very con-
cise, whereas experts are appointed by courts and take active part to the proceedings, delivering a 
more extensive report on the relevant foreign law. 
101 From a comparatist perspective, Legrand (2012, p. 34) talks about “differential co-presence,” 
in Leibniz’s terms: not only more laws exist but also they are different from each other. Support-
ing law’s pluralist nature, see the already cited Glenn (2014). 
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 We consider Italian courts competent to decide the case and consequently ig-
nore any complication arising in this respect: the cross-border dispute has al-
ways been correctly allocated to the competent jurisdiction and court. Hereby, 
we just examine what happens when the conflict rule, whatever its legal source, 
identify the foreign legal system, the provisions of which should be applied and 
interpreted. 
 As a result, the Italian system of private international law, consisting in conflict 
rules included in law no. 218/95, in EU regulations, and in international trea-
ties, is conveniently applied. 
 Conflict rules are interpreted according to the level of law they stem from: for 
instance, EU conflict of laws regulations need to be interpreted according to the 
canons of interpretation of EU law. Yet, such level of interpretation is not ex-
amined, unless it directly influences the following interpretation of foreign law. 
The chapter develops into four main sections. Section 2 explores how domestic 
courts acquire the needed knowledge of the relevant foreign law, provided that na-
tional judges hardly know its content on their own. Consider that not only judicial 
lack of familiarity with foreign law but also a potential personal knowledge of it, 
if combined with a simplistic view on foreign law and legal inter-systemic interac-
tions, risk to result in misinterpretation and misapplication of foreign provisions to 
the detriment of the parties.103 A sensible reliance on experts’ opinions is often the 
only viable solution, taking into account the larger scheme of (comparatist) dia-
logue between legal systems. An argument scheme is thus identified for evaluating 
expert’s contribution to knowledge of foreign law. Section 3 pictures some inter-
pretive case scenarios, introducing the issue of cross-border interpretive incompat-
ibility to the reader. Section 4 defines: a) the semi-formal language with its cave-
ats; b) a scheme for arguing with and about foreign canons of interpretation; c) the 
notion of cross-border interpretive incompatibilities, then analysed in various in-
stantiations; d) the relevant critical questions. Lastly, section 5 illustrates the first 
attempt to formalise the argument-based framework proposed in the preceding 
section. 
                                                                                                                                     
102 It is wort noting that, although it outreaches the scope of our work, the debate about which re-
lationship exists between those many levels of law is still lively, and many theories, in turn refer-
ring to monism, dualism, or pluralism, have tried to understand and explain it. See, for example, 
the recent theory of the law creators’ circle by Kirchmair (2016). 
103 For example, chapter 3 has presented the Bodum case (USA), in which the misapplication of 
French law provoked experts’ indignant reactions (e.g., Legrand 2013). 
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2. Foreign Law Knowledge 
Traditionally, knowledge is defined as justified true belief104 (Steup 2016): subject 
S knows that proposition p if and only if p is true and S is justified in believing 
that p. Truth, belief, and justification are thus “individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient” for knowledge (Ichikawa and Steup 2016). Applying this paradigm to 
the issue of foreign law knowledge, what is supposedly required for domestic 
judges to know the foreign law could thus be a well-supported belief that the rele-
vant foreign law has a certain content and, also, certain rules of interpretation and 
application.  
The first question is whether Italian courts are in such an epistemic position, so 
that their beliefs about foreign law’ content are true for justified reasons. Assum-
ing that a court is in the appropriate position to know the relevant law primarily 
because of its proximity105 to that law itself,106 consider the following epistemic 
positions (S is the national court, p the relevant foreign law): 
 Scenario 1–S is in the epistemic position to know p. The national judiciary has 
been educated and trained in more than one legal system and, with reference to 
those systems, it is in the position to know the law. 
 Scenario 2–S may be in the epistemic position to know p. For no “institutional” 
reasons, the court has personal knowledge of (some parts of) the applicable for-
eign law, masters the language in which that law is expressed, or is aware of 
the general context featuring that foreign legal system.  
 Scenario 3–S is not in the epistemic position to know p. Not only the court does 
not directly know the foreign law, but also it has neither the linguistic compe-
tences nor some knowledge of its characterising contextual factors. 
                                                          
104 Even though widely-accepted, such definition of knowledge has been ascribed two different 
meanings. In its strong conception, dating back to Descartes, knowers have knowledge of some-
thing only if they have conclusive reasons to believe it to be true (BonJour 2010). Differently, 
according to its weak conception (also called fallibilist account for knowledge), one may know 
something also just in presence of a probable justification for it (Pritchard and Turri 2014). If the 
first conception is usually rejected for its requirements are hard to meet in practice, the second is 
open to a basic criticism: if “justification comes in degree” (BonJour 2010, p. 58), a threshold, 
beyond which the subject can be said to have knowledge of something, must be fixed (exactly, 
the threshold problem) and it risks to be a matter of arbitrary choices (for an overview of replies 
to such critique, mostly known as impurism, please see Hannon 2017). 
105 Proximity is here understood in terms of physical and cultural closeness of the knower, i.e., 
the court, to its object of knowledge, i.e., the relevant law. 
106 Speaking of law, the epistemic plausibility, i.e., the fact that something can be known, is 
strictly linked to the legitimacy of that knowledge, i.e., the fact that the knower has the authority 
to legitimately acquire knowledge of (then applicable) law. In what follows, emphasis is put on 
“knowability” of foreign law as an epistemic problem, even if it cannot be disregarded that the 
authoritativeness of the knowledge source and the judicial ability to understand it strongly influ-
ence its concrete application. 
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If national courts share education and training with foreign courts, as in scenar-
io 1, they also are in the same epistemic position as foreign judges are to know 
foreign law. Also provided that it is not just a theoretical situation,107 it would 
concern, in the best case, only some foreign legal systems, probably belonging to 
similar legal traditions or the same linguistic community, in the worst case, just 
two legal systems, the national and one of choice of the legal professional: epis-
temic issues would be left open for all the remainder legal systems. 
Also scenario 2 is infrequent and merely accidental, but not negligible a priori: 
we cannot deny that, for some unspecified reasons, the court has had some experi-
ence of the relevant foreign law or is able to acquire some knowledge of it in au-
tonomous ways. If this is the case, according to sceptical standpoints, whatever 
personal knowledge of foreign law the court has, its roots in another legal system 
could impede a full correspondence between foreign law as applied in the domes-
tic system and foreign law as lived in the foreign country.108 In detail, it should be 
explored whether courts’ beliefs about foreign law satisfy the epistemic standards 
that guarantee its (at least) probable truth,109 as it will be clearer later on, not to say 
that such personal, informal knowledge has no authority nor legitimacy and should 
be sifted through adversarial mechanisms in order to have normative force in the 
case. 
Lastly, scenario 3 is no doubt the most recurrent, for the many reasons we have 
mentioned in this and previous chapters. As a matter of fact, it is not conceivable 
that national courts normally know foreign law, or have personal tools to get such 
knowledge on their own: mostly, they do not find themselves in adequate epistem-
ic position to accomplish the task, lacking linguistic skills as well as conceptual, 
cultural, and other contextual information featuring the relevant foreign law and 
legal system.  
Such uncertain and, generally, inconclusive epistemic positions seem to com-
promise any chance of correct foreign law application by Italian courts: national 
judges risk to run after their foreign colleagues, except for realising, at the last 
sprint, that they have been running two different races, and no common finish line 
even exists. At present, the epistemic gap represents one of the main “expenditure 
items” for the finances of private international law: expensive for both the court, 
with regard to cognitive and temporal resources, and the parties, in terms of (frus-
trated) interest to see foreign law properly applied. Therefore, it is worth investi-
gating what may put domestic judges in a more favourable epistemic position, so 
                                                          
107 As things stand now in Italian professional education, but also elsewhere in the EU (see, e.g., 
Verhellen’s (2016) report on similar circumstances in Belgium), this is exactly a theoretical ex-
ample. Still, it cannot be dismissed the idea that in future we could have different scenarios, e.g., 
due to common training activities or exchanges, in which the European Judicial Training Net-
work (www.ejtn.eu, accessed on 12/12/2016) is already engaging the judiciary of EU countries. 
108 See Legrand (2006, 2013). 
109 Even if a further analysis is not the focus of this thesis, it is worth noting that, theoretically, 
questions about what is domestic and foreign and the plausibility of legal knowledge could be 
posed also with reference to inner law. 
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that they could be satisfactorily closer to the object of knowledge with reasonable 
warranties of reliability, within the limits of (in)comparability between legal con-
cepts.110 However, consider that private international law, though strictly connect-
ed with comparative law and its studied set of problems, has a strong pragmatic 
bias against foreign law: since courts are first and foremost bound to “speak the 
law,” often “knowledge” of foreign law are those justified beliefs that practically 
allow courts to act on them with sufficient reasonableness, without much detailed 
exploration in terms of subtle nuances of meaning or conceptual misalignments. 
Yet, epistemologists agree on the existence of various sources of knowledge: 
perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony (Steup 2016). Different-
ly from the others, testimony is an indirect source, since it implies that S comes to 
know that p on the basis of someone’s reporting that p (id.). In everyday life, we 
often know things through testimony, broadly understood: when we read news 
from the newspaper, when someone tells us what time it is, and so on. From an 
epistemological perspective, an expert is a kind of testimony and is acknowledged 
a crucial role in acquisition of knowledge111 since, through them, we can more eas-
ily access technical and scientific notions. Also the legal domain looks to experts 
for validating knowledge of specific events or facts: e.g., as a result of experts’ as-
sistance, courts can evaluate technical or scientific evidence in trial.112 But, even if 
experts generally contribute to put the judge in a position to better know and un-
derstand something, a conceptual and terminological clarification is necessary: in 
common law systems, experts are indeed a special type of trial testimony and un-
dergo cross-examination as common witnesses do. Differently, in civil law sys-
tems, testimony is legally understood as the declaration uttered by a subject who 
had direct knowledge of the facts to be proved, whereas experts intervene, upon 
judicial request, to support the court in evaluating evidence: they convey a testi-
mony just in the epistemic sense above mentioned. By drawing such fundamental 
distinction, however, we do not intend to deny that, ultimately, experts in both le-
gal traditions get involved in private international law proceedings exactly to help 
courts become familiar with foreign law, as, e.g., provided for by Italian private 
international law (art. 14). In addition, a similar intervention raises further ques-
tions: why should such “testimony” provide courts with the required justified true 
belief on foreign law? What epistemic standards should be satisfied for the know-
er, i.e., the court, to have knowledge of what is “testified” on, i.e., foreign law? 
                                                          
110 This issue is typically discussed by comparatists: see chapter 3, sect. 2.2. Also, problems of 
legal translation are well-known: see, for example, Wróblewski (2000), distinguishing between 
linguistic, systemic, and functional equivalence of different legal languages. 
111 We refer to the ordinary usage of the terms “knowledge acquisition” as a form of human 
learning, and not to the knowledge engineering meaning, implying “teaching” to machines “by 
constructing a knowledge base that mimicked, or at least could be a functional equivalent of hu-
man domain knowledge” (Breuker 2013, p. 177). 
112 Expert opinions have been already discussed elsewhere in the thesis: for the analysis of the 
argument from expert opinion, see chapter 2, sect. 3; for their role in foreign law application 
from a purely legal point of view, see chapter 3, sect. 2. 
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In Italy, domestic courts acquire foreign law expert opinions through trial con-
sultancy, even if, in civil procedure law terms, they are not proper trial consultan-
cies, as explained in chapter 4. However, resorting to foreign law experts not only 
cannot be easily eluded from a practical point of view, since hardly, if ever, Italian 
judges are in a good epistemic position to directly and independently access and 
know foreign law. But, compared with other informative channels, like govern-
mental ones, it should also be encouraged for at least two reasons. Firstly, even as-
suming that the epistemic gap cannot be totally bridged and misalignments cannot 
be entirely eliminated, relying on experts should reduce the chances that national 
judges fall back on “domestic-like” foreign law applications, as in the US Bodum 
case, or directly reject foreign law in favour of forum law: in fact, usually, experts 
not only present the content of foreign provisions, but also try to explain their con-
text and plausible interpretations. Secondly, judges can profit, also in law applica-
tion, from the dialectics typical of ascertainment of facts in trial. Court-appointed 
experts may be assisted by experts nominated by the parties:113 the closing report, 
written by the court-appointed expert, encompasses various positions on content 
and interpretation of the relevant foreign law, expressed by the experts involved. 
In turn, such dynamics allow the foreign law to lose its (special) factual nature and 
to transform itself into a proper legal argument, which could be then processed 
and applied in the system of destination. 
In particular, concerning the probable truth of p, i.e., what the expert reports as 
foreign law, we maintain that, since experts are supposedly close to the epistemic 
community of the foreign legal system, they are aware of the specific intentions 
and presuppositions featuring that context. As a consequence, they are acknowl-
edged an acceptable epistemic position with reference to p, so that they are firstly 
able to acquire that knowledge on their own and, secondly, to satisfactorily trans-
mit it to those who are interested. That is the reason why, in the end, the expert’s 
intervention is considered sufficient to settle the epistemic difficulties in practice. 
If the national judges are mostly denied to autonomously know foreign law, on the 
contrary, experts are free to access it due to their acknowledged position, and to 
put others in a similar epistemic position: it follows that domestic courts can be 
provided with relevant and usable knowledge. Relevance of knowledge is then de-
fined with reference to the facts of the case, the legal questions presented by the 
parties, and the specific queries of the court; usability is rather assessed in terms of 
capability of prospecting a normative solution for the dispute, in line with the for-
eign legal order.  
It is not rare that appointed experts are comparatists. Still, experts are not en-
trusted with the task of drafting a comparative analysis of both legal systems on 
the legal issue at stake; rather, they should provide judges with sufficient (i.e., rel-
                                                          
113 Such dynamics are evident in common law systems, where party-appointed experts are cross-
examined as witnesses in the trial. Cross-examination may even result in fully opposite opinions 
expressed on the facts of the case, so that the court/jury must rely on the more persuasive opinion 
(so called battle of experts). 
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evant and usable) knowledge of foreign law’ content. So, in private international 
law cases, comparative law is often understood in merely functionalist and instru-
mentalist terms, as “a means to an end, one end only, which is to resolve concrete 
practical problems.” (Bermann et al. 2011, p. 956 – Zoller) 
Judges need to trust the appointed experts for safely relying on their contribu-
tion and for constructing their knowledge of foreign law. Trust is a highly critical 
issue when it comes to scientific or technical experts in trial, mainly because sci-
ence itself is fallible par excellence and, often, scientific communities admit more 
explanatory theories of the same problem. As for foreign law experts, the impact 
of the problem is softened and trust is satisfactorily built by requiring that experts 
are personally dependable, credible in the field of their expertise, i.e., the relevant 
foreign law, and justify their opinions with reliable sources of information. Be-
sides, experts’ trustworthiness is confirmed, and agreed upon, by the very epistem-
ic community they belong to: documented legal practice in the foreign legal order, 
scientific publications, or long-standing work in pertinent research centres may be 
sufficient proof of their reliability and, consequently, of the reliability of their jus-
tified opinions. 
At this point, it is worth recalling the argument from expert opinion, introduced 
in the second chapter, for it can offer a way to assess if opinions on foreign law, 
expressed by experts, count as knowledge, upon which courts can rightfully act. 
The following should be kept in mind: 
 Argument from expert opinion generally concerns acquisition of facts in trials 
and mainly aims to offer a professional point of view on technical or scientific 
evidence. It has been shown that, in private international law, foreign law is a 
sort of fact for national courts, which do not normally know it, requiring a reli-
able and legitimate114 source of knowledge. From these remarks, some modifi-
cations to the argument scheme follow, but they are not extreme. 
 In conflict of laws cases, expert opinions concern special facts, having a le-
gal/normative content, i.e., foreign provisions, and, thus, do not aim to evaluate 
evidence or to shift the burden of proof. On the one hand, they help to solve the 
epistemic issue, providing national courts with knowledge of foreign law. On 
the other hand, they contribute to transform such knowledge item, otherwise 
merely factual in kind, into a proper legal argument, which can be subsequently 
interpreted and applied by the national court. 
 As it is probably by now clear to the reader, a weak conception of knowledge is 
preferred. If meeting certain conditions of credibility, trustworthiness, reliabil-
ity, experts do provide national courts with highly probable beliefs about the 
content of foreign law, which in turn are considered sufficient knowledge for 
applying and interpreting foreign law. Differently, the strong conception would 
pose a too high epistemic standard, requiring national courts to have conclusive 
                                                          
114 Keep in mind footnote no. 106. 
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reasons, i.e., reasons that cannot be uncertain or just probable, regarding their 
beliefs about foreign law. 
 With reference to what epistemic standards should be satisfied to overcome the 
threshold problem regarding knowledge of foreign law, private international 
law context requires that the normative solution prospected by the court-
appointed expert should either provide evidence of the existence of a unique 
legal answer to the problem, thus rejecting other contrary positions, or present, 
in a consistent way, different modes of interpretation of foreign law. 
Thus, the argument from foreign law expert opinion, shaped on the argument 
from expert opinion (Walton et al. 2008), should account for all these remarks, es-
pecially in its critical questions: 
ARGUMENT FROM FOREIGN LAW EXPERT OPINION 
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in legal system F containing provision n. 
Minor Premise: E asserts that provision n (in legal system F) is true (false). 
Conclusion: n may plausibly be taken to be true (false). 
 
CQ1–Expertise Question: how credible is E as an expert source? 
CQ2–Foreign Legal System Question: is E an expert in the legal system that n is in? 
CQ3–Trustworthiness Question: is E personally reliable as a source? 
CQ4–Consistency Question: is n consistent with what case law and/or legal doctrine 
asserts? 
CQ5–Interpretation(s) Question: are various n1,…, nn presented plausible interpretations 
of n? 
CQ6–Reliable Source Question: is E’s assertion based on reliable source(s)? 
CQ1–2–3 are meant to assess both personal and professional reliability of the 
expert in the foreign legal system, preventing that bias or acknowledged dishones-
ty prejudice his/her work and checking his/her belonging (or proximity) to the ep-
istemic community of reference. CQ4 adapts the consistency question to the con-
text of foreign law: accordingly, the expert’s opinion should be consistent with the 
case law and legal doctrine that influence the interpretation and application of the 
relevant foreign law in the system of origin. CQ5 aims to reveal the existence of 
more plausible interpretations of foreign law n1,…, nn, presented as alternative in-
terpretive solutions by the experts. Lastly, in CQ6, the Backup Evidence Question 
is replaced by the Reliable Source Question: experts need to refer to reliable 
sources of information (e.g., official gazette) as supporting evidence for their as-
sertion on the foreign law content. CQ6 also faces the issue of authoritativeness 
and lawful force of n, i.e., foreign law as conveyed by the expert. Consider that the 
more reliable the expert’s sources prove to be, the easier will be for the national 
court to evaluate and choose among the range of interpretations n1,…, nn. 
Undeniably, foreign law raises strong epistemic concerns for domestic courts. 
Still, the fact that judges hardly find themselves in a satisfying epistemic position 
with regard to foreign law should stimulate lawmakers to find profitable ways to 
put them in such position. As also art. 14 law no. 218/95 shows, foreign law ex-
perts are exactly one of those legislative tools prepared for simplifying the judges’ 
task. So, knowing foreign law remains an epistemic enterprise, implying difficul-
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ties and limits of many sorts, but judges are not prevented from applying foreign 
provisions, even though unfortunate outcomes may occur.115 Besides, by critically 
questioning the expert opinion, the court preserves its position of first expert in 
trial, iudex peritus peritorum, a basic principle, all the more so when application 
of legal provisions is at stake. If such knowledge entails a good understanding of 
transmitted provisions and concepts and how judges may use it to interpret the 
foreign law, is analysed in the following sections. 
3. Interpreting across Borders: a Theoretical Picture 
Domestic courts mostly construct their knowledge about foreign law indirectly, by 
analysing and assessing either the expressed expert opinions on foreign law con-
tent,116 or legal information acquired through other external sources, like govern-
mental institutions, or through the parties themselves. 
In cognitive science terms, generally, when we address new information, we 
need to first mentally represent that information as concepts, propositions, rules, 
and analogies (Thagard 2000, Friedenberg and Silverman 2006). Only when we 
have at our disposal a mental representation of our world, we can process and ma-
nipulate information for our purposes. If “the structure of the mental representa-
tion places a cognitive constraint on our knowledge processes” (Grimm 2014, p. 
263), then, we will have different possibilities of reasoning with, or about, a piece 
of information and of drawing conclusions or comparisons from it, depending on 
what features of that information we decide to identify and represent in our mind. 
In other words, there is a strong link between mental representation of knowledge 
and its following processing and manipulation. 
Let us adapt such general knowledge pattern to foreign law application by do-
mestic courts. Whenever national courts are confronted with unfamiliar concepts, 
sentences, or rules, they should first have a mental representation of them, starting 
from the information at their disposal. In so doing, they can either search for simi-
lar notions they have in their cognitive store (memory) to confirm them, in case 
double-checking whether apparent similarities may hide discrepancies of meaning, 
thus, basically resorting to analogical reasoning, or discover how those new con-
cepts (e.g., legal institutions) work (Main 2013). Knowledge itself is not enough, 
if you do not have tools to adequately use that knowledge.117 In fact, the cognitive 
science metaphor further implies that, to satisfactorily apply foreign law, national 
                                                          
115 In the worst case, i.e., when foreign law cannot be ascertained, not even with the parties’ co-
operation, and no other connecting factor is identified by the conflict rule, judges apply inner law 
(art. 14, par. 2). 
116 Opinions are normally expressed in a final written report; though, if required, experts appear 
in court to reply to the queries in the presence of the judge and the parties. 
117 How to best represent and use knowledge is a real concern for AI (Kowalski 2011). 
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judges need to be able to process and manipulate it: to use their foreign law 
knowledge, they need to become familiar with the apparatus of foreign interpre-
tive canons and rules of application. In the end, through interpretation, the court 
faces the cognitive gap, administering justice in the concrete legal case and allow-
ing foreign law and canons to enter the domestic system. 
In what follows, we consider cases of foreign law application, each falling un-
der one of the next categories: 
 When choice of law rules (whatever their source, international, EU, or national) 
identify the law of another state as the law regulating the case: the court needs 
to interpret the foreign rule before it can be applied to the concrete case; 
 When the parties in a transnational contract have autonomously opted for a for-
eign law as the law governing their agreement: contractual clauses require to be 
classified and interpreted in light of the chosen foreign law; it can also happen 
that a legal institution, unknown to the domestic system, is established between 
Italian parties and has to be interpreted according to foreign law (e.g., trusts); 
 When the court is required to recognise and enforce a foreign judgement: in so 
doing, it needs to evaluate if foreign judgements, and the legal institutions they 
convey, are compatible with the domestic legal system. Usually, the recogni-
tion of foreign judgements is not strictly considered a matter of foreign law ap-
plication (Kiestra 2014); but such position overlooks that recognising an un-
known institution means to build an interpretive bridge between the two 
systems, often by searching for similar domestic law institutions, under which 
to classify the foreign institution, so to have proper legal effects. 
In all these cases, incompatibilities between legal systems118 may indeed occur 
because of different modes of interpretation: the rule as interpreted by the foreign 
legal system may prove incompatible with the public policy of the recipient sys-
tem; there may exist more, conflicting interpretations of the same provision; etc. 
The next subsection intends to provide for a seemingly exhaustive list of interpre-
tive case scenarios. Together with the mentioned major assumptions of our model, 
the case scenarios also assume the following rules, derived from Italian law no. 
218/1995: 
 Each case should present some link with one or more foreign countries: this is 
the factual premise for any application of private international law; 
 Private international law rules can be eluded only in case an overriding manda-
tory rule exists (art. 17); 
 Applicable is the substantive119 law of the relevant foreign legal system; renvoi 
(art. 13) is not considered as a viable solution, not only for reasons of simplici-
                                                          
118 It is worth repeating that two legal systems that regulate identical situations in different ways 
do not represent per se a logical contradiction or inconsistency, for the two systems are and re-
main separated (Hage 2015). 
119 Substantive law is distinct from the private international law of the foreign legal system. 
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ty (Dung and Sartor 2011), but also because always more often conflict of laws 
systems tend to avoid it whenever it is possible, as shown in chapter 4; 
 Public policy works as an ex post exception for preventing foreign law applica-
tion: if the relevant foreign law is not compatible with it, the foreign provision 
cannot be applied (art. 16); 
 The foreign substantive law must be applied according to its own canons of in-
terpretation and application over time (art. 15). 
3.1. Interpretive Case Scenarios 
The six interpretive case scenarios are structured as follows: 1) description of the 
hypothetical factual situation and normative framework; 2) focus on the incompat-
ibility that can presumably occur; 3) (eventual) reference to real legal cases, fall-
ing under the specific scenario.  
The symbols used are: 
 LSI for the Italian legal system, i.e., the domestic system considered;120 
 LSF for the foreign legal system, the substantive law n of which the competent 
Italian court k is required to apply; it has already been assumed that multiple 
legal systems LSi,…, LSz exist in our world, and no jurisdiction nor competence 
issue is at stake; 
 s is the cross-border legal dispute or relation; 
 c is the canon of interpretation that ascribes a meaning to the identified substan-
tive law n. 
3.1.1. Case (A): Existence of Overriding Mandatory Rules 
Imagine that there exists an inner provision that is considered a mandatory rule for 
the goal (g1) it pursues within the legal system. Then, suppose that s is not only 
governed by a foreign provision n, autonomously chosen by the parties, but also 
falls under the applicative scope of that mandatory provision. According to art. 17, 
mandatory rules override any other rule, private international law included, thus 
preventing its application. As a result, in case an overriding mandatory rule ap-
plies, foreign law is seen as ex ante incompatible with the domestic legal system. 
But suppose that the relevant foreign law n, originally applicable, can be inter-
preted, in LSF, both as n1, pursuing a goal g2 contrary to g1, and as n2, pursuing g1 
exactly as the inner provision does. If one of the possible interpretations of n is not 
conflicting with the important goal pursued by the inner mandatory rule and is, ra-
                                                          
120 It is worth repeating that the theoretical analysis, adequately changing the legislative frame-
work, lends itself to be extended to any legal system applying foreign law. 
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ther, capable of adequately satisfying its pursuit, can n be applied to the case? In 
fact, the Italian legal system pursues not only g1, but also others goals g3,…, gn, 
among which, for instance, legal certainty. In private international law, legal cer-
tainty is assured trying to meet the parties’ reasonable expectations as regards the 
law applicable to their relation, all the more so if that law was chosen by them. 
An example drawn by a real legal case,121 concerning classification and inter-
pretation of a clause of a transnational contract, can help to frame the interpretive 
issue. The particular clause, by stating that “in event of termination of this agree-
ment by the Licensor pursuant to this agreement […] the Licensee shall pay to the 
Licensor the balance of all outstanding sums payable to the Licensor under this 
Agreement,” substantially predetermines the amount to be paid in case of non-
fulfilment of contractual obligation by the licensee. Its regulation and consequent 
impact on the defaulting party depend on its classification and interpretation: in-
terpretive conflicts may arise because each legal system ascribes different mean-
ing and legal consequences to the same clause. 
According to the autonomous choice of the parties, the contract is regulated by 
the UK law, so that the Italian court should apply it to settle the dispute arisen 
around the classification of the clause. Under UK law, the clause could be classi-
fied in two ways, with opposite legal effects: 1) penalty clause, null and void, or 2) 
liquidated-damage-clause, legitimate. In Italy, the Civil Code classifies it as clau-
sola penale and art. 1384 provides for the equitable reduction of penalty clauses 
by courts in case of partial execution of the main obligation or of manifestly ex-
cessive amount of the penalty itself. This provision is a mandatory rule122 and its 
main goal is to protect the defaulting party by unfair economic repercussions. 
The question is, thus, if the UK regulation allows to satisfactorily achieve the 
goal. Indeed, UK case law favours a systematic interpretation of such contractual 
clauses, so that the distinction between penalty and liquidated-damage clauses is 
assessed considering many concrete elements existing when the clause was nego-
tiated in the contract. Penalty clauses just subsist in clearly excessive amounts of 
money, so called in terrorem clauses, whereas, mostly, the disputed clauses are 
read as liquidated-damage-clauses: being the result of predictable and reasonable 
quantifications of damages in case of non-fulfilment of a party, on which the par-
ties have agreed when stipulating the contract, they are seen as adequately protect-
ing both parties without discrimination. Such systematic interpretation thus seems 
to pursue the same goal protected by the mandatory code provision. 
3.1.2. Case (B): Public Policy Exception 
                                                          
121 The example is shaped on a case decided in 2007 by the Tribunal of Rovereto in Italy (Uni-
versal Pictures International no 2 BV v. Curatela del fallimento Academy Pictures s.r.l.), already 
cited by Dung and Sartor (2011). 
122 On its mandatory character, please see Cass., Un. Sect., no. 18128/2005. 
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A general conflict of laws rule states that if the relevant foreign law is not compat-
ible with the domestic public policy, the foreign provision cannot be applied (art. 
16). Such compatibility assessment is accomplished after the identification of for-
eign law and of its probable interpretation. 
Imagine that, applying a foreign canon of interpretation, the court derives an in-
terpretive result the effects of which, at first, definitely contrast with public policy: 
e.g., they violate a general principle of inner law. But suppose that inner law can 
be interpreted as being shaped on more general principles: according to this new 
interpretation, also foreign provision n does no longer conflict with public policy. 
Once again, a real example may be helpful. Civil liability regards both legal ob-
ligations deriving from private wrongs (torts) and breaches of contract that are not 
criminally relevant, as non-fulfilment of contractual obligations. Also, historically, 
civil liability is the area of law that has witnessed the worst and most frequent in-
terpretive conflicts between foreign laws and Italian law. In fact, cross-border civil 
liability disputes are scene of famous interpretive misalignments challenging goals 
and principles, which both foreign legal systems and the domestic one pursue with 
their own civil liability regulation. Frequently, normative systems and lawmakers 
adopt different legal solutions to attain the same objective. In civil liability, it is 
well-known that legal systems generally provides for the compensation of damag-
es suffered by the damaged party (g1). Still, while the Italian legislator prefers to 
inflict on the defaulting party the obligation to economically restore only damages 
effectively suffered by the other party (g2), foreign law may provide for monetary 
measures aimed also to sanction the defaulting party (g3). Moreover, within those 
monetary measures, sanctioning the defaulting party, further nuances are distin-
guished: there are systems that provide for so called astreinte that pursue the goal 
of threatening bad consequences to the detriment of the defaulting party (coercive 
function, g3a), whereas other systems (such as the USA) provide for so called pu-
nitive damages: they function as proper civil punishments, enriching the damaged 
party far beyond the economic damage actually suffered (g3b).
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What happens if Italian courts are required to enforce US punitive damages in 
Italy? Courts usually reject them, since g3b is essentially conflicting with g2, even 
if both laws are pursuing g1. Consider also that, in Italy, g3b is usually pursued by 
other branches of law, in primis criminal law, that are controlled by constitutional 
guarantees. Still, it may happens that domestic judges end up recognising foreign 
legal institutions that pursue g3a, acknowledging that there are inner legal tools 
that likewise pursue g3 in civil liability matters (e.g., art. 96, par. 3, civil procedure 
code). Does this change the perception of civil liability as understood and gov-
erned by inner law and, as a consequence, of punitive damages? Do constitutional 
provisions really prevent from pursuing g3b in civil law? One of the possible inter-
pretations of both inner law and foreign law is capable of eliminating any conflict 
with the public policy.  
                                                          
123 See more on punitive damages in chapter 4, sect. 3.2.1. 
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3.1.3. Case (C): Same Interpretive Canons Conflict 
A term, included in the relevant foreign provision n, could be interpreted in differ-
ent ways, depending on the fact that the same canon of interpretation is applied in 
LSF or in LSI. As a result, n has two possible interpretive outcomes: two norms, n1 
and n2, exist. 
Theoretically, an interpretive canon cannot give different and incompatible in-
terpretations within one legal system: for example, the canon for literal interpreta-
tion should give identical interpretive outcomes whenever it is applied within the 
same legal system. Such utterance assumes that it is not possible to have different 
literal meanings of the same provision in the same historical moment, in the same 
context, and within the same linguistic and legal community. In other words, if 
this happens in practice regarding inner law (frequently, the parties in a lawsuit 
contest the literal meaning of the law and propose opposite literal solutions), such 
conflict is always solved by the judge, who applies only one norm, i.e., one inter-
pretive outcome, among the many possible. The application of the same interpre-
tive canon can instead reasonably result in different meanings of the same foreign 
provision n, depending on the legal system and linguistic community of reference. 
Imagine that the interpreter is applying the canon for literal interpretation in or-
der to interpret n. Having regard to LSF and its mode of interpretation, as provided 
for by art. 15, n is interpreted as n1. Considering LSI, the literal interpretation is n2. 
In fact, there exist provisions n’ and n’’, respectively in LSF and LSI, and each of 
them gives n1’ and n2’’. Interpreting by coherence,124 in LSI, n should be interpret-
ed as n2, in contrast with the foreign law application of the same canon. But, ac-
cording to art. 15, the domestic court is supposed to apply n in light of the foreign 
canon of interpretation, i.e., as n1. In turn, n1 does not comply with the internal co-
herence of the recipient legal system. Some questions arise: if n1 and n2 coexist in 
LSI, is its inner coherence at risk, since two literal meanings of the same term exist 
in one legal system? Or is it possible to accept norm n1, in light of a different bal-
ancing of interests? For instance, the national court, ascertaining that n1 does not 
conflict with public policy, could opt for the foreign interpretation since it pro-
motes the application of foreign law according to its own canons of interpretation. 
Additionally, interpreting, and applying, n as n1 contributes to foster legal certain-
ty in cross-border relations: the expectations of the parties, as for the law to be ap-
plied to their cross-border case, is towards an application of foreign law as faithful 
as possible to its foreign interpretation. 
Consider the following example of classification of facts under a foreign piece 
of law.125 The applicable foreign law states that real estates, which are used as 
                                                          
124 This fictional case shows that the application of interpretive canons is seldom a single-canon 
affair: mostly, it is a matter of combination of various interpretive rules, as also noted by Mac-
Cormick and Summers (1991). 
125 The example is inspired by Cass., civ. sect. I, no. 5708/2014: on that occasion, the different 
meaning, ascribed to family home by one party, referred to an old case ruled by the foreign court. 
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family home and in community of property, cannot be sold to third parties without 
the consensus of both spouses. Differently, the sale contract shall be invalid, un-
less the buyer was totally unaware of the spouse/seller’s incapacity to perform the 
sale. 
The interpretive doubt concerns the possibility to consider family home and, so, 
to have the legal protection of the inefficacy of the contract, a house of family 
property, located in another state, the courts of which have jurisdiction on the 
case, and mainly used as summer residence. Imagine that: 
 In LSI, ‘family home,’ is read as concerning, also for tax concessions, just the 
first house of the family, where the family primarily lives and has its major 
centre of interests; second houses are totally excluded; 
 In LSF, ‘family home’ is instead read as including the second house as well, 
provided that it is regularly used by the family and that it meets essential family 
needs. 
Theoretically, court k should expand the textual meaning of ‘family home’ in 
LSI applying the interpretation of it as provided for by LSF, challenging with this 
interpretation the inner coherence of the former. 
3.1.4. Case (D): Multiple Interpretive Canons and Outcomes 
It may occur that, in the foreign legal system, various canons of interpretation can 
be applied to the relevant foreign provision n. From such simultaneous application 
of different rules of interpretation, it may follow that: 
 They result in the same interpretive outcome: n1; 
 They give different and conflicting interpretive outcomes: n1 ≠ n2 ≠ n3. 
Both situations can occur, but just the second one, i.e., several norms with ref-
erence to the same provision n, instantiates an interpretive incompatibility. Incom-
patibility is the effect of different interpretive outcomes that appear all theoretical-
ly possible, not only within the foreign legal system, but also in the system of 
destination, where the foreign rule needs to be applied. Facing interpretative con-
flicts that, initially occurring in the foreign system, end up replicating in the do-
mestic system, national courts have difficulty in detecting their solution: 
 There may be a conflict between stricter or broader canons of interpretation: for 
example, the technical meaning may conflict with canons looking for the inten-
tion of the lawmaker; 
 An interpretive evolution may have occurred in consequence of historical con-
stitutional changes; 
 An important case may subvert a previous foreign case law. 
Rather, the fact that multiple canons of interpretation lead to the same interpre-
tive outcome represents a common circumstance: in such cases, often all canons 
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are used to support that interpretation. Applying the norm n1, courts are just re-
quired to specify which canon they opt for in the end as the most supporting one. 
So, it is not a matter of proper conflicts between interpretations. 
Consider a legal case,126 originated by gambling debts. Jack incurred gambling 
debts when gambling in a Casino in France. The French Casino obtains, from the 
Italian judicial authority, an order (technically, a warrant of execution, decreto in-
giuntivo) that forces Jack to pay back his gambling debt (plus a penalty). Jack ju-
dicially resists the order, claiming that, according to art. 1965 of the French civil 
code (c.c.), creditors of gambling debt are prevented from acting against the debt-
or. 
The relevant law, on the basis of the 1980 Rome Convention, is indeed the 
French law and, thus, art. 1965. But, even if art. 1965 is the applicable foreign 
law, the competent Italian court has to ascertain if the facts of the case fall under 
its applicative scope. In fact, the next three different readings of the code provi-
sion are identifiable: 
 Literally, n states that “La loi n’accorde pa aucune action pour une dette du jeu 
ou pour le paiement d'un pari,” and, thus, seems not to allow that a gambling 
debt is protected in front of a judicial court; 
 An old opinion of the Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation, 4/03/1980) has then 
added that if gambling debts are incurred in authorised and regulated casinos, 
creditors can obtain judicial protection: in other words, the subjective qualifica-
tion of the creditor would make a difference in concrete, and no distinction is 
made with reference to what can be classified as ‘dette du jeu.’ 
 Other opinions of the Supreme Court (e.g., 31/01/1984 no. 82-15904, more re-
cently, 10/09/2014 no. 13-22001), though, have better qualified also the object: 
i.e., even if the creditor is a subject authorised by the law, like a regulated casi-
no, if the debt concerns a sum of money that the Casino loaned to the gambler 
for continuing to gamble, such situation is not included in those that can be pro-
tected by judicial intervention. So, irrespective of the subjective qualification of 
the creditor, a fundamental distinction is made with reference to what should be 
interpreted as ‘dette du jeu.’ 
The Italian interpreter should consider all possible interpretations and properly 
qualify the specific facts of the case. 
3.1.5. Case (E): Vague Concepts Resulting in Normative Gaps 
It may be the case that a concept a in the applicable foreign law n is vague. Let us 
suppose that the court cannot discover what interpretations of a exist in the foreign 
system and it is uncertain if the facts of the case (f) can be subsumed under n. 
                                                          
126 The example is loosely based on Cass., civ. sect. 1., no. 21712/2015. Real proceedings are 
simplified in order to focus on the proper interpretive issue. 
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Facing the absence of foreign suggestions, the court identifies at least two pos-
sible, conflicting interpretations: 
 Interpretation a1 restricts the scope of n and makes f fall outside it: this, for ex-
ample, happens if a is read through a strict interpretive canon as that of tech-
nical meaning; 
 Interpretation a2 enlarges the scope of n, by referring to the supposed goal of 
the foreign normative provision n or to superior principles that a strict applica-
tion of n would frustrate, or by comparing f to similar situations that are safely 
subsumed under n. 
In detail, both outcomes can be achieved: 
 By applying a domestic interpretive canon: this could either allow for applying 
n, or prevent its application, in this way frustrating its supposed purpose; or 
 By referring to the purposes, supposedly pursued by the foreign law and the 
foreign legal order (teleological canon of interpretation); or 
 By resorting to values that pertain to superior normative levels, to which both 
LSI and LSF belongs. 
Eventually, each interpretation avoids regulatory gaps, but with opposite solu-
tions. A legal case that presents a similar interpretive issue is used as working ex-
ample in chapter 6. 
3.1.6. Case (F):  Unknown (or Semi-Unknown) Legal Institutions 
Consider that the applicable foreign law may regulate, as it often happens, a legal 
institution, which a) has no correspondence in the domestic legal system, or b) on-
ly partially corresponds to domestic institutions. In case a), the court should inves-
tigate if goals and effects of the unknown institution, as interpreted in the foreign 
system, are compatible with the domestic system and its public policy. In case b), 
the same assessment would be favoured by the fact that the inner law governs in-
stitutions that can be assimilated to the foreign one, at least for certain aspects: for 
example, they pursue the same goal within the respective legal system, even if in 
different ways. 
Cases involving family law (divorce, patrimonial rights of the spouses, inher-
itance rights) and children rights (custody, international adoptions, parental re-
sponsibility in case of separation or divorce, up to dramatic cases of child abduc-
tion) are not exempt from cross-border interpretation criticalities, object of intense 
interest by the EU, and mainly evident when it comes to enforcing foreign judicial 
or extra-judicial measures. Recognising an unfamiliar legal institution is no doubt 
an interpretive act for the court: it implies to find domestic institutions, with which 
to establish a correspondence on some basis, so to legitimately derive the legal ef-
fects required by the parties. Differences are then usually due to different percep-
tions of family roles within distinct legal and religious traditions, and to different 
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purposes acknowledged to the law and its solutions. Consider for example that 
underage adoption is not legitimate in Islamic countries, with some exceptions,127 
because of Koranic prohibitions.128 As a substitutive legal institution for protecting 
neglected minors, Muslim states have established kafala. Originally commercial 
institute, it is a form of guardianship, through which a Muslim family voluntarily 
commits to taking on responsibility of children in need, by taking care of their 
wellbeing and education. International treaties (the New York Convention on the 
Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989; the Hague Convention on Protection of 
Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption of 29 May 1993) 
acknowledge kafala as protecting the child’s best interests, which should be the 
leading principle in cross-border disputes involving children rights. Still, recognis-
ing and enforcing it within a domestic legal system as Italy raise doubts as regards 
its possible assimilation to either adoption or softer forms of custody: such insti-
tutes are deeply different as regards the effects they produce on children and care-
givers. But failing to enforce it could also mean not only to inhibit the best inter-
ests of the child, but also to discriminate him/her for religious beliefs.
129
 It is thus 
not just a matter of normative goals, but also of superior principles, acknowledged 
and valid at many levels (e.g., LSF, LSI, LSINT, LSEU). 
4. Argument Schemes for Interpreting the Foreign Law 
When applying and interpreting the foreign law in cross-border disputes, domestic 
courts are required to use foreign rules of interpretation and application and, at the 
same time, to protect the inner coherence of their own legal system: as we have 
just shown, this raises interpretive doubts of many kinds. From an argumentation 
perspective, for instance, applying the same canon of interpretation to the same 
normative provision and obtaining opposite outcomes, i.e., contradictory or differ-
ent applicable norms, in different legal systems correspond to incompatible argu-
ments and, thus, requires for effective ways to cope with them in the national sys-
tem. 
We intend to analyse how domestic courts should handle those conflicting in-
terpretive arguments that are relevant to interpret the identified foreign law. Con-
sider that Sartor et al. (2014) have provided for a general structure for interpretive 
arguments: 
                                                          
127 Turkey, Indonesia and Tunisia (see http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2012/10/court-backs-
french-ban-on-islamic-%E2%80%98kafala%E2%80%99-adoption/, accessed on 24/05/2016). 
128 It is worth noting that the interpretation of the related passages of the Koran is not unanimous, 
even if mainly oriented in denying the possibility to adopt minors for Muslims. 
129 Cass., civ. sect. I, no. 1843/2015 regards the possibility to equalise kafala to international 
adoption for the purposes of family reunification under Italian law. 
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If expression E occurs in document D, E has a setting of S and E would fit this setting of S 
by having interpretation I, then, E ought to be interpreted as I. 
Argumentation schemes are reasoning patterns, where premises are reasons for 
deriving the conclusion: interpretive arguments, therefore, offer reasons to attain a 
certain interpretation with reference to a provision. It is also assumed that canons 
of interpretation are applied at a particular moment in time. Additionally, using 
this basic scheme in private international law contexts, where interpretation of for-
eign law is in question, means to consider that: 
 Canons of interpretation refer to at least two legal systems, the domestic and 
the foreign one; but both systems may also consist of normative sub-systems, 
e.g., religious or regional, and/or be part of larger systems, e.g., the EU (LSEU). 
Assuming the existence of many systems LSi,…, LSz, from a set-theoretical per-
spective, each LSi is either included in or including other LSl,…, LSz (often, 
both cases hold): with them, it is in various relations and their specific interpre-
tive canons may be relevant for the concrete foreign law application. 
 The foreign legal system may give priority to interpretive arguments, which are 
hardly or even not used in the domestic system: e.g., the argument from prece-
dent, common in the USA, is not so familiar to courts of civil law countries and 
is however not used on the same terms by the latter. 
 Interpretive conditions may change from one system to the other. 
 An ordering among all possible interpretations has to be made: this will even-
tually depend on the legal system taken as main reference and on the goals and 
values it refers to. 
The semi-formal language used to explore the interpretation of foreign law is 
now presented along with some clarifications that help in the following analysis of 
the reasoning patterns. 
4.1. The Semi-Formal Language: Features and Caveats 
Domestic courts construct their reasoning starting from the general scheme for 
cross-border interpretive incompatibilities: 
Foreign provision n may have more interpretation-outcomes O1,…, Om depending on 
which interpretive canon c1,…, cn is applied, where m ≤ n. 
O1,…, Om are incompatible. 
There exists an interpretive canon ci that can solve such incompatibility. 
Canon ci may belong to LSi,…, LSz. 
In our semi-formal language, the following holds: 
 n is the textual provision of the foreign law that has to be applied by the Italian 
court k according to choice of law rules; 
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 Interpretation outcomes O1,…, Om are the sentences expressing all the different 
meanings attributed to the foreign provision n, i.e., the applicable norms ob-
tained by applying a certain canon of interpretation (or more canons, as the 
next bullet item specifies); 
 m ≤ n means that canons c1,…, cn may all have different interpretation out-
comes O1,…, Om, but may also produce the same interpretive outcome Oi; 
 The existence of more normative systems (LSi,…, LSz) is assumed; 
 If the existence of more normative systems (LSi,…, LSz) is assumed, then, the 
foreign legal system (LSF) and the Italian one (LSI) may be not the only inter-
pretive references for the case; rather, other legal orders may be involved in the 
process: e.g., because of the peculiar interests and rights discussed, the Europe-
an legal system (LSEU), or international treaties (LSINT),
130 could provide for 
specific rules of interpretation. 
Let us explain what interpretive incompatibility means, so to identify the cases, 
in which O1,…, Om can be said to be indeed incompatible. Besides, it is worth in-
vestigating if and how the fact that O1,…, Om refer to different legal systems, first-
ly, influences the definition of incompatibility, and, secondly, is perhaps the way 
out the interpretative doubt in the end. 
Several concepts of complementary interpretations may be presented. As a first 
step, we endorse the basic idea of incompatible interpretations drawn from Rotolo 
et al. (2015), adapting it to the private international law context: interpretations O1 
and Om of the foreign provision n are incompatible whenever O1 is different from 
Om, irrespective of any possible logical relation (entailment, semantic overlapping, 
etc.) between O1 and Om. Such definition should then be enlarged in light of the 
peculiarities of cross-border reasoning, so to include the following insight: when-
ever canons and interpretations are moved from their natural environment to an-
other legal system, as it happens when foreign provisions are applied in the do-
mestic system, even a plain interpretation may result incompatible with the system 
of destination. What follows illustrates both hypothesis of incompatibility. 
Each interpretation-outcome Oi is the conclusion of an interpretive argument Ai 
based on a precise interpretive canon ci, seen as rule of inference: the canon allows 
the interpreter to draw the result of an interpretative activity (Oi), which is, in turn, 
the applicable norm derived from the foreign provision n. They are so structured:  
Interpretive Argument A1  Z1,…, Zl, c1 → O1 
Interpretive Argument A2  Z1,…, Zl, c2 → O2  
…    … 
Interpretive Argument Am  Z1,…, Zl, cn → Om  
                                                          
130 From a strictly legal perspective, public international law, including customary law, jus co-
gens, and international treaties, is part of the Italian legal system, either by virtue of constitution-
al reference (art. 10, par. 1, referring to customary law), or of ratification orders, attributing the 
status of laws to treaties. Considering public international law a separate legal order (LSINT) aims 
to highlight that, in the interpretive reasoning, it may provide a different outlook on the legal is-
sue in question, to which inner law and foreign law applied in LSI need to adapt. 
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Where    Z1,…, Zl hold  
m ≤ n 
 
Each interpretive argument Am reads as follows: “If cm applies and Z1,…, Zl hold, n should 
be interpreted as Om.” 
Z1,…, Zl are extra-conditions that characterise the interpretive arguments A1,…, 
Am. So, there will ultimately be as many interpretive arguments A1,…, Am not only 
as many different interpretive canons c1,…, cn apply to the same provision n, but 
also as many different extra-conditions feature that interpretation. 
Extra-conditions are, firstly, the legal systems LSi,…, LSz that are involved in 
the cross-border legal relation or dispute. Further extra-conditions may concern: 
 The validity of the provision n: validity is here broadly understood, so to in-
clude its temporal validity in LSF, its constitutionality with reference to LSF, the 
fact that it has been promulgated by the competent authority in LSF; as already 
noted, in case the court profits from the assistance of foreign law experts, as-
sessment on validity of n is concurrent with the evaluation of experts, whereas, 
when governmental channels are preferred, it is inevitably assumed that they 
convey legally valid information, unless evidence of the contrary subsists. 
 The normative goals (g) that n supposedly pursues in LSF: more goals g1,…, gm 
may be assigned to n (in superscript: g
n
1,…, gnm), so to condition its interpreta-
tion outcome On; such goals g1,…, gm may in turn have different relevance de-
pending on the LSi,…, LSz of reference; 
 The values characterising the legal systems LSi,…, LSz considered: provision n 
is grounded on many values v1,…,vn that may guide the prevalence of one in-
terpretation O1 against another O2. 
Multiple interpretive arguments, so, imply that more interpretations, in the form 
of both multiple canons and outcomes, are possible with reference to the applica-
ble foreign provision n. Still, not all of them instantiate incompatibilities in the 
sense we have defined beforehand. 
Consider, for instance, the following case: 
Example (a) 
Interpretive Argument A1  Z1,…, Zl, c1 → Oi 
…    … 
Interpretive Argument Am  Z2,…, Zl, cn → Oi 
Where Z1, Z2,…, Zl, hold and i = n 
Multiple Applicable Canons c1 ≠ … ≠ cn 
One Interpretive Outcome  Oi 
Example (a), along with case D in the previous section, shows that multiple in-
terpretive canons do not necessarily entail different norms. If anything, when 
speaking the law in similar cases, judges need to justify why an interpretive canon 
has been preferred to other, equally applicable rules of interpretation. This is part 
of the grounds of the ruling: courts are generally required to provide the parties 
with an accurate and comprehensive motivation, regarding both questions of fact 
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(de facto) and questions of law (de iure). The circumstance that applicable is a 
foreign provision instead of a national legal rule does not exempt domestic courts 
from properly motivating its application and legal consequences. However, the 
applicable norm is just one and no interpretative uncertainty nor incompatibility 
confront the national judges in that respect, unless that interpretation contrasts 
with the domestic system. 
On the other hand, a multiplicity of interpretive arguments may actually reveal 
such incompatibility when their interpretive outcomes O1,…, Om are different with 
one another, as the next example illustrates: 
Example (b) 
Interpretive Argument A1  Z1,…, Zl, c1 → O1 
…    … 
Interpretive Argument Am  Z2,…, Zl, cn → Om 
Where    m ≤ n and Z1, Z2,…, Zl all hold 
 
Multiple Applicable Canons c1 ≠ … ≠ cn  
Different Interpretive Outcomes O1 ≠ … ≠ Om 
If the result is O1 ≠ … ≠ Om, then an interpretive incompatibility exists since the 
applicable norm needs to be one. 
Still, as already mentioned, even a plain interpretation as Oi in example (a), ap-
parently a rather safe occurrence, may ultimately result incompatible with the do-
mestic system as a whole: e.g., if it conflicts with its public policy. It is a second 
level incompatibility, following the requirement that interpretations fit the system 
of destination. 
Such interpretive incompatibilities, though instantiated in many different ways, 
are all faced, and possibly solved, by national courts by opting for one interpretive 
canon (ci) or outcome (Oi) and by adequately justifying their choice. In so doing, 
courts establish preferences among different interpretations and, correspondingly, 
order concurrent arguments. Of course, the context is broader than that courts usu-
ally face on occasion of domestic law application, and this weighs on the result. 
Besides, it is worth noting that this is a form of meta-reasoning: not only are the 
courts interpreting the foreign law131 to derive the norm to be applied, but they are 
also managing, and thus reasoning about, arguments and canons pertaining to var-
ious legal systems. The idea of meta-argumentation is used also for formally de-
veloping the theoretical model here presented, as section 5 will explain. 
Lastly, before analysing the reasoning schemata, it should be noted that private 
international law stems from the necessity to meet the parties’ reasonable expecta-
tions, as regarding the law applicable to their cross-border legal relation. Such re-
mark encourages to think that, in case of multiple interpretive outcomes, if there 
exists an interpretation that promotes the application of foreign law and prevents 
resorting to national law discretionarily, that interpretation should be preferred, in 
                                                          
131 In fact, legal interpretation may be considered a form of meta-reasoning, irrespective of the 
specific law object of interpretation. 
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compliance with core values of the recipient domestic system. This rule of inter-
pretation adapts to private international law, which, as autonomous branch of law, 
tries, at the same time, to adequately rule private law relations with international 
characters, to safeguard inner coherence of national systems, and to promote val-
ues and goals of superior normative systems, thus also fostering international legal 
cooperation. 
4.2. Reasoning Patterns and Preferences among Interpretations 
The present subsection is set out to explore what should happen in case incompat-
ibilities effectively occur. To achieve the target, it moves forward in a step-by-step 
fashion, first, by analysing what kinds of incompatibility judges may face, then, by 
examining what reasoning steps those incompatibilities actually trigger. 
The scheme for cross-border interpretive conflicts now looks as follows: 
Foreign provision n may have more interpretation-outcomes O1,…, Om depending on 
which interpretive canon c1,…, cn is applied, where m ≤ n. 
O1,…, Om are incompatible since: 
1. O1 ≠ … ≠ Om; and/or 
2. O1,…, Om conflict with the system of destination LSI. 
Facing such conflict, the court should investigate, in the first place, if there ex-
ists a canon cn or an interpretive argument An that could satisfactorily solve it. In 
so doing, the court cannot disregard the leading principles of private international 
law, i.e.,: 
 Interest in meeting, whenever possible, the parties’ reasonable expectations re-
garding the relevant foreign law, as an instantiation of legal certainty; 
 Need to protect the core values of the domestic legal system: foreign law appli-
cation cannot translate into a violation of fundamental principles of inner law; 
 Necessity to acknowledge that normative systems variously intertwine and each 
of them carries its own values. 
4.2.1. Conflicts among Outcomes and Canons 
Example (b) above represents an occurrence of interpretive incompatibilities:  
Interpretive Argument A1  Z1,…, Zl, c1 → O1 
…    … 
Interpretive Argument Am  Z2,…, Zl, cn → Om 
Where    m ≤ n and Z1, Z2,…, Zl all hold 
Multiple Applicable Canons c1 ≠ … ≠ cn  
Different Interpretive Outcomes O1 ≠ … ≠ Om 
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Bearing in mind that the context is that of application and interpretation of for-
eign law, at least two diverse cases A) and B) may occur. 
CASE A) 
Interpretive Argument A1  LSF, Z1, c1 → O1    
Interpretive Argument A2  LSF, Z2, c2 → O2 
Where  Z1 and Z2 hold and c1 and c2 are different canons of interpretation 
Interpretive Incompatibility: O1 ≠ O2 
Both canons of interpretation c1 and c2 result applicable in the foreign legal sys-
tem LSF and bring forth two interpretive outcomes (O1 ≠ O2). It has been stressed 
that, theoretically, it is not admissible for different interpretations to coexist with 
reference to the same provision n of a legal system: in the end, just one applicable 
norm must be available to the court. On such occasions, the domestic court should 
thus engage in a three-step reasoning process meant to identify which interpretive 
outcome eventually wins. Note that the steps follow one another. 
Three-step reasoning process: 
1. (LSF, r1 (c1 > c2) → O1 > O2) ⊻  (LSF, r2 (c2 > c1) → O2 > O1) 
2. LSI, r (c1 > …> cn) → O1 > …> Om  
3. (LSI, c3 → (O1 ˄ ¬O2)) ⊻  (LSI ,c3 → (O2 ˄ ¬O1)) 
According to the first step, the court k should investigate if the foreign legal 
system LSF provides for a rule r that establishes a priority among the different 
canons, so that c1 > c2 (or vice versa: c2 > c1). If so, the domestic court, in compli-
ance with the obligation to apply the foreign law following its own canons of con-
struction, applies r1 obtaining that O1 > O2 (or, r2: O2 > O1). As a result, if n 
should be interpreted as O1 (or O2) in LSF, then, n should be likewise interpreted in 
LSI. 
The two next steps are residual: they work if step 1. has not identified a foreign 
solution to the interpretive conflict. Assuming that no such rule r establishing a 
preference among interpretive canons (e.g., c1 > c2) obtains (or can be found)
132 in 
LSF, the court has the following options: 
 Such a rule r exists in LSI so that c1 > c2 (or vice versa: c2 > c1) and, as a con-
sequence, O1 > O2 (or: O2 > O1); or 
 In LSI, there may be an interpretive argument A3, according to which canon c3 
should apply to n bringing about the interpretive outcome O1 ⊻ O2 (exclusive 
or), so that O1 prevails over the competing interpretation O2, or vice versa. 
Solution 1. complies with the fundamental requirement, according to which the 
relevant foreign law should be applied according to its own canons of interpreta-
tion and to the rules regulating those canons in the foreign system (art. 15, law no. 
218/1995). As a direct consequence, domestic courts should preferably apply rules 
of preference provided for by the foreign legal system, if existing and identifiable. 
                                                          
132 Chapters 3 and 4 have extensively examined the central problems of private international law, 
ranging from the access to foreign law content, to the very identification of the relevant foreign 
provision, up to the way it is concretely applied by foreign courts. 
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The other two steps, despite not interpreting the foreign provision n using foreign 
canons of interpretation,133 have two undeniable advantages: both allow to apply 
the foreign law, without resorting to the lex fori, so conforming to the parties’ ex-
pectations, and, at the same time, opt for interpretations that presumably guarantee 
the compatibility of n with the recipient system. 
Another instantiation of O1 ≠ … ≠ Om occurs when the same canon of interpre-
tation ci, even if applied to the same provision n, gives different interpretation out-
comes O1 and O2,
134 depending on the legal system taken as reference (case B, be-
low). For instance, this frequently happens with linguistic canons of interpretation. 
CASE B) 
Interpretive Argument A1  LSF, c1 → O1 
Interpretive Argument A2  LSI, c1 → O2 
O1 ≠ O2  
The question here is whether this difference between interpretations instantiates 
an incompatibility. Clearly, if the two systems remained separated, no incompati-
bility would occur: national courts of either system would apply n according to the 
respective outcome (O1 or O2). Though, in the context of private international law, 
LSF and LSI are not completely separated from the perspective of LSI, the courts of 
which are required to interpret foreign law as it is interpreted in LSF. Consistently 
with such provision, the court should apply O1, even if it differs from the usual in-
terpretation O2. This solution avoids the first hypothesis of conflict, opting for one 
outcome instead of the other, but leaves room for further observations, regarding 
what should happen if O1 proves incompatible with basic pillars of LSI. 
4.2.2. Assessing the Compatibility with Public Policy: Another Step Forward 
The next level of incompatibility occurs when the interpretation OF, to which the 
foreign canon of interpretation leads, does not fit with core values of the recipient 
legal system. Such values constitute the public policy (or ordre public, in French). 
Public policy has long been, and partially continues to be, a vague concept. As 
illustrated in chapter 4, over the years, the concept has ended up including and re-
ferring to a broad sphere of fundamental values, standards, and goals featuring not 
only the domestic legal order in a precise historical period, but also other norma-
tive systems, which cooperate at the international or European level. 
Such conceptual expansion has progressively made it more difficult for domes-
tic courts, facing conflict of laws cases, to raise the exception of public policy and, 
consequently, to reject the foreign law. So, the mere difference of interpretive out-
comes is not itself a reason not to apply the foreign law, provided that fundamen-
tal values and goals are safeguarded. Besides, promoting the application of the 
                                                          
133 They exactly start from the assumption that it is not possible to know how the foreign judge 
would interpret the law. 
134 Recall case scenario (C) (sect. 3.1.3.): a term t of n had different meanings in LSF and LSI. 
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foreign law as identified by conflict rules contributes to stronger forms of interna-
tional legal cooperation. In turn, similar considerations imply that, if there exists 
the possibility to interpret the foreign provision n in such a way to make Oi com-
patible with the public policy, whatever the canon of interpretation applied, Oi 
should prevail over the temptation to resort to and apply domestic law. Public pol-
icy should be thus considered extrema ratio, useful when no other legal solution is 
available. 
Consider again case B) above: 
B) SAME CANON, DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS IN LSF AND LSI 
Interpretive Argument A1  LSF, c1 → O1 
Interpretive Argument A2  LSI, c1 → O2 
O1 ≠ O2  
Suppose that the two legal systems ascribe two different meanings to the same 
term included in the applicable foreign provision. O1 ≠ O2 instantiates the first in-
compatibility as we have above defined it: 
Interpretations O1 and O2 of the foreign provision n are incompatible whenever O1 is 
different from O2, irrespective of any possible logical relation (entailment, semantic 
overlapping, etc.) between O1 and O2. 
In the previous subsection, we have concluded that domestic courts, according 
to private international law, should apply n using the foreign canons of interpreta-
tion: the consequent choice in favour of O1 solves the interpretive mismatch. Dif-
ferences of meaning are not per se a reason for disregarding the foreign provision. 
Still, further doubts arise: is O1 in line with public policy? Does the interpretive 
incompatibility, i.e., O1 ≠ O2, actually hide a subtler, but if possible deeper incom-
patibility with values and principles of the domestic legal system? 
Another example may help in understanding the point: 
C) DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS IN LSF 
1. A1: LSF, c1 → O1 
2. A2: LSF, c2 → O2 
3. O1 ≠ O2    (1st level incompatibility) 
4. LSF, r: (c1 > c2) → O1 > O2  (step 1.: Rule of preference in LSF) 
5. LSF, r: (c1 > c2), LSI → O1  (Application of r in LSI) 
6. O1     (Preferred Interpretive Outcome) 
The interpretive incompatibility O1 ≠ O2 is solved thanks to a rule of preference 
in the foreign system. But is O1 compliant with the public policy of LSI? In both 
cases (B and C), domestic courts should not confine themselves to solve the first-
level interpretive incompatibility. Rather, they should inquiry if public policy is at 
risk in consequence of foreign law application in LSI. Consider the two following 
examples. 
The relevant foreign law states that a person is full age at 17 years old (O1), 
whereas the national threshold is maintained at 18 years old (art. 2, civil code).135 
                                                          
135 Mosconi and Campiglio (2015) present this example to explain the difference between inner 
and international public policy in Italy. See chapter 4 for detail. 
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If O1 enters the domestic system, the same concept, i.e., full age, has two different 
meanings. Does such difference threaten public policy? Being the temporal dis-
tance between 17 and 18 minimal does not seem realistic to have harmful effects 
on the legal order as a whole. The lawmaker’s intention to recognise full legal ca-
pacity to a person who is psychological and physical developed (ci) is presumably 
not undermined by accepting, in the concrete case, that a seventeen-year-old boy 
or girl has already the full legal capacity. 
Now, suppose that Oi conveys a family law institution that raises more reason-
able suspicions as for its compatibility with public policy. Consider that Islamic 
law bans interfaith marriages, i.e., marriages between people who profess different 
religions. Could the domestic system accept a similar legal prohibition within its 
borders? Does this legal institution simply fall under the category of irrelevant dif-
ferent modes to reach the same goal? Compared to the previous example, it is hard 
to support such a position: equality and non-discrimination on the basis of gender 
or religion are protected as fundamental principles not only by inner law (i.e., art. 
3, Constitution), but also by the international community (among many texts, the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Incompatibility with public policy 
is thus assessed referring to a core of essential values, recognised by both the inner 
system and the international system. 
Domestic interpreters will probably act as follows: 
 In the first case, they explore if national canons of interpretation ci,…, cm (with 
m ≥ i), applied to n, produce an interpretive outcome that makes n compatible 
with the public policy (e.g., the intention of the lawmaker). 
 In the second case, they disregard foreign law n: since its effects on the inner 
legal order are not acceptable and no other interpretation is possible, it results 
absolutely incompatible with public policy; lacking other connecting factors, 
they resort to inner law (art. 16, law no. 218/1995). 
All in all, the assessment of the n-compatibility with public policy means also 
to investigate whether inner canons may provide for a compatible interpretation. 
In the absence of a compatible interpretation, courts reject the foreign law, apply 
alternative connecting factors, and, eventually, inner law. This approach favours 
foreign law application, while not preventing the court from resorting to national 
law at a later time, once verified that no adequate interpretation of n is conceiva-
ble. Public policy should really function as an exception, raised by domestic courts 
just when the foreign law, however interpreted, results contrary to it. 
4.2.3. Exploring Extra-Conditions 
Each interpretive argument Ai is not only featured by a specific canon of interpre-
tation ci, its inference rule, but also is conditioned by further extra-conditions 
(Z1,…, Zl). In the interpretation, these variables change their value, depending both 
on the foreign provision n and on the interpretive canon ci that is applied. 
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Interpretive Argument Ai  Z1,…, Zl, ci → Oi 
“If Z1,…, Zl hold and ci applies, n should be interpreted as Oi.” 
Firstly, extra-conditions are the legal systems LSi,…, LSm involved. It may be 
the foreign legal system according to which n should be interpreted and applied, or 
the national system that provides for a different way to interpret the same term and 
in light of which compatibility with public policy has to be assessed, up to the EU 
law system providing for superior values to consider. Moreover, the foreign legal 
system may consist of more legal orders. 
The legal system of reference (LSi) influences other extra-conditions. For in-
stance, the fact that the foreign provision n belongs to another legal tradition im-
plies that it may be drawn from sources of law different from sources of law usual 
in the domestic system. In this sense, a relevant difference is that between statuto-
ry law, if LSF is a civil law country, and judicial precedent, if it is a common law 
country. As it will be clearer afterwards, legal sources contribute to differentiate 
how n is eventually interpreted, conditioning subsequent choices between interpre-
tive canons: statutory law and judicial precedents are faced by different reasoning 
patterns.  
Some further conditions should be ascertained: 
 The force and validity of n: was the authority that promulgated/issued it com-
petent? Is n temporally valid? If not, has n retroactive effects in the present 
case? In what relations is n with other provisions in the system? 
 Its constitutionality with reference to LSF. 
Such evaluations precede any other: only after Z1,…, Zl have been proven to 
hold with reference to n in light of LSF, the canons ci,…, cn may be applied. 
The second bullet item needs some specifications, aimed at investigating if 
domestic courts should check the constitutionality of the applicable foreign law 
with respect to the legal system of origin. Although all may theoretically agree on 
this as an obvious criterion for n to be applicable, a positive reply actually obtains 
only if the foreign legal system admits the judicial review, as explained in the pre-
vious chapter. In other words, if the judiciary of LSF has the power
136 to invalidate 
laws and opinions held incompatible with constitutional provisions, then domestic 
courts can proceed to the same control. So, assuming that judicial review is the 
case, the national court should primarily evaluate which interpretation conforms to 
the (written or unwritten) constitution of the foreign legal system. Only after-
wards, it should assess whether that interpretation is also compatible with the sys-
tem of destination. 
Therefore, it is evident that some Z1,…, Zl represent a threshold of applicability 
of n, directly following from the principle that foreign law is primarily law and, as 
such, it should comply with the conditions the law is normally subject to. This is-
sue is not new: when the role of external sources of knowledge has been dis-
cussed, we have stressed that one basic requirement is that acquired foreign law is 
                                                          
136 Such power of judicial review varies in scope and procedure depending on the legal system. 
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exactly the law a foreign judge would apply. In addition, this reasoning step re-
sembles the argument from rule application presented in chapter 2. But, here, the 
applicable law comes from another system and the interpreter is extraneous to all 
its basic functioning rules, included those referring to normative goals and under-
lying values. 
4.2.4. Resorting to Goals and Values beyond the National Borders 
Interpretive incompatibilities may result when more normative goals are possibly 
assigned to the legal statement n: different goals may lead to attribute different 
meanings to concepts and to define narrower or broader applicative scopes of n.  
Goals as well are extra-conditions of the interpretive argument Ai: they are as-
cribed to n in light of the legal system as a whole, and characterise the very struc-
ture of the argument built on them. In detail, those arguments rely on the teleolog-
ical canon of interpretation: it attributes to n a rational purpose identified from the 
goals and interests, which the foreign law supposedly promotes (MacCormick and 
Summers 1991). 
Teleological Argument Ai  Z1,…, Zl, gnm, ct → Om  
Where :   Z1,…, Zl, hold 
g
n
m is the goal m assigned to the foreign provision n 
ct is the teleological canon of interpretation  
National interpreters should list all the goals that can hypothetically be assigned 
to n, and examine whether they respectively bring about different interpretive out-
comes, instantiating interpretive incompatibilities. In the next examples, we start 
from acknowledging that interpretation of n is uncertain and that resorting to tel-
eological canons of interpretation may be useful to solve that uncertainty. 
Case A: More goals in LSF. 
 
Teleological Argument A1  LSF, g
n
1, ct → O1 
Teleological Argument A2  LSF, g
n
2, ct → O2  
Teleological Argument A3  LSF, g
n
3, ct → O3  
Interpretive Conflict  O1 ≠ O2 ≠ O3 
 
Case B: Different goals may be identified in LSF and LSI. 
 
Teleological Argument A1  LSF, g
n
1, ct → O1 
Teleological Argument A2  LSI, g
n
2, ct → O2 
Interpretive Conflict  O1 ≠ O2 
 
Case C: More goals may be identified referring to LSF, LSI, and other LSm. 
 
Teleological Argument A1  LSF, g
n
1, ct → O1 
Teleological Argument A2  LSI, g
n
2, ct → O2 
Teleological Argument A3  LSINT, g
n
3, ct → Om  
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where three mutually exclusive cases may hold: (Om = O1 ˄ Om ≠ O2) ⊻ (Om = O2˄ Om ≠ 
O1) ⊻ (Om ≠ O2˄ Om ≠ O1) 
Cases A, B, and C, illustrate that assigning different goals to a legal statement n 
is not a neutral activity, mostly if such assignments are cross-border. The same in-
terpretive canon, i.e., the teleological canon ct, produces multiple interpretive out-
comes O1, O2,… that cannot coexist since one norm only should be derived from a 
textual legal provision. 
Reasoning steps in case more g1,…, gm may be assigned to n (in superscript). 
1. Goals should be ordered so that g
n
1 > … > gnm. 
1.1 Is there a rule r that establishes such hierarchy? 
1.1.1. To what LSF, LSI,… does r belong? 
1.2 If not, are there values vi,…, vm that could establish such hierarchy? 
1.2.1. To what LSF, LSI,… do vi,…, vm belong? 
2. After establishing a hierarchy, the preferred outcome must be compatible with public 
policy in LSI. 
In line with what stated in previous sub-sections, in case B, the conflict is pref-
erably solved applying the foreign interpretation since the foreign law should be 
applied and interpreted according to its own canons of interpretation. The national 
interpretation O2 should thus apply only when the foreign interpretive outcome O1 
is contrary to the public policy in LSI: a clash between normative goals, and their 
underlying values, may easily occur and give rise to norms that are inadmissible in 
the domestic system. 
Case C shows that teleological reasoning implies that the foreign and domestic 
legal systems are included in the frame of international and supranational systems: 
in such broader contexts, certain goals and values may override national purposes. 
In front of interpretative uncertainties, the natural temptation to reject the foreign 
law and take refuge in the safe harbour of national law should be contrasted with 
this larger outlook: the domestic system is variously involved in more normative 
levels, private international law has the primary purpose to meet the expectations 
of the parties as regards the foreign law applicable to their relation, and superior 
values are always more often protected beyond national borders and aspire to be 
shared by all civilised nations. Such viewpoint explains why the hierarchy among 
goals may be fruitfully established referring to further legal systems, expression of 
new value systems.  
A special role is played by goals when investigating whether a national piece of 
law should prevail on the identified foreign law since the former has a mandatory 
character. Contrary to what happens for the public policy, functioning as an excep-
tion, overriding mandatory rules function beforehand, conditioning the application 
of private international law. Conflict rules and, thus, foreign law should apply on-
ly if there is no overriding mandatory rule applicable to the case: the cross-border 
nature of the latter would ultimately not count. The ratio underlying such strict re-
quirement is that mandatory rules pursue goals and protect values regarded as fun-
damentals, and guarantee that certain situations, connected with the domestic legal 
system, are regulated uniformly. But what if foreign law interpretations pursue the 
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same goal and protect the same values as the inner law does? What prevents na-
tional courts from applying the foreign law? Doubts arise mostly when the parties 
have freely chosen the law that should govern their legal relation, mainly of con-
tractual nature, as in case scenario A (sect. 3.1.1. above). 
Let us compare different normative solutions in the specific context of manda-
tory rules using goals. 
Factual premises: 
1. Foreign provision n is the applicable law; 
2. gm is considered a fundamental goal in LSI  
3. In LSI, rule r is an overriding mandatory rule: ∀n ∈ LSi, grm: r > n 
 
since it pursues goal g
r
m: 
 
Interpretive Argument A1  LSI, r, ct, g
r
m → Om 
If there exists a rule r in LSI, and the canon for teleological interpretation ct applies, and ct 
assigns r the goal gm (g
r
m), then, r should be interpreted as Om. 
 
Interpretive Argument A2  LSF, n, ct, g
n
m → Om’ 
If n is the applicable foreign law, the canon for teleological interpretation ct applies, and ct 
assigns n the goal gm (g
n
m), then, n should be applied as interpreted as Om’. 
 
Om ≠ Om’   (1st level of interpretive incompatibility) 
Two different norms are achieved. Still, both Om and Om’ pursue goal gm. The 
prevalence of A1 could be challenged, considering that true purpose of mandatory 
rules is to protect precise normative goals and values. If n, interpreted as Om’, pur-
sues the same goals as Om, should the domestic court reject it in any case? If ever, 
this further option would promote the application of foreign law as reasonably ex-
pected by the parties, mainly when they have autonomously chosen it, at the same 
time without weakening, or even subverting, the national system in its core values. 
4.2.5. Different Sources of Law, Special Interpretive Arguments 
The teleological argument is just one of the special arguments involved in reason-
ing with cross-border interpretive conflicts. If the teleological argument is special 
because of the attention it pays to goals and values, canons of interpretation, and 
the arguments they build, may be special also because they apply to different legal 
sources or concepts of law. In short, different legal sources often require different 
interpretive approaches, in turn mirroring the values that underpin the whole legal 
system of reference. 
So, the applicable foreign provision n may have various sources, depending on 
the foreign legal system it is drawn from. As anticipated, a fundamental distinction 
is that between statutory law and judicial precedents. Let us see how such distinc-
tion influences interpretation. 
Linguistic canons of interpretation are the main rule in statutory interpretation. 
Within one legal system, they split into (MacCormick and Summers 1991): 
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 Ordinary meaning: if a statutory provision can be interpreted according to the 
meaning a native speaker of a natural language would ascribe to it, it should be 
interpreted in this way, unless there is a reason for a different interpretation; 
 Technical meaning: if a statutory provision concerns a special activity that has 
a technical language, it ought to be interpreted in the appropriate technical 
sense, as opposed to its ordinary meaning. 
From these definitions, it should follow that: 
 If the statutory provision is comprehensible in the context of natural language, 
that ordinary meaning should be maintained in the legal interpretation; 
 Other possible interpretations should be favoured only if robust reasons support 
them; 
 If an ordinary meaning and a technical meaning are both applicable to the pro-
vision, and the provision regards a specific technical activity, the second mean-
ing should prevail: this is somehow a specification of the second rule. 
If national borders are crossed, as it happens in private international law cases, 
further complications arise: applying a linguistic argument beyond its original lin-
guistic and cultural background implies to export, along with a normative provi-
sion, a series of meanings, concepts, institutions as well as contextual intentions 
and presuppositions that may be totally unknown to the other legal system. 
Consider what may occur in such case: 
A1  LSF, Zn, cling → O1  
A2  LSI, Zn, cling → O2 
Where Zn holds and is condition of cling (linguistic interpretations are subject to the inner 
coherence of the system) 
Zn holds for both LSF and LSI 
cling is the canon for linguistic interpretation 
 
Interpretive conflict   O1 ≠ O2 
Case A)    O1 ؿ O2 
Case B)    O1 ـ O2 
In case A), O1, i.e., n as interpreted in the foreign legal system, has a narrower 
applicative scope than O2, i.e., n as interpreted in the domestic system, whereas in 
case B), the complementary situation occurs: basically, O1 covers more cases and 
facts than O2. 
The question is if such transplant of linguistic meanings, by either expanding or 
compressing the usual meaning of a word/sentence (both in natural and technical 
language) in the system of destination and, so, the scope of the relative provision, 
threatens the inner coherence of the domestic system. In other words, interpreters 
should evaluate if the narrower (or broader) meaning is capable of undermining 
the coherence that would be in turn safeguarded by applying the national interpre-
tation. As a general rule, foreign linguistic interpretations should be accepted, 
even if different: the linguistic interpretation of n is recognised if coherent pri-
marily with the linguistic community of its system of origin (Zn). Of course, if 
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public policy is put at risk by the effects of such linguistic reading, the foreign in-
terpretation should leave room for the national one. Opting for a domestic-like in-
terpretation of foreign law instead of a full rejection is the lesser of two evils, from 
private international law perspective, even if comparatists surely disagree. Still, 
the pragmatic bias of conflict of laws should make national interpreters tend to 
this solution, when available. 
As for judicial precedents, it is necessary to start by making some remarks. His-
torically, common law and civil law countries have been mainly distinguished for 
the different role that judicial precedents played in each of them. The theory of 
stare decisis, or of formally binding precedents, is the leading theory in common 
law countries. Accordingly, precedent set by the highest courts is formally binding 
on lower courts, but such binding value is not absolute and highest courts can de-
part from or overrule their precedents in exceptional cases. Civil law countries do 
not acknowledge such systemic role to precedents, and struggle to recognise it a 
proper normative force: statutory law and codifications are still the main sources 
of law. Nevertheless, it is easily arguable that precedents do play a role in civil 
law countries, even if almost in disguise: legal decision making is not exempt 
from references to precedent cases for interpreting the applicable law. Thus, over 
the years, aided by the fact that common law and civil law countries have in-
creased dialogue and exchanges, the traditional distinction has been softened, and 
it can also be noted a substantial, often hidden, convergence on the use of judicial 
precedents (MacCormick and Summers 1997). 
However, some differences exist, if only because binding precedents still repre-
sent the chief source of law in common law countries: rules are drawn from judi-
cial precedents and contextualised within precise factual occurrences and fact pat-
terns. Legal practitioners use advanced techniques for treating judicial precedents: 
not only for recognising ratio decidendi and obiter dicta,137 but also for distin-
guishing the present case from the precedent. On the contrary, facts have low or 
no importance when civil law judges use judicial precedents. Normally, civil law 
courts resort to judicial precedent for supporting or confirming their statutory in-
terpretation: in fact, a part from some fields of law, in which case law is a proper 
source of law (e.g., administrative law), normally the judicial precedent is but an 
interpretive argument supporting a certain interpretation of a statute. It has a force, 
this force is somehow normative, but it is primarily meant to meet the need for a 
harmonic interpretation of the law by national courts. Supreme Court’s opinions 
are thus mainly cited to support one interpretive outcome instead of another. 
Interestingly, some room is left for exploring what reasoning strategies domes-
tic courts should deploy when precedents are relevant in the application of the for-
eign provision, either because case law is the source from where to draw n, or 
more interpretations of n exist, each appealing to a different judicial precedent. 
According to the argument from precedent (MacCormick and Summers 1991), 
if a statutory provision has a previous judicial interpretation, it should be inter-
                                                          
137 See chapter 2, sect. 3.2.1. 
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preted in conformity with it. If courts are organised hierarchically, lower courts 
must conform to the judgement of higher ones. 
Argument from Precedent A1 LSUSA, s, p1, cp → O1 
Argument from Precedent A2 LSUSA, s, p2, cp → O2 
Argument from Precedent A3 LSUSA, s, p3, cp → O3 
Where    s is the present case 
p1, p2, p3 are the judicial precedents applicable to s  
cp is the canon that applies the judicial precedent 
 
Interpretive conflict  O1 ≠ O2 ≠ O3 
Facing three applicable judicial precedents (p1, p2, p3), domestic courts should 
engage in the comparison between s and each of p, in terms of similarity and dif-
ferences, as any US court would do. By performing the same analogical reasoning, 
national courts abide by art. 15 law no. 218, which, therefore, should not be read 
as requiring to conform to hypothetical, real US case law, confronting an identical 
situation.138 Time, resource, and procedural constraints would in fact prevent any 
Italian court from having success in such an enterprise. So, the court firstly choose 
the precedent more similar to the case. From that case, the norm to be applied to it 
is then derived. Finally, the court will explore if such norm is compatible with the 
public policy in LSI. If this is the case, that norm should be applied. 
4.3. Critical Questions and Evaluation 
The previous sections have framed the setting, within which interpreters move, 
work, and argue. In detail, the informal argument-based approach has kept the fo-
cus on those “meaningful reasons” that lead national courts engaged in such inter-
pretive process. Applying and interpreting the foreign law proves to be, first and 
foremost, reasoning with, and about, canons of interpretation and interpretive out-
comes and, at the same time, considering some fundamental principles, either as-
cribable to the private international law version of legal certainty (i.e., the need to 
meet the parties’ reasonable expectations as for the applicable law in cross-border 
disputes and relations), or to public policy (including values resulting from inner 
constitutional order of domestic systems, their international subjectivity, and pos-
sible EU membership). 
Having said that, critical questions are now needed for identifying exceptions 
and counter-arguments to the interpretive arguments, and for establishing when 
the whole reasoning can be considered correct. They also show how domestic sys-
tems should face the access of exogenous legal elements within their borders. Be-
sides, since interpreting foreign law often means to simultaneously reason with 
different argument schemes (e.g., the canon from ordinary meaning along with the 
                                                          
138 The Supreme Court agrees on the point: more in chapter 4, sect. 4.1. 
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argument from precedent), critical questions may suggest how different schemata 
should interact.  
Starting from the above defined interpretive argument scheme and interpretive 
incompatibility, we track our previous stepwise analysis, identifying correspond-
ing clusters of critical questions. We have defined interpretive arguments and pos-
sible interpretive conflicts that obtain in cross-border situations. Extra-conditions 
(Z1,…, Zl) specify the legal systems of reference as well as normative and interpre-
tive conditions, which, in turn, are dependent on normative systems, interpretive 
canons, and concrete facts of the case. 
A three-step evaluation procedure emerges: domestic courts have 1) to assess 
that extra-conditions, i.e., the legal grounds for applying and interpreting n, exist, 
2) to solve possible interpretive incompatibilities understood as different interpre-
tive outcomes, and 3) to evaluate the compatibility with the public policy of the 
achieved interpretation On. Each step challenges the credibility of premises and 
conclusions of each interpretation in light of involved legal systems and in sight of 
their effects within the domestic system. The critical questions proposed below re-
trace such three-step track and expand some arguments introduced by MacCor-
mick and Summers (1991). The list of critical questions is illustrative and intends: 
 To identify on what levels the judicial reasoning should develop; 
 To explore how interpretive conditions for each canons are determined and in-
fluenced not only by the system of origin, but also by the system of destination; 
 To guide the meta-reasoning of the judicial body in case of conflicts, keeping 
in mind the leading principles of private international law. 
4.3.1. Assessing Extra-Conditions and Canons of Interpretation 
Extra-conditions draw the threshold of applicability of the relevant foreign law 
and of the canon of interpretation ci: thus, they need to be examined by the court 
with the first row of critical questions. Many remarks fall under the evaluation of 
foreign law expert opinions, in the event the court resorts to an expert for acquir-
ing the foreign law. 
n-RELATED CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
CQ1: Was the authority that promulgated/issued n competent in LSF? 
CQ2: Is n temporally valid in LSF? 
CQ2.1: If not, has n retroactive effects in the present case? 
CQ2.2.1: Is the retroactivity harming some superior values in LSI? 
CQ3: Is n respectful of constitutional values of LSF? 
CQ4: In what relations is n with other provisions in LSF? 
CQ4.1: Does it determine contradictions within LSF? 
CQ4.2: Can it be read so that it is coherent with LSF as a whole? 
CQ4.3: Is it contrary to some important goal in LSF? 
CQ4.4: Is it contrary to some general principle of LSF? 
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Apart from CQ2.2.1, the n-related assessment is accomplished in light of the 
foreign legal system for two main reasons. First, Italian judges are required to ap-
ply foreign law using its own canons of construction and application over time 
(art. 15): this implies to attest that the foreign law complies with formal and sub-
stantial requirements of the legal system of origin. Secondly, in this way, foreign 
law accesses the domestic system along with its legal background, practically em-
bodying the idea, underlying private international law, to acknowledge the exist-
ence of legal systems other than the national one. 
Differently, questions concerning the specific canons of interpretation take into 
account also the fact that those canons are moved from a specific context to an ex-
traneous legal environment. What will eventually cross the borders is the interpre-
tive outcome On, i.e., the applicable norm derived from the textual provision n. 
ci-RELATED CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
CQ1: Do the interpretive conditions of the specific canon ci subsist? 
CQ1.1: Have they changed over the years in LSF? 
CQ1.2: Have they changed in consequence of constitutional changes in LSF? 
CQ2: Do the interpretive conditions of ci subsist also in the domestic system LSI? 
Each canon of interpretation that can be hypothetically applied to n has its own 
conditions, the satisfaction of which ultimately depends on the facts of the case 
(MacCormick and Summers 1991). In particular, if its interpretive conditions are 
not satisfied, the interpretive argument, which is grounded on them, cannot be ap-
plied, or, if applied, cannot exert its full justificatory force. In short, no interpreta-
tion can be given based on that canon, or other interpretations will be better sup-
ported. 
Imagine that, as frequently happens, the preferred canon of interpretation is that 
of ordinary meaning, one of the two linguistic arguments. Its interpretive condi-
tions mainly refer to the fact that, in the context of the natural language the provi-
sion is written in, its constituent sentences and words are ordinarily comprehensi-
ble by an average person: if this is the case, the interpreter will ascribe that plain 
meaning to the rule. 
Starting from the above scheme for ci-related critical questions, such interpre-
tive argument and its conditions may be criticised analytically as follows: 
(FOREIGN) CANON FROM ORDINARY MEANING 
A) CQ CONCERNING ITS APPLICATION IN LSF 
CQ1: Is meaning m the only possible in the linguistic context? 
CQ1.1: What other meanings are alternatively possible? 
CQ1.2: Does it exist a meaning m in the past and a meaning m’ at the present time? 
CQ1.3: Has the plain meaning m been subject to constitution-oriented readings? 
CQ2: Does the chosen meaning solve any ambiguity? 
CQ2.1: Is the term still vague? 
CQ2.2: Is the term to be interpreted evaluative in kind (e.g., ‘good faith’)? 
CQ2.3: Are the terms too general and abstract? 
B) CQ CONCERNING ITS APPLICATION IN LSI 
CQ1: Does it exist a linguistic translation of the term in LSI? 
CQ2: Is meaning m’ provided for by the translation faithful to the original meaning m? 
CQ2.1: If so, is m’ normally used and applied in LSI as it is in LSF? 
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CQ2.2: If not, does m conflicts with the system coherence of LSI? 
The same analysis can be articulated for the other canons of interpretation, hav-
ing regard to the fact that interpretive conditions are canon-specific. Differences 
aside, the final target is always to establish that interpretive conditions are satis-
fied in both systems, and, thus, the interpretation is adequately justified. Note that, 
undeniably, the satisfaction of interpretive conditions cannot be detached from the 
concept of public policy, as we stress in a future subsection. 
As the linguistic argument above, also the teleological argument is greatly de-
scriptive. The interpretive conditions of this argument are linked to the possibility 
to identify the goals the statutory provision is meant to implement. 
(FOREIGN) TELEOLOGICAL CANON 
A) CQ CONCERNING THE APPLICATION IN LSF 
CQ1: Is goal g1 the only ascribable to n? 
CQ1.1: What other goals g2,…, gn are alternatively possible? 
CQ1.2: Does it exist a goal g’ expression of the historical lawmaker’s intentions 
(subjective) and a goal g’’ expression of the ideal legislator’s intentions (objective)? 
CQ1.3: Has the goal g1 been modified by constitutional changes?  
B) CQ CONCERNING THE APPLICATION IN LSI 
CQ1: Is goal g1 pursued also in LSI? 
CQ2: Is goal g1 conflicting with other goals g2,…, gn in LSI? 
CQ3: Is goal g1 conflicting with goals g3,…, gn in LSINT or LSEU? 
This kind of analytic investigation may challenge any chosen canon of interpre-
tation, be it linguistic, systemic, or teleological, and gives a picture of all the facets 
that need to be considered. Then, since canons of interpretation interact with each 
other, also such interaction and potential conflicts need to be assessed. 
4.3.2. Interpretive Incompatibility: Nuances and Levels 
Interpretive arguments interact variously. Besides the rare case of single-argument 
interpretation, occurring when just one canon of interpretation gives a satisfactory 
interpretative result, canons are normally applied jointly and can sometimes con-
flict with each other for they support competing outcomes. More interpretive out-
comes (O1 ≠…≠ Om) correspond to derive multiple norms from one legal provi-
sion n: it represents the basic interpretive incompatibility. 
At this level, critical questions highlight how the interpretive conflict should be 
addressed and solved. They are listed as consequential, but it should be by now 
clear that any interpretative endeavour develops horizontally, operating on many 
levels at once, often going back and forth. 
CQ1: Is c1, the interpretive canon that provokes the conflict, inapplicable because its 
conditions do not exist? 
This may for instance occur when linguistic arguments are applied. A term that 
at a first glance appeared to be unambiguous and perfectly comprehensible is then 
challenged on semantic or syntactic grounds within the system of origin, or, in the 
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domestic legal system, by the translation of the words of the provision, which rep-
licates the ambiguity of the transferred legal concept, or unveils its vagueness.  
CQ2: Is there another canon of interpretation c2 that nullifies the interpretive conditions of 
c1? 
For example, the ordinary meaning of a term in a legal provision is replaced by 
its technical meaning for systemic reasons: if the legislation concerns a technical 
activity and, in that context, the term has a specific meaning that is different from 
the ordinary, the technical meaning prevails. 
CQ3: Is there a rule r in LSF establishing a priority relation among diverse interpretive 
canons and, consequently, outcomes? 
CQ3.1: If not, can a rule r’, which in LSI establishes a priority relation among national 
interpretive canons, be applied to the foreign provision n? 
The third row of questions is meant to find a way to establish priorities among 
different norms. As any other legal system, the foreign legal order may provide for 
its own hierarchy among canons of interpretation. A possible ordering may look as 
follows: 1) linguistic arguments, 2) systemic arguments, 3) teleological argu-
ments; the following step is reached only if there are reasons to abandon the pre-
vious level (MacCormick and Summers 1991, p. 531). Intentions may then inter-
vene at any level to identify values the legislator supposedly holds as fundamental: 
the argument from intentions, named ‘transcategorical’ for this reason (id.), may 
confirm a first ordering of the involved interpretations or, contrarily, show reasons 
to abandon it. It is conceivable that courts, if incapable to identify the priority rule 
as established by the foreign system, may apply the corresponding national priori-
ty rule, paying specific attention to the plausible intentions of the foreign lawmak-
er, if discriminating, and to their compatibility with the national system.  
CQ 4: If such a rule r does not exist, is there an interpretive canon ci in the domestic legal 
system LSI so that the conflict can be solved? 
Jointly with the previous case, the fourth question discloses a possible last sce-
nario: to favour the application of foreign law n, the domestic court resorts to a 
canon of interpretation of its own system. Imagine that the intentions of the inner 
lawmaker support one of the multiple outcomes and reject the other. This solution, 
already presented as theoretically and practically feasible, would promote foreign 
law applicability and safeguard the national inner coherence, but to the detriment 
of a faithful “foreign-like” interpretation of n. 
In particularly complex scenarios, interpreters often refer to teleological argu-
ments: their typical focus on goals easily favours one interpretation instead of oth-
ers. Some questions are thus specifically linked to this hypothesis: 
ON GOALS 
CQ5: Is the identified goal g1 a legitimate goal to pursue? 
CQ6: Is goal g1 the only goal underlying the provision n? 
CQ6.1: If not, in what relations are the other goals with one another? 
CQ7: Are there other goals g2,…, gn belonging to other LSi,…, LSm? 
CQ7.1: Are these other goals superior to g1? 
154  
 
ON INTERPRETIVE OUTCOMES 
CQ8: Is the reached interpretation O1 effectively pursuing the goal g1?  
CQ8.1: Are there other interpretations O2, …, On that achieve g1 more effectively? 
CQ9: Is O1 blocking the achievement of other important goals g3,…, gn of LSI? 
Besides, normative goals are usually grounded in certain values that lawmakers 
have considered important to promote within the legal system. Therefore, reason-
ing with goals means to reason also with the underlying values, mostly if they of-
fer a way out possible interpretive conflicts. 
ON VALUES 
CQ10: Is the interpretation O1 effectively promoting value v1 behind g1? 
CQ10.1: Is O1 demoting other important values v2,…, vn ideally grounding g1? 
CQ10.2: Is there an alternative interpretation O2 that promotes any value involved? 
CQ11: Is value v1 behind g1 also pursued in LSI? 
CQ11.1: Does it conflict with other values v3,…, vn important in LSI? 
CQ11.2: Should values v4,…, vn, underlying other LSi,…, LSm, prevail? 
Values trigger a special form of legal reasoning known as outweighing (or bal-
ancing). Accordingly, contrasts between interpretive outcomes O1 and O2 are faced 
by referring to the reasons, supporting either of them, which generally outweigh 
any other reason. So, within one legal system, it could happen that ordinary mean-
ing is replaced by an argument from general principles. Rather, in cross-border 
disputes, a basic value of the domestic system, or even of another, superior legal 
system (e.g., the EU), may be read as necessarily prevailing over any other value, 
which is also possibly recognised, but on an inferior level: ultimately, this funda-
mental value identifies which interpretive argument should outweigh the other. 
4.3.3. Public Policy 
Compatibility with the public policy is assessed whatever interpretation has been 
ultimately achieved, and however previous interpretive conflicts have been solved. 
CQ1: Is interpretation O1 compatible with the public policy in LSI? 
It is worth repeating that, despite the vagueness of the concept, over the years, 
public policy has gradually included a core of fundamental values, standards and 
goals characterising not only the domestic system in a precise historical period, 
but also other normative systems, with which the national system cooperates at the 
international or European level. Even if it is still not possible to talk about a proper 
international or communitarian public policy, domestic courts, when facing legal 
solutions that are strongly different from their legal traditions, need to investigate 
if, irrespective of the differences, the foreign solution is anyway respectful of this 
broader sphere of values and goals. 
CQ1.1: If not, do other interpretations O1 ≠ … ≠ Om exist? 
CQ1.2: If other interpretations O1 ≠ … ≠ Om exist, is one of them respectful of the public 
policy? 
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CQ1.3: If not, is there an interpretive canon ci in LSI so that the interpretive outcome Oi of 
n is compatible with the public policy? 
Such questions enlarge the interpretative horizon and prevent courts from im-
mediately resorting to national law every time public policy exception may ab-
stractly be advanced. Preferably, national law is applied in case no compatible for-
eign norm can be derived: public policy should remain an extraordinary measure 
in order not to frustrate the raison d’être of private international law. 
5. First Formal Developments 
The study of cross-border interpretive argumentation has so far been eminently le-
gal-theoretical in kind and informal in its development. Though, it usefully lends 
itself to more formal approaches of analysis of legal argumentation, as shown in a 
recent paper (Malerba et al. 2016, in Appendix). Not only that paper reconnects 
with the branch of AI and Law research that generally aims to formalise argumen-
tation and argumentation schemes, but it is also a step forward in the direction of 
the formalisation of a problem so far disregarded, i.e., cross-border legal interpre-
tation. As such, it represents a good starting point for further practical implemen-
tations in AI and Law. In what follows, we introduce research objectives, method-
ologies, and contribution of that paper, recollecting some remarks already made in 
chapter 2. For technical details, though, the reader shall refer to the full text of the 
paper in Appendix. 
The research issue of reasoning about interpretive canons across different legal 
systems is addressed by developing a logical framework based on Defeasible Log-
ic (DL). The paper adapts the concept of meta-argumentation, presented by Rotolo 
et al. (2015), to the interpretive challenges of private international law. It is worth 
noting that the logical model by Rotolo et al. refined an existing argument-based 
framework of legal interpretation within one legal system (Sartor et al. 2014): the 
present work is but a natural extension of those contributions to explore the feasi-
bility of formal methods for arguing with canons of interpretation, exactly consid-
ering cases in which canons come from different legal systems. 
Rotolo et al.’s DL-based machinery took some basic intuitions as starting point; 
among them, there are the following:139 
 Interpretive canons are represented as defeasible rules: their antecedent condi-
tions can be of any type (assertions, obligations, etc.), and their conclusion is an 
interpretive act that, as a result, leads to interpret a provision n in a certain way; 
 Standard priority relations can be established over interpretation rules: conflicts 
occurring among interpretive canons can thus be handled and solved (e.g., Rule 
1 > Rule 2); 
                                                          
139 The complete list is reported in chapter 2, sect. 4.1. 
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 A legal provision n can be abstract, if its logical structure is not analysed, or 
structured, if it corresponds to a linguistic sentence having the structure of a 
rule a1,…, an ⇒ b. 
In particular, the distinction between abstract and structured rules corresponded 
to two variants of DL for reasoning about canons of interpretation. In our paper, 
the simplest one is used: legal provisions and their meanings are understood as ar-
gumentative, abstract logical units. Their basic components are then identified in: 
 A set of legal provisions n1, n2,… to be interpreted; 
 As set of literals a, b,…, corresponding to any sentences, which can be used to 
offer a sentential meaning to any provision n (a literal a is the meaning of pro-
vision n); 
 A set of interpretative acts or interpretations I1, I2,… (literal interpretation, etc.) 
that return a sentential meaning for any legal provision; 
 A set of rules encoding interpretive arguments (i.e., rules that state what inter-
pretive act can be obtained under suitable conditions); consider that these rules 
express modes of reasoning within any given legal system. 
The further step consists in replying to the following question: what does rea-
soning about foreign and inner interpretive canons specifically require to be 
properly performed by a reasoner/interpreter? Basically, such meta-reasoning re-
quires: 
 To specify to which legal systems legal provisions belong and in which legal 
system canons are applied; 
 To introduce meta-rules that allow to reason about both foreign and national 
rules of interpretation; 
 That the introduced meta-rules support the derivation of interpretation rules; in 
other words, the head of these meta-rules are interpretation rules, while their 
antecedents may include any condition. 
In this light, an abstract meta-rule r may look as follows (for details on the used 
language L, see the Appendix): 
r : (OBLIt
LSi
(n1
LSi
, p), a ⇒c (s : OBLIsLSj(n2LSi, d) ⇒I IcLSj(n1LSi, p))) 
Meta-rule r states that, if (a) it is obligatory the teleological interpretation (It) in 
legal system LSi of legal provision n1 belonging to that system (n1
LSi
) and returning 
p, and (b) a holds, then the interpretive canon to be applied in legal system LSj for 
n1 is the interpretation by coherence, which returns p as well, but which is condi-
tioned in LSj by the fact that n2 in this last system (n2
LSi
) is interpreted by substan-
tive reasons as d. In other words, r allows for importing interpretive results from 
LSi into LSj in regard to the legal provision n1 in LSi which can be applied in LSj. 
Therefore, profiting from meta-rules as r above, it is feasible to formalise the 
peculiar legal interpretation and reasoning domestic courts carry out when apply-
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ing foreign law in private international law contexts, considering the interactions 
between intra- and inter-systemic interpretive elements.  
6. Closing Comments 
The chapter has proposed an argument-based framework in order to encompass 
the interpretive interactions occurring in private international law disputes be-
tween different legal systems. 
In so doing, it has primarily addressed the problem of acquiring knowledge of 
foreign law: in fact, domestic courts usually experience an epistemic distance with 
the knowledge object they are though supposed to interpret and apply. Thus, re-
quirements for such knowledge to be reliable and usable are identified, having re-
gard to consider that in most cases courts are forced to resort to external sources. 
In this light is read the possible intervention, upon judicial demand, of foreign law 
experts in the trial and, accordingly, an argument scheme from foreign law expert 
opinion has been defined. 
Then, sect. 3 has taken a theoretical picture of the plausible case scenarios that 
domestic courts face in cross-border decision-making. Notably, several elements 
compete when applying and interpreting foreign rules: not only legal concepts and 
institutions coming from the identified foreign system, but also principles, values, 
and goals that belong to superior normative systems. Case scenarios have also re-
vealed in practice what the previous chapter has described from a legal theoretical 
perspective: the public policy reservation and overriding mandatory rules still play 
a fundamental role in protecting the domestic system, even though their frame and 
contents are by now modified. 
Then, the chapter has explained in detail how argumentation schemes prove 
useful when interpreting foreign law in conflict of laws contexts. After presenting 
the semi-formal language and the argumentation scheme for interpreting foreign 
law in domestic legal systems, the chapter presents the crucial concept of interpre-
tive incompatibility. It is worth repeating that the latter is understood in a double 
sense, meeting the special features of private international law: on the one hand, 
interpretations O1 and Om of the foreign provision n are incompatible whenever O1 
is different from Om, irrespective of any possible logical relation (entailment, se-
mantic overlapping, etc.) between O1 and Om, as already presented by Rotolo et al. 
(2015) for reasoning with different interpretations within one legal system; on the 
other hand, an interpretative discordancy also occurs when a rather plain interpre-
tation of the foreign rule results in conflict with the legal system of destination, 
which is in turn taken into account both as a whole and as part of a complex net-
work of normative systems. The argument schemes proposed, embedding both no-
tions of interpretative incompatibilities, allow national courts to consider multiple 
normative systems together as well as the various canons of interpretation possibly 
involved in the reasoning. Some clusters of critical questions, then, stress how the 
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argument scheme can be challenged, proving once again that courts are always 
hanging in the balance of opposed interests: not only those of the parties in the 
proceedings, as in any civil trial, but also those of the normative systems involved, 
regulating legal relations and problems differently, and complying with different 
principles and values. Needless to say that the presented argumentative framework 
is strongly influenced by pluralist approaches to private international law that have 
lately emerged in the legal theory, both in the EU and the USA, and that have been 
described in the preceding chapters. 
Last but not least, the first attempt of full formalisation of the proposed model 
has been introduced. It refers to a published paper (Malerba et al. 2016), appendix 
of the thesis, and aims to demonstrate that meta-argumentation may fruitfully ex-
press legal interpretation and reasoning across legal systems. 
The next chapter is going to apply our informal argument-based framework to 
two working examples, drawn from real legal cases, thus illustrating how it func-
tions in actual contexts and what the trickiest challenges are for the domestic in-
terpreter. 
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Chapter 6: Putting the Theory to the Test 
 
1. Introducing Working Examples 
This chapter stems from the need to apply the described argument-based frame-
work to plausible case scenarios, with the intent to measure both the efficacy and 
the convenience of our theoretical study for setting standards of correct reasoning 
in cross-border legal disputes and relations. 
To this end, two real legal cases are analysed as working examples, with slight 
changes as regards the original judicial procedure. Each case is structured as fol-
lows: 
 Description of the facts and of the legal request(s) advanced by the parties; note 
that technicalities about Italian civil procedure law are referred to (often in 
footnote) for the reader to understand the broader legal framework, but are ir-
relevant for the purposes of the analysis; 
 Examination of the legal provisions involved; translations from French or Ital-
ian into English are ours, where no official translation exists; 
 Identification of the specific cross-border interpretive incompatibility; 
 Investigation of the possible argumentative strategies, which domestic courts 
could build when dealing with it, bearing in mind at the same time the objec-
tives of private international law, the inner coherence of the national legal sys-
tem, and the need to balance competing rights, interests, and values. 
The cases have been chosen for the specific legal issues debated, for the inter-
pretive challenge faced by the court, and for the supposed impact of foreign law or 
institution on the domestic system. The first, a family-law case of paternity recog-
nition of a foreign minor, offers an overview of almost the whole range of possible 
interpretive issues discussed in the previous chapter: from the use of linguistic 
canons up to that of teleological interpretive arguments. The second case is inter-
esting because the cross-border nature of the legal relation derives from the fact 
that the foreign institution, i.e., a trust, although generally recognised by the do-
mestic system through the ratification of an international treaty, is not regulated by 
any domestic law; thus, not only the parties necessarily resort to some foreign 
provisions to govern their legal arrangement, but also the court needs to apply that 
foreign law to establish its validity and its compatibility with the system of desti-
nation. 
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2. Cross-Border Paternity Action 
The first case is shaped on the decision of the Court of Cassation, no. 2791/2002. 
The facts are the following: a woman, Cameroonian citizen, put forward an Italian 
court a paternity action with respect to her daughter, also Cameroonian citizen, 
underage at the time, on the basis of article 340, Cameroonian Civil Code and arti-
cle 33, law no. 218/1995. She alleged that the child was born within a relationship 
she had with an Italian citizen, who initially took care of the girl and financially 
provided for her support, then refusing to recognise the child. The judicial ques-
tion is thus the recognition of the legitimate paternity in favour of the girl, and its 
main legal consequence would be to burden the presumed father with the duty to 
give her due support in the form of maintenance and education. Considering the 
consequences of law application is essential for distinguishing between interpreta-
tions in the context of private international law: an interpretation could be accept-
ed if it has no negative effects on the domestic system involved. 
Firstly, consider the legal provisions involved in such a typical140 cross-border 
case. After ascertaining that the factual premises for applying the Italian private 
international law no. 218/1995 hold (the case presents links with more than one 
legal system) and that no other private international law provisions apply (e.g., EU 
regulations), the appropriate rule of conflict is article 33 that identifies the national 
law of the child at the moment of the birth as the applicable law. 
Art. 33, “Filiation.” 
1. The status of son/daughter is determined by the national law of the child at the moment 
of the birth. 
2. It is legitimate the child that is considered so by the law of the state of which either 
parent is citizen at the moment of the birth of the child. 
3. The national law of the child at the moment of the birth regulates requirements and 
effects of ascertainment and refutation of the status of son/daughter. The status of 
legitimate child, acquired on the basis of the national law of either parent, can be 
contested only on the basis of the same law. 
Being the girl a Cameroonian citizen, the national law is the Cameroonian law: 
conditions and effects of ascertainment and refutation of the status of son/daughter 
have to be established according to the rules of that foreign system. 
Art. 340, Civil Code of Cameroon, “Judicial declaration of paternity outside marriage.” 
1. Paternity outside marriage can be judicially declared: 
[…] 
5°) when the alleged father provided for or participated in the support [entretien] and 
education of the child in function as father. 
2. […] 
3. The suit can be actioned only by the child. If he/she is underage, only the mother, even 
if she is underage as well, has the legitimation to propose the suit. 
4. The paternity suit will be presented within two years from the childbirth. 
                                                          
140 Family law is the area of law more affected by transnational elements together with contrac-
tual matters. 
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5. However, in the case provided for in 5°) above, the suit can be filed within the two 
years that follow the cessation, either of the cohabitation, or of the participation of the 
alleged father in the support [entretien] and education of the child. 
6. […] 
At a first glance, it appears crucial to properly interpret the term entretien for it 
represents a condition for lawfully advancing the judicial request of paternity. In 
fact, not only is the mother legitimate to go to court if such entretien subsists, but 
also the two-year limit for filing the lawsuit accrues from the end of the participa-
tion of the alleged father in the entretien and education of the child, when the two 
years from the childbirth are already passed, as in the present case. Different in-
terpretations of the term entretien are discriminating, establishing whether or not 
the man’s behaviour can be considered as entretien. Once again, the interpretive 
uncertainty mainly derives from the distance existing between the facts of the case 
and the legal concept that is abstractly described in the rule. Additionally, as it of-
ten happens in conflict of laws cases, the Italian court is not able to discover how 
the term is normally interpreted, and the law thus applied, in Cameroon. In fact, 
the external source of legal information, i.e., the Embassy of Cameroon,141 did 
nothing but transmit the required Cameroonian legislation, certifying both its con-
formity to the original version and its correct translation into Italian. No reference 
was made to the usual mode of interpretation of that law. So, the intervention of 
the Embassy on the one hand allowed to verify that the foreign provision n, i.e., 
art. 340 of Cameroonian Civil Code, was promulgated by the competent authority 
in Cameroon, was there temporally and constitutionally valid, and was the only 
Cameroonian law applicable to the case (n-related critical questions). On the other 
hand, it left open the issue of how n should be interpreted and applied. 
The domestic court should firstly have an Italian translation of the term. Trans-
lating is not a neutral operation in the legal context: not only are the communities 
and linguistic conventions different, but also different are the legal traditions that 
have arisen from them. Translated terms usually hide nuances of meaning that cor-
respond to different legal consequences, concepts, or institutions. Besides, apply-
ing the foreign law using its own canons of construction and application over time 
means to consider at the same time the community of provenance and the recipient 
one since foreign law application should not contrast with the public policy of the 
latter. With this said, French-Italian bilingual dictionaries142 translate entretien as 
mantenimento, at the second or third entry, after its immediate meaning of ‘inter-
view.’ But mantenimento may in turn be ascribed more than one meaning in LSI, 
depending on the canon of interpretation taken into account. 
                                                          
141 The Embassy of a foreign country falls within the category of governmental channels, which 
domestic courts can resort to in acquiring foreign law (art. 14, law no. 218/1995), together with 
foreign law experts. They are considered an authoritative source of knowledge. See chapter 5, 
sect. 2 for detail on the epistemic concerns raised by foreign law application. 
142 “Entretien.” (2008) Dizionario Il Francese Compatto, Zanichelli, Bologna; “Entretien.” 
(2015) Dizionario di Francese. Edizione Minore, Florence Bouvier, Hoepli, Milano. 
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INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENTS BASED ON LINGUISTIC CANONS 
Interpretive Argument A1  LSI, Z1, cord → O1 
Interpretive Argument A2  LSI, Z2, ctech → O2 
 
Where : 
Z1 and Z2 all hold and stand for: 
Z1: use of mantenimento in ordinary language 
Z2: use of mantenimento in technical fields 
cord: canon for ordinary meaning 
ctech: canon for technical meaning 
 
O1 ≠  O2 
The application of the linguistic canons for ordinary meaning and for technical 
meaning leads to different outcomes. By applying the ordinary meaning canon, A1 
attributes a softer meaning to the term mantenimento, which is normally used in 
everyday language:143 any form of support offered to satisfy the ordinary needs of 
the beneficiaries in their daily life. Such translation seems not limited to economic 
support. Differently, A2 applies the linguistic canon of technical meaning as pro-
vided for by Italian civil code: accordingly, mantenimento is more precisely a pe-
riodic and regular financial support, in such amount to meet the needs of the bene-
ficiary. 
Reading n through such different lenses brings about an interpretive incompati-
bility, as it has previously been defined: depending on the linguistic canon applied, 
the applicability conditions for the law are different, and in the end the facts will 
or will not be included within the scope of the rule. According to O1, the foreign 
rule n provides for mantenimento broadly understood, so covering more particular 
cases, whereas O2 reduces its applicative scope, allowing to contain just forms of 
support compliant with precise technical requirements, i.e., financial, regularly 
paid, meeting the everyday needs of the beneficiary. In the end, applying the two 
linguistic canons, two competing norms, i.e., O1 ≠  O2 (specifically, O1 ـ O2), may 
therefore be derived and applied, an irrational result from a legal viewpoint. 
It is worth repeating that the technical meaning usually prevails over the corre-
sponding ordinary meaning, at least within one legal system, so that, ideally, O2 
should prevail over O1 in LSI. Though, domestic courts should not forget that they 
are applying a foreign norm within their normative system: meaningful reasons for 
reaching one conclusion instead of the other may thus be found in either system 
and lean towards a different solution of the incompatibility. For instance, national 
judges could derive the intentions of the foreign lawmaker from the overall formu-
lation of the statute; such intentions could in turn provide for precise interpretive 
recommendations. In fact, the interpretative discordancy does not fail to have con-
sequences: depending on the concrete facts of the case and specifically on the 
man’s behaviour, the two-year time limit to put forward the paternity action will 
or will not be already expired. Note also that the two years accruing from the ces-
                                                          
143 “mantenimento”: www.treccani.it/vocabolario/mantenimento/ (accessed on 19/08/2016). 
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sation of the support is a time limit more favourable to the child than the regular 
two-year period accruing from the childbirth. From such remark, it could be thus 
deduced that the Cameroonian lawmaker has meant to provide for laws and provi-
sions that could meet the needs of the child: in this particular case, favouring the 
recognition of the parental relation. 
INTENTIONS OF THE FOREIGN LAWMAKER 
Interpretive Argument Aint  LSCAM, Zm, cint, g1 → O2 
Where : 
Zm holds 
Zm: the lawmaker has intended to favour the establishment of the parental relation 
cint: canon from intention 
g1: favouring children rights  
Aint ends up supporting O2 since, in comparison to O1, such interpretive out-
comes favours the intention of the lawmaker to favour the children right, intention 
that can be derived by the formulation of the whole civil code rule. 
Then consider that interpretive arguments are not isolated: they not only com-
pete with each other, as in the case just described, but are also supported by other 
arguments and, consequently, reasons. Therefore, if O2 would almost certainly 
prevail within the sole LSI, O1 may though be the best legal solution in light of 
LSCAM, of the other interested party, and of further legal considerations. Let us ex-
amine the systemic impact144 of respectively O1 and O2. Suppose that the canon for 
contextual harmonization is used to back O2: the technical interpretation is proba-
bly coordinated with the usual reading of the word mantenimento in other provi-
sions in LSI, belonging to that broader set of statutes concerning the management 
of patrimonial family relations in case of separation, divorce, filiation (e.g., arti-
cles 155 and 156 of the Italian Civil Code145): a technical area of the law that re-
quires for a uniform treatment of certain words and concepts, among which exact-
ly mantenimento. This looks as follows: 
SYSTEMIC INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENTS 
Interpretive Argument A3  LSI, Z3, ccontHarm → O2 
Where : 
Z3 holds 
Z3: in LSI, other rules use the term in the same way 
ccontHarm: canon for contextual harmonization 
A3  supports A2 
At this point, a useful critical question queries if there exist further linked nor-
mative provisions in LSI, or in other LSi, which both LSI and LSCAM are part of, that 
provides for a different use of the term. 
                                                          
144 Keep in mind that, according to the ordering among canons drawn from the comparative 
study edited by MacCormick and Summers (1991), the plausible interpretative steps are 1) lin-
guistic arguments, 2) systemic arguments, 3) teleological arguments; the next level is reached on-
ly if there are reasons to leave the previous one. 
145 Both code provisions have been modified by law no. 54/2006, but hereby the old formulation 
is taken into account since the case was ruled in the previous normative framework. 
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COUNTERARGUMENT FROM CONTEXTUAL HARMONIZATION 
Interpretive Argument A4  LSI, Z4, ccontHarm → O1 
Where : 
Z4 holds 
Z4: in LSI, other rules establish that rules concerning children rights are read in favour of 
children 
ccontHarm: canon for contextual harmonization 
 
A4  supports A1 
As the example shows, O1 may be supported by systemic arguments as well. In 
particular, the identified foreign provision cannot be read as isolated from article 
35, law no. 218/1995, establishing the favor filiationis as a general principle in pa-
ternity recognition issues. This means that Italian private international law sees as 
fundamental the application of laws that favour the recognition of the parental re-
lation. Which interpretation of the foreign provision is more suitable to this end? 
Other counterarguments may also appeal to general principles shared by the in-
ternational community or included in international treaties. 
COUNTERARGUMENT FROM GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Interpretive Argument A5  LSI, LSCAM, LSINT, Z5, cgenPrinc→ O1 
Where : 
Z5 holds 
Z5: in LSI, LSCAM, LSINT, children protection is a general principle 
cgenPrinc : canon for general principles 
 
A5 supports A1 
Some observations may thus offer valuable help to accomplish a solid compari-
son among interpretative arguments, counterarguments, and outcomes, in line with 
the critical questions: 
 Which meaning could the foreign court opt for, having in mind the facts of the 
case, the opposite consequences of the two interpretations, the probable inten-
tions of the lawmaker as well as the purpose(s) of each norm? 
 What purposes and intentions underlie the different systemic arguments? 
Identifying what goals are supposedly pursued by the involved legislators, the 
Cameroonian and the Italian, may be a further step. 
INTERPRETING WITH GOALS 
g1: legal certainty – use of the same technical meaning in similar cases 
g2: legal certainty – meeting the parties’ expectations concerning the applicable law 
g3: favouring the child in establishing parental relations (favor filiationis) 
g4: best interest of the child 
 
Interpretive Argument A6  LSI, LSINT, Z6, g1, ct → O2 
Where : 
Z6 holds 
Z6: interpreting n as O2 pursues g1 
ct: teleological canon 
A6 supports A2 
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Legal certainty is an essential component of the rule of law. Reasonably, thus, 
in the absence of the specific mode of interpretation of the foreign court, the Ital-
ian court should interpret as it usually does in totally internal cases. 
Still, further goals may actually be pursued by the foreign provision in object, 
mostly in the light of the foreign legal system as a whole, or of the Italian system 
itself, or even of the international legal system. 
Interpretive Argument A7  LSI, LSCAM, Z7, g2, ct → O1 
Where : 
Z7 holds 
Z7: belonging to the international community, LSI pursue g2 with conflict of laws and is 
open to LSCAM 
ct is the teleological canon 
 
A7  supports A1 
 
Interpretive Argument A8  LSI, LSCAM, Z4, Zm, g3, g4, ct → O1 
Where : 
Z4 and Zm hold 
Z4: in LSI, other rules establish that rules concerning children rights are read in favour of 
children 
Zm: the LSCAM lawmaker intended to favour the child 
ct is the teleological canon 
 
A8  supports A1 
 
Interpretive Argument A9  LSI, LSCAM, LSINT, Z4, Zm, Zl, g3,  g4, ct → O1 
Where : 
Z4, Zm, Z5 hold 
Z4: in LSI, other rules establish that rules concerning children rights are read in favour of 
children 
Zm: the LSCAM lawmaker intended to favour the child 
Z5: in LSI, LSCAM, LSINT, children protection is a general principle 
ct is the teleological canon 
 
A9  supports A1 
 
Note that the three interpretive arguments A7, A8, A9 could be unified. 
These last interpretive arguments A7, A8, A9 take a step forward in the reason-
ing: they identify the plausible goals pursued by the foreign provision n consider-
ing that both LSI and LSCAM are part of the international community LSINT. In fact, 
various international treaties (e.g., the New York Convention on the Rights of the 
Child of 20 November 1989, or the Hague Convention on Protection of Children 
and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption of 29 May 1993) have es-
tablished the best interest of the child as a primary goal of legislations concerning 
children rights around the globe. Moreover, A7, A8, A9 gather considerations, al-
ready found in other interpretive arguments, concerning intentions of the Came-
roonian legislator, or general principles of the involved legal systems. 
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Closing the first example, it seems that national courts should also take into ac-
count the intrinsic goals of private international law, and thus interpret the foreign 
rule overcoming the double threshold of the compliance with the intentions of the 
involved lawmakers (national, foreign, international and EU) and of the public 
policy: a complex, but worthy interpretative endeavour. 
3. Validity of Trusts 
Trusts establish legal relationships, through which one party (trustee) holds, man-
ages, employs, and disposes of assets for the benefit of another (beneficiary) or for 
a specified purpose, in compliance with the terms of the trust. Trusts are usually 
created by a person (settlor), inter vivos or on death.  
The trust is a legal institution typical of common law jurisdictions. When re-
quired to recognise and enforce trusts, civil law countries, lacking a specific regu-
lation and, often, comparable institutions, discussed primarily about their overall 
compatibility with systems of reception. Especially controversial was that, typical-
ly, the property of trust assets is entitled to trustees, who however need to keep 
them separate from their other property; thus, trust assets constitute a separate 
fund that cannot be attached by creditors, whose financial guarantee in front of 
debtor’ insolvency results correspondingly diminished. The Italian legal order was 
no exception and did not provide for a specific regulation of trust; though, ratify-
ing the Hague Convention on the law applicable to trusts and on their recognition 
(1/07/1985), with statute no. 364/1989,146 the Italian legislator ended up consider-
ing it a legitimate scheme of legal arrangement. The ratification meant to judge 
trusts as generally compatible with inner public policy: its effects are not abstract-
ly conflicting with inner constitutional principles or laws. But, on the one hand, 
law no. 364 has generally
147
 recognised as lawful a foreign legal institution previ-
ously unknown to the domestic system; on the other hand, it forces, whenever an 
Italian citizen wishes to conclude a trust, to necessarily resort to foreign law to 
regulate it. In fact, it is not infrequent the negotiation of so called “inner” trusts, 
where parties are Italian citizens and controlled assets are located in Italy, but 
which are governed by a foreign law of autonomous choice of the parties.148 Inter-
estingly indeed, thus, when it comes to settling a trust in Italy, the parties’ auton-
omous choice of the applicable law is not justified only by the generally acknowl-
edged broad autonomy in negotiation matters, but also by the absolute shortage of 
Italian regulations on the subject. 
                                                          
146 The Convention was ratified with no qualification. 
147 Save the case-by-case judicial evaluation of its compatibility with the public policy. 
148 Lacking the expressed choice of the parties, the 1985 Hague Convention states that the trust is 
governed by the law with which it is most closely connected (art. 7). 
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Inner trusts are exactly the topic of a recent legal case, decided by the Court of 
Appeal in Milan on 1/12/2016. The lawsuit149 originated from a disciplinary pro-
cedure against a notary who had drawn up four deeds of inner trust considered to-
tally void for lack of purpose by the Notary Archive. In detail, settlor, trustee and 
beneficiary were coinciding in all four trusts. After being sanctioned with a finan-
cial penalty by the local administrative commission (Commissione Regionale 
Amministrativa – Lombardia) on demand of the Notary Archive for violation of 
the Notarial Law, the notary requested the Court to verify that he had not commit-
ted violation of his notarial duties since the trust instruments were compliant with 
the legal requirements. As a result, any disciplinary procedure against him should 
be rejected. 
Underlying the disciplinary issue, legal questions concern, firstly, the condi-
tions of validity of trusts, where settlor and trustee coincide (i.e., self-declared 
trusts, or declaration of trust), on the basis of foreign law and, secondly, their 
compatibility in light with the domestic legal system. The Trusts Jersey Law 1984 
is the foreign law autonomously chosen by the parties as the law governing their 
trusts and the Italian court needs to primarily evaluate both existence and validity 
of those trust instruments in light of that law. It is worth observing that, when for-
eign law is designated by the parties, its content is more easily identified than in 
case of application of choice of law rules: the parties themselves usually provide 
the court with the interested legal provisions, putting the court in a satisfying epis-
temic position with reference to foreign law. Also, the fact that the Trusts Jersey 
Law is often opted for as the applicable law in inner trusts makes it even more 
reachable. Besides, the Jersey Legal Information Board website allows to down-
load the official statute.150 Consider some of its provisions. 
TRUSTS JERSEY LAW (1984 plus amendments) 
Art. 2: Existence of a trust 
A trust exists where a person (known as a trustee) holds or has vested in the person or 
is deemed to hold or have vested in the person property (of which the person is not the 
owner in the person’s own right) – 
(a) for the benefit of any person (known as a beneficiary) whether or not yet 
ascertained or in existence; 
(b) for any purpose which is not for the benefit only of the trustee; or 
(c) for such benefit as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) and also for any such 
purpose as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (b). 
 
Art. 9: Extent of application of law of Jersey to creation, etc. of a trust 
PAR. 5: The rule “donner et retenir ne vaut” shall not apply to any question concerning 
the validity, effect or administration of a trust, or a transfer or other disposition of 
property to a trust. 
                                                          
149 This lawsuit was initiated in the form of urgent procedure (art. 702-bis and ff., c.p.c.). In 
broad terms, urgent procedures are featured by a summary judgment on the facts of the case and 
are decided with an order, which can be appealed within 30 days. 
150 The .pdf version is available at https://www.jerseylaw.je/laws/revised/Pages/13.875.aspx (last 
accessed: 17/01/2017). 
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The 1985 Hague Convention defines trusts and their main features at art. 2. The 
Convention is now integral part of the Italian legal system, through the ratification 
law no. 364/1989. 
HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPICABLE TO TRUSTS AND ON THEIR 
RECOGNITION (1985) 
Article 2: 
PAR.1: For the purposes of this Convention, the term "trust" refers to the legal 
relationships created – inter vivos or on death – by a person, the settlor, when assets have 
been placed under the control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified 
purpose. 
PAR. 2: A trust has the following characteristics – 
a) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the trustee's own estate; 
b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name of another person 
on behalf of the trustee; 
c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which he is accountable, to 
manage, employ or dispose of the assets in accordance with the terms of the trust and the 
special duties imposed upon him by law. 
PAR. 3: The reservation by the settlor of certain rights and powers, and the fact that the 
trustee may himself have rights as a beneficiary, are not necessarily inconsistent with the 
existence of a trust. 
The legal case is studied in the two-step procedure modelled in the preceding 
chapter: section 3.1. sheds light on interpretive incompatibilities possibly arising 
from a combined reading of Trusts Jersey Law and the 1985 Hague Convention; 
section 3.2. analyses if trusts as interpreted by the foreign law can be judged com-
patible with inner policy and, generally, inner system. 
3.1. Validity of Self-Declared Trusts in light of the Foreign Law 
The essential interpretive issue regards whether the establishment of self-declared 
trusts, i.e., trusts where the settlor coincides with the trustee, is valid according to 
the governing foreign law, the Trusts Jersey Law (TJL). The legal consequences 
on the case are clear: if the four trusts result validly established according to TJL, 
they were not unlawfully certified by the notary, who, in turn, could not be sanc-
tioned for violating his notarial duties. 
n1: art. 2, let. B, TJL [“for any purpose which is not for the benefit only of the trustee”] 
 
1) INTERPRETIVE INCOMPATIBILITY AROUND n1 
 
INTERPRETIVE A FORTIORI ARGUMENT AaFortiori: LSJer, n1, Z1, caFortiori → O1 
Where : 
 Z1 holds and stands for: “If generally trusts are not valid when they pursue a purpose only 
for the benefit of the trustee, a trust where the settlor coincides with trustee and 
beneficiary is a fortiori a trust that benefits only the trustee and, thus, is not valid” 
n1: art. 2, let. B, TJL, “for any purpose which is not for the benefit only of the trustee” 
caFortiori: canon for a fortiori interpretation 
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O1: n1 should exclude self-declared trusts from trusts that are validly arranged according 
to LSJer 
 
INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT Alit  LSJer, n1, Z2, Z3, clit → O2 
Where : 
Z2 and Z3 hold 
Z2: “if a trust is not established for a purpose which is not for the benefit only of the 
trustee, then it is a valid trust” 
Z3: no reference to the coincidence between settlor/trustee(/beneficiary) can be found in n1 
n1: art. 2, let. B, TJL 
clit: canon for literal interpretation 
O2: n1 should include self-declared trusts among trusts that are validly arranged according 
to LSJer 
 
O1 ≠  O2 
The opposite interpretive outcomes O1 and O2 are reached using different can-
ons of interpretation. In AaFortiori, the canon for a fortiori interpretation (Tarello 
1980) gives an extensive reading of the sentence literals. The situation of the set-
tlor/trustee(/beneficiary) is considered quintessential of trusts established for the 
only benefit of trustees: if a settlor coincides with both trustee and beneficiary, the 
trust has been inevitably established for his/her own only advantage. Though, no 
such reference appears in the wording and Alit reads the lack of it as symptomatic 
exactly of the contrary opinion: the provision does not specifically refer to the set-
tlor/trustee in particular, so the coincidence of settlor and trustee (and beneficiary)  
and the fact that the trust is established for the benefit only of the trustee are not 
necessarily correlated. If anything, a similar correlation should be assessed case by 
case to verify that, in concrete, a self-declared trust aims to practically achieve the 
benefit only of the settlor/trustee/beneficiary. 
Furthermore, if the Jersey lawmaker had intended to forbid self-declared trusts, 
it would have explicitly mentioned it. Let us, thus, consider the argument applying 
the canon from intentions of the foreign legislator. Intentions are expressed as dif-
ferent goals to pursue by law. 
2) INTERPRETIVE INCOMPATIBILITY AROUND THE INTENTIONS OF THE LSJer 
LAWMAKER 
 
INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT Aint_1  LSJer, Z4, Zi
g1
, cint, g1 → O2 
Where: 
Z4 and Zi
g1
 hold 
Z4: LSJer fails to expressly prohibit or admit the coincidence of ‘settlor’ and ‘trustee’ in 
TJL 
Zi
g1
: Z4 reveals the intention to pursue g1 
g1: regulating both trusts and self-declaration of trusts 
cint: canon from intentions 
TJL should be interpreted as O2, i.e., as including self-declared trusts among 
trusts that are validly arranged according to LSJer. But an opposite argument from 
intentions Aint_2 could be built on similar basis. 
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INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT Aint_2  LSJer, Z4, Zi
g2
, cint, g2 → O1 
Where: 
Z4 and Zi
g2
 hold 
Z4: LSJer fails to expressly prohibit or admit the coincidence of ‘settlor’ and ‘trustee’ in 
TJL 
Zi
g2
: Z4 reveals the intention to pursue g2 
cint: canon from intentions 
g2: excluding self-declaration of trusts from the general regulation of trusts 
 
TJL should be interpreted as O1, i.e., as excluding self-declared trusts from trusts that are 
validly arranged according to LSJer. 
Still, Aint_2 conflicts with the usual, technical interpretation of another important 
disposition of the relevant foreign law. 
n2: art. 9, par. 5, TJL [“transfer or other disposition of property”] 
 
INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT Atech_1:  LSJer, n2, Z5
TJL
, ctech → O2 
Where : 
Z5 holds 
Z5
TJL: ‘transfer’ and ‘other disposition of property’ are technical terms in trust law, the first 
implying disjointed settlor and trustee, the second including the possibility for the settlor 
to declare him or herself the trustee 
ctech: linguistic canon for technical meaning 
Also, Atech_1 and, thus, O2 are further supported by the goals that the foreign le-
gal system LSJer supposedly pursues with trusts in general. One of those goals is to 
lawfully provide for the possibility to constitute a separate fund with the assets en-
titled to the trustee, as derived from the following art. 21, par. 6, TJL. 
Art. 21, TJL: Duties of the Trustee 
Par. 6: A trustee shall keep trust property separate from his or her personal property and 
separately identifiable from any other property of which he or she is a trustee. 
 
g3: constituting a separate fund  
 
TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT Ateleo: LSJer, g3
TJL
, Z6, Z7, ct → O2 
Where : 
Z6 and Z7 hold 
g3
TJL
: TJL pursues g3 
Z6: n2 should be interpreted in the sense that favours the pursuit of g3 
Z7: self-declared trusts pursue g3 for they earmark trust assets within the settlor’s property 
ct : teleological canon 
If the foreign law pursues the goal of authorising the constitution of separate 
funds, self-declared trusts do not impede it since they realise the fund separation 
within the settlor’s assets. Ateleo ends up further backing both Aint_1 and Atech_1: a 
subjective distinction between settlor and trustee seems not to be a foreign law 
requisite for trust validity. We recall the earmarking effect in the next sect. 3.2., 
when addressing the issue of compatibility with the domestic system: such effect 
significantly impacts on the financial liability of the subjects involved, for trust as-
sets cannot be generally attached by creditors. 
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However, the interpreter who wishes to prove that foreign law does not admit 
self-declared trusts could resort to the 1985 Hague Convention (HC): its ratifica-
tion allows for the recognition of trusts within the Italian legal order. In fact, one 
of its provisions in particular lends itself to opposite interpretations, as already 
stressed by legal doctrine (Bartoli 2005): art. 2, par. 1 defines trusts as “legal rela-
tionships created […] by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under 
the control of a trustee,” a vague definition for many aspects. 
n3: art. 2, par. 1, HC [“[…]by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under 
the control of a trustee”] 
 
3) INTERPRETIVE INCOMPATIBILITIES AROUND n3 
INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT Aord  LSI, n3, Z7, Z8, cord → O3 
 
Where: 
Z7 and Z8 hold 
Z7: using two words, ‘settlor’ and ‘trustee,’ in ordinary language is commonly regarded as 
implying two different subjects 
Z8: LSI  fails to expressly authorise or prohibit coincidence of ‘settlor’ and ‘trustee’ 
cord: linguistic canon for ordinary meaning 
O3: n3 should exclude self-declared trusts from its applicative scope 
 
Aord implies that only interpreting TJL as O1, (i.e., excluding self-declared trusts from 
trusts that are validly arranged according to LSJer) makes TJL compatible with the public 
policy of LSI:   O3 → O1(LSI) 
Aord triggers the following reasoning: regardless of their validity in LSJer,
151 the 
fact that self-declared trusts do not fall under the scope of n3 according to the or-
dinary meaning its wording has in LSI, should lead to reject self-declared trusts in 
LSI. In other words, a preference should be in any case accorded to the interpreta-
tion more close to ordinary meaning of the system of destination. However, this 
theoretical model accepts the rule of preference, according to which if both an or-
dinary and technical meaning of a word or sentence exist, the technical meaning 
should prevail, at least generally. Here, the application of the canon for trust-law 
technical meaning provides for reasons to derive O2, also considering that the 
Convention cannot be read disjoint from the relevant foreign law: according to 
foreign law only, the validity of the trusts has to be assessed. 
INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT Atech_2: 
LSJer, LSI, n3, Z8, Z9
TJL
, ctech → O4 
Where : 
Z8 and Z9
TJL
 hold 
Z8: LSI  fails to expressly authorise or prohibit the coincidence of ‘settlor’ and ‘trustee’ 
Z9
TJL
: ‘settlor’ and ‘trustee’ are words of technical language, referring to corresponding 
legal roles within a trust arrangement, commonly provided for by trust law in LSJer, i.e., 
TJL 
ctech: linguistic canon for technical meaning 
O4: n3 should include self-declared trusts among trusts that are validly recognised in LSI  
                                                          
151 But, a fortiori, the same interpretive outcome is reached, if Aint_2 above is the starting point. 
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In turn, Atech_2 supports the compatibility of O2 with the public policy of LSI: 
O4 → O2(LSI)     
The interpretive incompatibility around n3, given by the conflict between Aord 
and Atech_2, stems from the application of a national and a foreign interpretive rule. 
In Aord, the ordinary meaning is that of the Italian legal system: provided that trusts 
are not disciplined by inner laws, there is no specific technical terminology about 
them and, thus, ordinary language is resorted to. Atech_2 refers to the technical lan-
guage typically employed in Trust Law in LSJer (see Atech_1 above). The preference 
rule, according to which Atech_2 prevails over Aord, is correctly applied also because 
the technical meaning supports the application of foreign law as applied in the for-
eign system LSJer: in this way, the parties’ reasonable expectations are met, while 
also pursuing the goal of legal certainty in cross-borders disputes and relations. 
Applying a systemic interpretation of the provisions involved, Atech_2 results to 
be supported by Atech_1 above, ascribing technical meanings to the phrase “transfer 
or other disposition of property” in n2, and shapes the interpretive reasoning as fol-
lows. 
SYSTEMIC INTERPRETATION OF n2 (LSJer) and n3 (LSI) 
ARGUMENT FROM CROSS-BORDER CONTEXTUAL HARMONIZATION  
  
Atech_1 implies a harmonised reading of n3, as in Atech_2: 
(LSJer, n2, Z5
TJL
, ctech → O2) →ccontHarm (LSJer, LSI, n3, Z8, Z9TJL, ctech → O4) 
 
Where: 
Z5
TJL
 and Z9
TJL
 hold 
Z5
TJL: ‘transfer’ and ‘other disposition of property’ are technical terms in trust law, the first 
implying disjointed settlor and trustee, the second including the possibility for the settlor 
to declare him or herself the trustee 
Z9
TJL
: ‘settlor’ and ‘trustee’ are words of technical language, referring to corresponding 
legal roles within a trust arrangement, commonly provided for by trust law in LSJer 
ccontHarm: canon from contextual harmonization 
ctech: linguistic canon for technical meaning 
Additionally, n3 includes the vague expression ‘under the control of,’ and thus 
avoids to specify what acts of property dispositions set up valid trust arrange-
ments. In this way, it is not clear what the Italian legislator152 has meant to include 
under the category of recognisable, valid trusts. The legal doctrine,153 exactly re-
ferring to the lawmaker’s intentions, has developed (at least) two conflicting inter-
pretations of those terms. 
INTENTIONS OF THE LSI LAWMAKER 
A) INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT Aint_3 LSI, Z10, Zi
 g2
, Zprep_works, cint, g2 → O3 
Where: 
Z10, Zi
 g2
, and Zprep_works hold 
                                                          
152 Through the ratification, the 1985 Hague Convention is inner law. 
153 See Bartoli (2005). 
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Z10: LSI opts for the generic phrase ‘under the control of’ instead of the technical trust law 
terminology ‘transfer or other disposition of property’ 
Zi
 g2
: the choice in favour of the generic phrase reveals the intention to pursue g2 
Zprep_works: Convention’ preparatory works attest the discussion about the opportunity to 
recognise trusts, self-declared trusts, and trust-like instruments 
cint: canon from intentions 
g2: excluding self-declared trusts from the validly established trusts, recognisable in LSI 
O3: n3 should exclude self-declared trusts from its applicative scope 
 
B) INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT Aint_4 LSI, Z10, Zi
g3
, Zprep_works, cint, g3 → O4 
 
Where: 
Z10, Zi
g3
, and Zprep_works hold 
Z10: LSI opts for the generic phrase ‘under the control of’ instead of the technical trust law 
terminology ‘transfer or other disposition of property’ 
Zi
g3
: the choice in favour of the generic phrase reveals the intention to pursue g3 
Zprep_works: Convention’ preparatory works attest the discussion about the opportunity to 
recognise trusts, self-declared trusts, and trust-like instruments 
cint: canon from intentions 
g3: regulating as validly established trusts, recognisable in LSI, a broader category of trust-
like instruments 
O4: n3 should include self-declared trusts among trusts that are validly recognised in LSI 
Interestingly, the legal doctrine, by applying the same canon (canon from inten-
tions) and resorting to the same extra-conditions (e.g., the preparatory works of 
the Convention), ends up providing two opposite readings. In particular, Aint_3 
shows a highly cautious and sceptical attitude towards unknown (even unforesee-
able, as trust-like institutions) instruments, possibly approaching the inner system. 
Still, Aint_4 proves to be more aligned with the commonest foreign law interpreta-
tion, O2, supported by both technical and systematic reasons. So, considering that 
the relevant law is Trusts Jersey Law and provided that no compelling reason 
stands in the way (e.g., public policy concerns), courts should prefer those inter-
pretations that favour the inclusion of self-declared trusts among validly estab-
lished trusts. 
3.2. Compatibility of (Self-Declared) Trusts with Public Policy 
The ratification of the 1985 Hague Convention has sanctioned the general compat-
ibility of trusts with the Italian legal system. Goals and effects, which foreign law 
purses with trusts, have been considered abstractly compatible with goals pursued, 
and legal consequences favoured, by inner law. 
But before then, recognising and enforcing trusts in Italy raised strong doubts, 
mainly for the segregating effect trusts produce on settlors’ assets: not only are 
such assets subtracted from the settlor’s property, but also they constitute a fund 
separate from the trustee’s holdings, even if the trustee is commonly entitled their 
property. Important legal consequence of separate funds like trusts is that they 
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cannot be attached by general creditors, whose credit guarantee is therefore corre-
spondingly diminished. A similar result could not but be looked at suspiciously by 
the Italian lawmaker. In fact, on the one hand, the civil code promotes the auton-
omy of the parties in contractual matters, also in light of the Constitution,154 for 
example allowing to conclude contracts that are not expressly regulated by the law 
(art 1322 c.c.). On the other hand, parties’ contractual autonomy must respect the 
law and should aim for interests and effects that are worthy of legal protection. 
Assessment on lawfulness is made in concrete, checking that the effects, pursued 
and provoked by a specific agreement, deserve to be safeguarded and recognised 
by the legal order as a whole. Agreements that do not pass such test are considered 
invalid for lack of legitimate purpose (articles 1325,1343, 1344 c.c.) and, thus, 
void (art. 1418 c.c.) 
Even if trusts are now generally acknowledged legal worthiness in the effects 
they try to attain, they cannot escape the same judicial concrete assessment. If 
anything, this is mandatory for some forms of trusts, e.g., self-declared trusts, 
which can more easily have elusive effects and hide proper frauds against inner 
law. Therefore, what the court is required to assess is if the specific purpose of the 
trust is illegal according to the mentioned code provisions. 
Before listing the relevant Italian civil code rules, it is worth noting that, even if 
trusts are not always seen as contracts in common law jurisdictions due to the mul-
tifarious schemes of trust existing in the legal practice (Rounds Jr 2016), Italian 
courts are used to relating them to contracts, mainly for the major correspondences 
with contracts than to other institutions of the domestic system. 
Art 1322 c.c.: Contractual Autonomy155 
PAR. 1: The parties are free to determine the terms of their contractual relationship within 
the limits posed by the law and by corporate provisions. 
PAR. 2: The parties can also conclude contracts, which are not specifically disciplined by 
the law, provided that they are meant to serve interests worthy of legal protection 
according to the legal order. 
 
Art. 1325 c.c.: Requisites of the Contract156 
Requisites of the contract are: 1) the mutual agreement between the parties; 2) the 
purpose; 3) the subject matter; 4) the form, when it is required by the law for the contract 
not to be void. 
 
                                                          
154 art. 41, Const.: The private economic initiative is free. It cannot contrast with social utility or 
be undertaken so to damage safety, liberty, and human dignity. The law determines appropriate 
programmes and controls so that public and private economic activity is oriented and coordinated 
towards social ends. 
155 Original version: Autonomia contrattuale. 1. Le parti possono liberamente determinare il con-
tenuto del contratto nei limiti imposti dalla legge e dalle norme corporative. 2. Le parti possono 
anche concludere contratti che non appartengano ai tipi aventi una disciplina particolare, purché 
siano diretti a realizzare interessi meritevoli di tutela secondo l'ordinamento giuridico 
156 Original version: I requisiti del contratto. I requisiti del contratto sono: 1) l'accordo delle par-
ti; 2) la causa; 3) l'oggetto; 4) la forma, quando risulta che è prescritta dalla legge sotto pena di 
nullità. 
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Art. 1343 c.c.: Illegal Purpose157 
The purpose is illegal when it is contrary to mandatory legal provisions, to the public 
policy, or to public decency. 
 
Art. 1344 c.c.: Contract to elude the law158 
It is considered illegal the purpose when the contract is the way to elude the application of 
a mandatory legal provision. 
 
Art. 2740 c.c.: Financial Liability159 
PAR. 1: Debtors are liable for the fulfilment of their obligations with all their present and 
future assets. 
PAR. 2: Limitations of liability are permitted only by law. 
Under sect. 3.1., interpretive conflicts around the validity of self-declared trusts 
in light of foreign law were considered more suitably solved admitting their validi-
ty, i.e., O2, both on the basis of linguistic (technical) and systemic canons of inter-
pretation. But is foreign law, interpreted as O2, compatible with the inner public 
policy of LSI? Teleological canons of interpretations may help to reply the com-
patibility question. Bear in mind that, with respect to the previous section, inter-
pretive outcomes (O1), goals (gn), and extra-conditions (Zn) are changed in content 
and numberings are restarted. 
Trusts Jersey Law (TJL) 
 
O1: self-declared trusts can be considered valid 
¬O1: self-declared trusts are invalid 
 
INTERPRETING WITH GOALS 
g1: constituting a separate fund 
g2: deducting assets from the subject’s property 
g3: legally protecting worthy interests of the parties 
g4: guaranteeing contractual autonomy 
g5: protecting private economic initiative 
g6: guaranteeing the unity of debtor’s financial liability 
g7: protecting creditors’ interests  
 
1) PRO-VALIDITY 
 
1. LSJer, cteleo, g1
TJL
, g2
TJL
 → O1    (A1) 
2. LSI, cteleo, Z1, g1, g2 → O1     (A2) 
3. ((a → b) ˄ (c → b)) → ((a ˄ c) → b))   (Rule) 
4. (LSJer, cteleo, g1
TJL
, g2
TJL
 ) ˄ (LSI, cteleo, Z1, g1, g2) → O1  (A3) 
 
                                                          
157 Original version: Causa illecita. La causa è illecita quando è contraria a norme imperative, 
all’ordine pubblico o al buon costume. 
158 Original version: Contratto in frode alla legge. Si reputa altresì illecita la causa quando il 
contratto costituisce il mezzo per eludere l’applicazione di una norma imperativa. 
159 Original version: Responsabilità patrimoniale. 1. Il debitore risponde dell'adempimento delle 
obbligazioni con tutti i suoi beni presenti e futuri. 2. Le limitazioni della responsabilità non sono 
ammesse se non nei casi stabiliti dalla legge. 
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Where : 
cteleo : teleological canon 
g1
TJL
: cteleo ascribes foreign law TJL g1 
g2
TJL
: cteleo ascribes foreign law TJL g2 
Z1 holds and stands for: other provisions/institutions in LSI pursues g1 and g2 
If O2 can be derived from applying the teleological canon for interpreting for-
eign law in the system of origin and recognising that constituting a separate fund 
is a goal of foreign law, and if the same goal is likewise pursued by LSI, as results 
from other legal instruments in LSI (Z1), then O2 is also compatible with the system 
of destination. Z1 includes, for example, art. 2645ter c.c., which authorises the 
conclusion of legal arrangements aimed to separate a fund for specific purposes 
within a family. 
2) COUNTERARGUMENT 
 
1. (LSJer, cteleo, g1
TJL
, g2
TJL
) ˄ (LSI, cteleo, Z1, g1, g2) → O1 (A3) 
2. (LSI, Z2, g6, g7, g3, cteleo) → ¬O1   (A4) 
3. O1 ≠  ¬O1     (Interpretive conflict)  
4. (g6 ˄ g7 ˄ g3) > (g1 ˄ g2)    (Rule of preference R1) 
5. ¬O1      (Incompatibility with LSI) 
 
Where Z2 holds and stands for: other provisions/institutions in LSI pursue g6 ˄ g7 ˄ g3 
It is possible to attack the previous argument and support the incompatibility of 
self-declared trusts within the inner system, i.e., ¬O1, by arguing that other goals, 
likewise pursued by the Italian lawmaker, prevail over the purpose of constitution 
of separate funds. The rule, according to which the debtor’s financial liability can 
be diminished by expressed legal provisions (art. 2740, par. 2), is read as implying 
that a trust, which only aims to diminish that liability, cannot be included in those 
atypical contract authorized by the legislator (art. 1322). Thus, they are invalid for 
illegal purpose and, thus, void. 
Though, another argumentation move is left in favour of O1: 
3) COUNTER-COUNTERARGUMENT 
 
1. (LSI, Z2, g6, g7, g3, cteleo) → ¬O1   (A4) 
2. (LSI, Z1, g6, g7, g3, cteleo) ˄ (LSI, cteleo, Z1, g1, g2) → O1 (A5) 
3. ¬O1 ≠  O1      (Inner Interpretive Conflict) 
4. (g1 ˄ g2 ˄ g3 ˄ g6 ˄ g7)    (Rule of preference R2) 
5. R2  > R1     (Rule of preference R3) 
6. O1      (1,2,3, R3) 
7. (LSJer, cteleo, g1
TJL
, g2
TJL
) ≈ (LSI, cteleo, Z1, g1, g2)  (≈ Functional correspondence) 
8. (LSI, Z1, g6, g7, g3, cteleo) ˄ (LSJer, cteleo, g1TJL, g2TJL) → O1 (2,7, Substitution) 
In 3), A5 shows that LSI provides for legal institutions (Z1) that pursue, at the 
same time, all goals (2.). In fact, LSI does not only allow to conclude legal ar-
rangements to manage separate funds, but also provides for concurrent ways, 
through which general creditors can attach the separated assets. One of those legal 
procedures is the revocatory action, i.e., the action given to creditors exactly to ob-
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tain that acts done by the debtor in fraud of their rights (e.g., right for compensa-
tion) are inefficacious towards them (art. 2901-2904 c.c.). In front of an inner in-
terpretive incompatibility (3.), preference rule R1 is subject to R2, stating that all 
the goals should be pursued by the law when possible, under R3: if there is a way 
to pursue all the goals the legal system considers important, that way should be 
favoured. Self-declared trusts in LSJer, then, being comparable to separate funds in 
LSI as regards goals and effects (above defined “Functional correspondence,” step 
7.), can be likewise accepted as valid in LSI as they are in LSJer (8.). According to 
this interpretive arguments, the purpose of the self-declared trust is considered 
generally valid. In other words, the risk of enforcing a foreign institution, the main 
effect of which may be detrimental to the protection of creditors’ interests, is bal-
anced with the analysis of inner law, which provides for legal tools to contrast the 
possible damaging effects. 
In our working example, in particular, no evidence of the settlor’s intention to 
declare a trust in order to damage creditors’ rights can be detected. Thus, by inter-
preting the foreign law as admitting self-declared trusts and arguing than no com-
pelling reasons against such interpretation exist both in the inner system, given 
that similar institutions are regulated by inner law, and in the specific facts of the 
case, the court could justifiably opt for recognising the compatibility of foreign 
law interpretation with the domestic system and its public policy. 
4. Concluding Comments 
The analysis of the working examples shows that our argumentation framework, 
based on cross-border interpretive arguments, proves helpful in identifying: 
 What canons of interpretation, irrespective of their foreign or domestic nature, 
are involved: usually, courts resort to the whole range of rules of interpretation 
(see chapter 2, sect. 4), drawing on the practice of all interested systems. Usual-
ly, judges start from foreign linguistic canons (often, in the form of transla-
tions), comparing them with the national use of similar terms; afterwards, they 
consider goals possibly pursued by the foreign law (i.e., teleological argument) 
as well as any systematic reason that could support a certain interpretation.  
 What interpretive incompatibilities may arise from their application: on the one 
hand, incompatibilities arise from uncertainties of many kind (vagueness of the 
original rule or of its translation, multiple existing interpretations of the same 
rule, etc.); on the other hand, they are fostered by the specific legal queries of 
the parties, which variously challenge the receptive attitude of the domestic le-
gal system and its core of values and principles (i.e., public policy). 
 What ways exist to solve interpretive conflicts: conflicts are faced and solved 
having in mind both the position of the parties (i.e., their judicial requests and 
interests) and the legal framework that features their relationship (i.e., national, 
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foreign and, possibly, international or EU laws). Also, balancing techniques are 
used to establish preference among different interpretations. 
 What modes, if any, exist to attack or defend different arguments: in fact, inter-
pretive arguments are attacked claiming that canon-specific extra-conditions do 
not hold in the present case and thus the argument does not have enough justi-
ficatory force; that other extra-conditions, supported in either legal system tak-
en as main reference, are better-supported so that another interpretation should 
be preferred; that interpretive arguments based on technical meanings are over-
ridden because of compelling reasons or general principles. 
The argumentative strategy, developed thanks to this argument-based frame-
work, refers both to foreign and inner law, allowing for considering intra- and ex-
tra-systemic elements in the legal reasoning: something that courts are more and 
more forced to do, even on a daily basis, but that informal (and formal) argumen-
tation still had to specifically pay attention to. 
The next chapter is going to review the whole research work, in particular in-
vestigating whether the research questions posed in the first chapter have been an-
swered to in the end. In chapter 5, it has been anticipated that some results of the 
present theoretical work have been already object of formalisation (Malerba et al. 
2016, in Appendix). Such first formalisation, taking the first legal case here pre-
sented as main working example, suggests that the issues raised by foreign law in-
terpretation can be interestingly addressed from more formal perspectives by the 
AI and Law community. 
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Chapter 7: Results and Conclusions 
 
In this final chapter, we primarily discuss if the research questions presented in the 
first chapter have been successfully replied to in the thesis (sect. 1). We then iden-
tify the major contributions to knowledge of our research, also in light of what has 
been already done in the field of argumentation, legal reasoning, and AI and Law 
(sect. 2). Finally, we suggest that our results reveal two possible lines of future re-
search (sect. 3). 
1. Discussion 
This study has explored the feasibility and utility of a theory for arguing with can-
ons of interpretation coming from different legal systems, once they have accessed 
domestic legal systems in private international law disputes. In so doing, it has de-
fined an argument-based conceptual framework that encompasses occurring inter-
pretive interactions, without ignoring the existing, broader normative background 
each legal system is nowadays part of. 
Argumentation and argumentation schemes were not new to the study of legal 
interpretation and of normative conflicts, for the latter are often brought about by 
interpretative doubts or mismatches. Both topics had thus been already addressed 
using argumentation tools, both formally and informally; though, these research 
efforts had concentrated on normative and interpretive conflicts arising within one 
legal system, keeping a mainly inward outlook (Sartor 1992, Prakken and Sartor 
1995, Sartor et al. 2014, Rotolo et al. 2015, Walton et al. 2016). The examination 
of the extant literature revealed that also interactions among distinct normative 
systems had interested scholars in both legal theory and AI and Law with regard to 
the allocation of jurisdiction and choice-of-law characterising private international 
law cases. The issues of legal pluralism and the fundamental mechanisms of con-
flict of laws had consequently been studied through argumentation and logics 
(Sartor 2005, Dung and Sartor 2011, Hage 2015), but the focus had been main-
tained on the level of virtual conflicts between legal systems, each considered as 
potentially competent to rule the case: precisely the kind of conflicts that private 
international law in fact prevents. 
Hence, no specific consideration had been given so far to the issue of applica-
tion and interpretation of the foreign provision when the conflict rule identifies it 
as the applicable law to the particular case in front of national judges. In such cas-
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es, many legislators160 require that domestic courts interpret and apply the relevant 
foreign law using foreign rules of interpretation and application over time. Ulti-
mately, applying foreign canons of interpretation within the domestic legal system 
may result in conceptual misalignments, normative gaps, interpretive uncertain-
ties, and proper clashes with inner canons of interpretation. The present thesis fills 
this gap in the literature, building on the research hypothesis, according to which 
those virtual conflicts between normative systems, avoided by private internation-
al law, can still occur at the level of interpretation.  
Considering the previous remarks, the thesis posed the ensuing main research 
question: 
 How can theory of argumentation and, specifically, argumentation schemes be 
used to explain the way domestic courts should reason when they apply and in-
terpret a specific foreign law in order to decide the cross-border case in front of 
them? 
Addressing such question has preliminarily meant to put domestic courts in a 
convenient epistemic position with reference to foreign law (see chapter 5, sect. 
2). In fact, getting familiar with both foreign law content and its modes of inter-
pretation raises significant problems, ranging from reliability, credibility, up to the 
very legitimacy of the resorted informative channels and, therefore, of the legal in-
formation they supply. In spite of many concrete difficulties, we have concluded 
that, all in all, judges can reach a positive epistemic position, if they profit from 
external sources of knowledge, which, in turn, comply with certain requirements. 
Starting from the argument scheme from expert opinion, we have proposed an ar-
gument scheme from foreign law expert opinion, in case the court decides to rely 
on an expert to acquire knowledge of foreign law. 
ARGUMENT FROM FOREIGN LAW EXPERT OPINION 
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in legal system F containing provision n. 
Minor Premise: E asserts that provision n (in legal system F) is true (false). 
Conclusion: n may plausibly be taken to be true (false). 
 
CQ1–Expertise Question: how credible is E as an expert source? 
CQ2–Foreign Legal System Question: is E an expert in the legal system that n is in? 
CQ3–Trustworthiness Question: is E personally reliable as a source? 
CQ4–Consistency Question: is n consistent with what case law and/or legal doctrine 
asserts? 
CQ5–Interpretation(s) Question: are various n1,…, nn presented plausible interpretations 
of n? 
CQ6–Reliable Source Question: is E’s assertion based on reliable source(s)? 
With this premise in mind, we have presented a cross-border interpretive argu-
ment scheme, a definition of interpretive incompatibilities in foreign law applica-
tion, and a general pattern for dealing with such cross-border interpretive incom-
patibilities, in reply to sub-questions 1, 2, 3, as structured in chapter 1, sect. 5.  
                                                          
160 See art. 15, Italian law no. 218/1995. 
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1. Which argumentation schemes can help in dealing with interpretive canons 
coming from foreign legal systems? 
In order to answer sub-question 1, we have identified the next reasoning pat-
tern, which allows the domestic court to reason with canons of interpretation com-
ing from the foreign country (see chapter 5, sect. 4.1). 
Interpretive Argument Ai Z1,…, Zl, ci → Oi 
Where :  Z1,…, Zl are the extra-conditions 
Z1,…, Zl hold 
ci is the interpretive canon to be applied  
Oi is the resulting interpretive outcome  
 
Ai reads “If ci applies and Z1,…, Zl hold, n should be interpreted as Oi.” 
Each argument Ai applies to the relevant foreign law n. It has a premise, com-
posed of extra-conditions Z1,…, Zl and of a canon of interpretation ci, and a con-
clusion, consisting in an interpretive outcome Oi, i.e., the norm derived from pro-
vision n. As already in Sartor et al. (2014) and Rotolo et al. (2015), canons of 
interpretation are considered inference rules in the interpretative argument: addi-
tionally, in our argument scheme, rules of interpretation are either foreign or na-
tional, depending on the extra-condition considered.  
2. How do the identified argumentation schemes help to deal with interpretive 
incompatibilities occurring in foreign law application? 
Interpretive incompatibility is defined as double-sided: on the one hand, it re-
fers to a basic idea of incompatible interpretations (Rotolo et al. 2015), according 
to which interpretations O1 and Om of foreign provision n are incompatible for O1 
is different from Om, and irrespective of any possible logical relation (entailment, 
semantic overlapping, etc.) between O1 and Om; on the other hand, foreign law in-
terpretation requires that canons and interpretative outcomes are moved from their 
natural environment to the national legal system of destination, so that a plain in-
terpretation in the original system may be incompatible with the system of destina-
tion as understood by its public policy. As a second compatibility threshold, public 
policy continues to protect the inner coherence of the domestic system, even if it 
now includes also values and principles extraneous to the mere national system. 
INTERPRETIVE INCOMPATIBILITY 
Interpretive Argument A1  Z1,…, Zl, c1 → O1 
…    … 
Interpretive Argument Am  Zm,…, Zl, cm → On  
Where    n ≤ m, Z1, Zm,…, Zl hold, c1,…, cm apply 
 
Foreign provision n may have more interpretation-outcomes O1,…, On depending on 
which interpretive canon c1,…, cm is applied, where n ≤ m. 
 
Interpretive Incompatibility : 1) O1 ≠ … ≠ On 
    2) On is incompatible with public policy in LS
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Through the different extra-conditions Z1,…, Zl that characterise each interpre-
tive arguments involved in the reasoning, national interpreters refer to the different 
normative systems involved (e.g., LSI, LSCAM, LSINT as in the first working exam-
ple in chapter 6, sect. 2) and to the interpretive canons, both national and foreign, 
that could be applied. Also, they build their argumentative strategy considering 
goals and values that pertain to various legal orders, all called upon by the specific 
foreign law application. Thereby, they face all likely interpretive incompatibilities 
trying to comply with the following needs of private international law: 
 Need to meet the reasonable expectations of the parties whenever it is possible 
(see chapter 3, sect. 2.3.); 
 Need to protect the core values and inner coherence of domestic systems (see 
chapter 4, sect. 3.2.); 
 Need to acknowledge that normative systems variously intertwine and carry 
their own values (see chapter 4, sect. 4.2.). 
Any plausible ordering among many interpretations of the foreign rule n will 
eventually depend on the legal system taken as main reference and on the goals 
and values it promotes, with a view to the system of destination. These mecha-
nisms are analysed in various hypothetical scenarios (see chapter 5, sect. 4.2.). 
Critical questions, then, evaluate the reasoning process: in a step-by-step fashion 
that mirrors the level of reasoning involved, they assess if the interpreters have 
abided by this network of rules and principles (see the illustrative list in chapter 5, 
sect. 4.3.). 
3. How can the identified argumentation schemes give an explanatory view on 
what should happen when foreign canons of interpretation enter the national 
legal system, i.e., on the interactions between intra- and inter-systemic inter-
pretative elements in the judicial reasoning? 
Extra-conditions Z1,…, Zn characterise the interpretive arguments A1,…, Am, so 
that there will ultimately be as many interpretive arguments A1,…, An not only as 
many different interpretive canons c1,…, cn apply to the same provision n, but also 
as many different extra-conditions feature that interpretation; they allow to ac-
count for extra-systemic factors in the reasoning of the national court, so that the 
resulting interpretive arguments are able to consider at the same time the intra- 
and extra-systemic elements that foreign law interpretation in private international 
law implies. 
Our argumentation framework has been then applied to two working examples 
and has proved to be useful to spot interpretive incompatibilities and, mostly, to 
outline argumentative strategies to face them (see chapter 6). 
We have also presented the first formal developments of the present work, fo-
cused on the concept of meta-argumentation (see chapter 5, sect. 5): the logical 
model uses meta-rules to perform reasoning about foreign and national canons of 
interpretation (Malerba et al. 2016, in Appendix). 
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2. Impact 
If foreign law is more and more referred to in unexpected scenarios, when national 
courts use it in order to interpret domestic legislations and constitutions, as illus-
trated in chapter 1, private international law offers a safe and interesting frame-
work where to analyse the interpretative interactions triggered by foreign law ap-
plication and the many challenges it poses to domestic legal systems. But studying 
the application of foreign law and interpretive canons by domestic courts is not 
only practically relevant, given the frequency of cross-border legal relations and 
judicial cross-references, but is also theoretically significant, because no theory of 
legal interpretation could claim completeness if it misses to refer to the application 
of foreign canons of interpretation by national courts, in domestic contexts. 
The thesis takes the required step forward in understanding such complex legal 
relations that unfold in legal interpretation, the cornerstone of legal reasoning, and 
that have so far remained substantially unexplored. The contribution to knowledge 
is thus firstly on the level of analysis of a relevant theoretical problem with highly 
practical implications: how domestic courts should reason with foreign interpre-
tive canons translates into different modes of impact of the foreign law not only on 
the regulation of the particular case in front of the judges, but also on the possible 
consequences within the system at large, in terms of future legislative develop-
ments, or of interpretive evolution of domestic legal solutions. 
For the purposes of this theoretical analysis, it has been important to account 
for what concrete factors lead the court to a certain interpretive solution among the 
many possible. As a result, argumentation and argumentation schemes have been 
chosen as preferred research methods: in fact, by maintaining the content of inter-
pretive arguments, such methods preserve the “meaningful reasons” that guide in-
terpreters, i.e., national courts, in accomplishing their task.  
A second contribution of the thesis can be detected in the fact that the argu-
ment-based conceptual framework provides for an initial standard of correctness 
for reasoning and interpreting in cross-border situations. It has also paved the way 
to formal studies on the topic, as the first formalisation presented in chapter 5 
shows. The cross-border interpretive reasoning is represented in terms of meta-
rules, the head of which consists of interpretation rules, and its antecedents include 
any type of conditions (Malerba et al. 2016, in Appendix). 
Argumentation schemes have already proven powerful analytical tools for prac-
tical AI and Law implementations (Walton et al. 2008): technically, they can be 
modelled as rules of inference of a logical system (Verheij 2003, Prakken 2005, 
Walton et al. 2008, van Eemeren et al. 2014), where their premises-conclusion re-
lation is seen in terms of conditional rules. The obtained rules are generally defea-
sible, instantiating the so called defeasible modus ponens (Horty 2001). 
Any formalisation of argumentation schemes should then preserve their peculi-
ar vocation for maintaining nuances of meaning while reproducing the reasoning 
process (Prakken 2005). In particular, some parts of informal argument schemes 
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are strictly context-specific and, as such, determined by the content of the sentenc-
es they consist of: contextual logic can thus turn out to be more useful than ab-
stract logic in formalising them (Verheij 2003). In line with this vision, also argu-
mentation logic makes use of non-monotonic techniques allowing for expressing 
exceptions, disagreement, and uncertainty. As a consequence, argument schemes 
have been embedded in abstract argumentation frameworks (Prakken 2005), 
where arguments, defined as trees including both deductive and defeasible infer-
ences, can be rebutted, undercut, and undermined. Prakken has further improved 
this AF in ASPIC+ (Prakken 2010, Prakken et al. 2015) by formalising argument 
schemes for factor-based reasoning. Argumentation logic expands upon the issue 
of distinguishing what relation form and content have within an argument scheme, 
which is also the missing link between common sense knowledge and practical 
reasoning on the one hand, and logics and formalisms on the other hand. Addi-
tionally, such abstract argumentation frameworks are capable of managing con-
flicts among arguments. 
3. Future Work 
Discussing results and implications has shed light on at least two possible lines of 
further research. 
Firstly, the formal developments in Malerba et al. (2016), by reconnecting with 
the mentioned branch of AI and Law research that generally aims to formalise ar-
gumentation and argumentation schemes, may represent a starting point for further 
practical applications in AI and Law. It could, for example, be explored if the pro-
posed logical machinery can also express the characteristic content of cross-border 
interpretive argumentation schemes, which have been analysed throughout the 
thesis. This would be a clear step forward in the direction of a full formalisation of 
cross-border legal interpretation, so far disregarded. 
Secondly, resuming a legal theoretical perspective, it could be interesting to in-
vestigate whether the developed theory could be a wide-ranging explanatory tool 
for foreign law application and interpretation by domestic courts, also beyond the 
borders of private international law. In other words, it could be interestingly stud-
ied if our theoretical model is susceptible of broader use. For instance, Dung and 
Sartor (2011), representing conflict of laws through modular argumentation, have 
envisioned that, in front of the emerging on the Internet of marketplaces and elec-
tronic societies involving human and artificial agents, their model could more 
generally govern relations between agents belonging to different marketplaces. 
Likewise, it is conceivable that the proposed theory for arguing with and about 
foreign canons of interpretation in private international law contexts could be ex-
tended, with appropriate adjustments, to other forms of informal references, by 
domestic courts, to foreign law and foreign legal arguments. 
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4. Concluding Comment 
The thesis has intended to offer usable access keys to understand a growingly 
complex legal reality, which we, as citizens, experience every day. In detail, it has 
showed that a rationality can be identified when national courts use foreign canons 
of interpretation to apply the foreign law to decide on cross-border cases. Still, 
more and more, that rationality may be given by values and principles that over-
come the territorial borders of nation states and necessarily impact on foreign law 
application and interpretation in national systems. 
Intense legal globalisation, specialised international normative cooperation, as 
well as stronger supranational legal integration cannot but influence the way legis-
lators, judicial bodies, and legal experts in general think of the law: such trans-
formed perspective, open to a network of values and goals other than the domestic 
ones, is unavoidably assumed firstly when it comes to reasoning with laws and 
canons of interpretation coming from other legal systems. 
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Abstract. In this paper we extend a formal framework presented in [6] to model
reasoning across legal systems. In particular, we propose a logical system that en-
compasses the various interpretative interactions occurring between legal systems
in the context of private international law. This is done by introducing meta-rules
to reason with interpretive canons.
Keywords. Legal Interpretation; Defeasible Reasoning; Private International Law
1. Introduction
Developing formal methods to study legal reasoning and interpretation is a traditional
topic of AI and Law (cf., e.g., [4,6,8] and [5] for an overview). The topic has been ad-
dressed using argumentation tools, both formally and informally; though, these research
efforts had concentrated on interpretive issues arising within one legal system, keeping
a mainly inward outlook. An examination of the literature reveals that also interactions
among distinct normative systems had interested some scholars in both legal theory and
AI and Law with regard to the allocation of jurisdiction and choice-of-law characteris-
ing private international law cases. The issues of legal pluralism and the fundamental
mechanisms of conflict of laws had consequently been studied through argumentation
and logics [7,2,3], but the focus had been maintained on legal dogmatics or at the level of
virtual conflicts between legal systems, each considered as potentially competent to rule
the case: precisely the kind of conflicts that private international law in fact prevents.
Hence, no specific consideration had been given so far to the issue of application of
canons and interpretation of the foreign provision when, e.g., the conflicting rule identi-
fies it as the applicable law to the particular case in front of national judges. Filling this
gap in the literature, the present paper builds on the research hypothesis, according to
which those virtual conflicts between normative systems, avoided by private international
law, can still occur at the level of interpretation and of interpretive canons. In spite of the
difficulties faced to get acquainted with both foreign law content and its interpretation,
domestic courts are nevertheless required to apply it as if they were the foreign court, as
it happens, e.g., in the Italian legal system. Indeed, applying a foreign piece of legislation
within the domestic legal system means to tackle conceptual misalignments, to deal with
normative or interpretive gaps, and to solve clashes between canons of interpretation.
1Supported by the EU H2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant
agreement No. 690974 for the project MIREL: MIning and REasoning with Legal texts.
This paper aims at developing a fresh logical framework, based on Defeasible Logic
(DL), which properly addresses the research issue of reasoning about interpretive canons
across different legal systems. The proposed framework extends the contribution of [6].
The layout of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical context of our
framework, the specific problem we address, and offers an example; Section 3 presents a
simplified version of one of the variants of DL of [6]; Section 4 proposes the new system
extending the logic of Section 3 to handle the interpretation of legal provisions across
legal systems.
2. Reasoning across Legal Systems: The Case of Private International Law
When applying and interpreting the foreign law in cross-border disputes, domestic courts
are required to behave as if they were the foreign court and, at the same time, to protect
the inner coherence of their own legal system: this raises interpretive doubts of many
kinds. From an argumentation perspective, for instance, applying the same canon of in-
terpretation to the same normative provision and obtaining opposite outcomes in differ-
ent legal systems could correspond to incompatible arguments and, thus, requires for ef-
fective ways to cope with them in the national system. The purpose of this paper is to
offer a formal method to model how domestic courts should reason about foreign law
by handling conflicting interpretive arguments that are relevant to interpret the identified
foreign law. Reasoning in the context of private international law and of interpretation of
the foreign law means to consider also that:
• canons of interpretation refer to at least two legal systems, the domestic and the
foreign one, but both systems may consist of normative sub-systems, and may be
part of larger systems, e.g., EU system: assuming the existence of many legal sys-
tems LSi, . . . ,LSz, from a set-theoretical perspective, each LSi is either included
in or including other systems (more and more often, both cases hold), with which
it is in various relations;
• in the foreign legal system, priority may be given to interpretive arguments that
are hardly or not used in the domestic one (e.g., the argument from precedent,
common in the USA, is not so familiar to civil law courts);
• interpretive conditions may change from one system to the other;
• an ordering among all interpretations has to be made: this will depend on the legal
system taken as main reference and on the goals and values it refers to.
Summing up, private international law states the principle that courts in a given
system have to apply (and somehow import) the law from other systems. This requires
sometimes to also use foreign interpretive standards and canons (see, for the Italian case,
Article 15 of legislative act 218/1995). We will illustrate our method by elaborating the
following real example.
Example 1 A woman, Cameroonian citizen, put forward an Italian court a paternity ac-
tion with respect to her daughter, also Cameroonian citizen, underage at the time, on
the basis of article 340 Cameroonian Civil Code and article 33 law no. 218/1995. She
alleged that the child was born within a relationship she had with an Italian citizen,
who initially took care of the girl and provided financial support for her, then refusing
to recognise the child. The judicial question is thus the recognition of the legitimate pa-
ternity in favour of the girl, whose main legal consequence would be to burden the pre-
sumed father with the duty to give her due support in the form of maintenance and edu-
cation. Art. 340, Civil Code of Cameroon, states that the judicial declaration of paternity
outside marriage can only be done if the suit is filed within the two years that follow
the cessation, either of the cohabitation, or of the participation of the alleged father in
the support [entretien] and education of the child. At a first glance, it appears crucial to
properly interpret the term entretien for it represents a condition for lawfully advancing
the judicial request of paternity. Different interpretations of this term can be offered in
Cameroon’s law, and may fit differently within the Italian leal system.
3. Defeasible Logic for Reasoning about Canons
In [6] we proposed two variants of Defeasible Logic for reasoning about interpretive
canons. Let us recall here the simplest one, in which we further simplify language and
proof theory for space reasons. This framework handles the overall meaning of legal pro-
visions intended as argumentative, abstract (i.e., non-analysed) logical units. The follow-
ing basic components (among others) are introduced:
• a set of legal provisions n1,n2, . . . to be interpreted;
• as set of literals a,b, . . . , corresponding to any sentences, which can be used to of-
fer a sentential meaning to any provision n (a literal a is the meaning of provision
n);
• a set of interpretative acts or interpretations I1, I2, . . . (literal interpretation, teleo-
logical interpretation, etc.) that return for any legal provision a sentential meaning
for it;
• a set of rules encoding interpretive arguments (i.e., rules that state what interpre-
tive act can be obtained under suitable conditions); these rules expresses modes
of reasoning within any given legal system.
Definition 1 (Language) Let PROP = {a,b, . . .} be a set of propositional atoms,
NORM= {n1,n2, . . .} a set of legal provisions, INTR = {I1,I2, . . .} a set of interpreta-
tion functions (for example, denoting literal interpretation, etc.),MOD= {OBL,Adm} a
set of modal operators whereOBL is the modality for denoting obligatory interpretations
and interpretation outcomes and Adm for denoting the admissible ones.
1. The set L= PROP∪{¬p | p ∈ PROP} denotes the set of literals.
2. The complementary of a literal q is denoted by ∼q; if q is a positive literal p,
then ∼q is ¬p, and if q is a negative literal ¬p, then ∼q is p.
3. The setModLit= {✷a,¬✷a|a ∈ L,✷ ∈MOD} denotes the set of modal literals.
4. The set INT= {Ii(n,a),¬Ii(n,a)|∃Ii : NORM 7→ L ∈ INTR :Ii(n) = a} denotes
the set of interpretive acts and their negations: an expression Ii(n,a), for instance,
means that the interpretation Ii of provision n returns that the literal a is the case.
5. The complementary ∼φ of an interpretation φ is defined as follows: 2
φ ∼φ
Ii(n,a) ∼Ii(n,a) ∈ {¬Ii(n,a), Ii(n,b), I j(n,c)|a 6= b,a 6= c}
¬Ii(n,a) ∼¬Ii(n,a) = Ii(n,a).
2This does not cover cases where, e.g., a is semantically included in b, which was considered in [6].
We will also use the notation ±Ii(n,a) to mean respectively Ii(n,a) and ∼Ii(n,a).
Hence, ∼± Ii(n,a) means ∓Ii(n,a).
6. The set of qualified interpretations is ModIntr = {✷φ ,¬✷φ |φ ∈ INT, ✷ ∈
MOD}.
7. The complementary of a modal literal or qualified interpretation l is defined as
follows (φ ∈ L∪ INT):
l ∼l
OBLφ ∼OBLφ ∈ {¬OBLφ ,OBL∼φ ,Adm∼φ ,¬Admφ}
¬OBLφ ∼¬OBLφ = OBLφ
Admφ ∼Admφ ∈ {¬Admφ ,OBL∼φ}
¬Admφ ∼¬Admφ = Admφ
We use defeasible rules and defeaters3 [1] to reason about the interpretations of
provisions; these rules contain literals, interpretations and qualified interpretations in
their antecedent, and interpretations in their consequents.
Definition 2 (Interpretation Rules) Let Lab be a set of arbitrary labels. The set RuleI
of interpretation rules contains rules is of the type
r : A(r) →֒X C(r)
where (a) r ∈ Lab is the name of the rule; (b) A(r) = {φ1, . . . ,φn}, the antecedent (or
body) of the rule is such that each φi is either a literal l ∈ L, a modal literal Y ∈ModLit,
or a qualified interpretation X ∈ModIntr; (c) →֒∈ {⇒I ,❀I} denotes the type of the rule
(if →֒ is ⇒I , the rule is a defeasible rule, while if →֒ is❀I , the rule is a defeater); (d)
C(r) = ψ is the consequent (or head) of the rule, where ψ ∈ INT is an interpretation.
Example 2 Consider the following provision from the Italian penal code:
Art. 575. Homicide. Whoever causes the death of aman [uomo] is punishable by no less than
21 years in prison.
Consider now that paragraph 1 of art. 3 of the Italian constitution reads as follows:
Art. 3. All citizens have equal social status and are equal before the law, without regard to
their sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, and personal or social conditions.
The interpretation Is (interpretation from substantive reasons
4) of art. 3 leads to c, which
corresponds to the following sentence:
All persons have equal social status and are equal before the law, without regard to their sex,
race, language, religion, political opinions, and personal or social conditions.
The following interpretation defeasible rule could be:
r1 : kill adult,kill female,OBL Is(art.3,c)⇒
I
Ic(art.575,b)
where b=“Whoever causes the death of a person is punishable by no less than 21 years
in prison”. In other words, if art. 3 of the Italian constitution states formal equality before
3A defeater is a rule which prevents opposite conclusions without allowing to positively deriving anything.
4An argument from substantive reasons states that, if there is some goal that can be considered to be funda-
mentally important to the legal system, and if the goal can be promoted by one rather than another interpretation
of the statutory provision, then the provision should be interpreted in accord with the goal.
the law without regard also to gender identity, then b is the best interpretation outcome
of art. 575 of the penal code, with Ic denoting, for example, interpretation by coherence.
Given a set of rules R, RI
❀
and RI⇒ denote, respectively, the sets of all defeaters and
defeasible rules in the set R; RI [φ ] is the set of rules with the interpretation φ in the head.
Definition 3 (Interpretation theory) An Interpretation TheoryD is a structure (F,R,>),
where F, the set of facts, is a set of literals, modal literals, and qualified interpretations,
R is a set of interpretation rules and >, the superiority relation, is a binary relation over
R.
An interpretation theory corresponds to a knowledge base providing us with inter-
pretive arguments about legal provisions. The superiority relation is used for conflicting
rules, i.e., rules whose conclusions are complementary.
Example 3 The following theory reconstructs a very simple interpretive toy scenario in
the Italian legal system. Assume that a = “Whoever causes the death of a adult male
person is punishable by no less than 21 years in prison” and that Il stands for literal
interpretation or from ordinary meaning.
F = {kill adult,kill female,OBL Is(art.3,c)}
R= {r1 : kill adult,kill female,OBL Is(art.3,c)⇒
I
Ic(art.575,b),
r2 :⇒
I
Il(art.575,a)}
>= {r1 > r2}
Rule r1 has been already introduced above. Rule r2 establishes by default that art. 575
be literally interpreted as a. However, when r1 is applicable, it prevails over r2.
Let us now present the proof theory.
Definition 4 (Proofs) A proof P in an interpretation theory D is a linear sequence
P(1) . . .P(n) of tagged expressions in the form of +∂ I
✷
φ and −∂ I
✷
φ (with φ ∈ INT and
✷ ∈MOD), +∂✷l and −∂✷l (with l ∈ L and ✷ ∈MOD), where P(1) . . .P(n) satisfy the
proof conditions below5.
The tagged interpretation +∂ I
✷
φ means that the interpretation φ is defeasibly provable
in D with modality ✷, while −∂ I
✷
φ means that φ is defeasibly refuted with modality ✷.
The tagged literal +∂✷l means that l is defeasibly provable in D with modality ✷, while
−∂✷l means that l is defeasibly refuted with modality ✷. The initial part of length n of a
proof P is denoted by P(1..n).
Notice that an interpretation can be admissible or obligatory. For instance, I of n
is admissible, if it is provable using a defeasible interpretation rule; it is obligatory, if
this interpretation of n is the only one admissible [6]. Let us work on the conditions for
deriving qualified interpretations.
Definition 5 A rule r ∈ RI is applicable in the proof P at P(n+1) iff for all ai ∈ A(r):
5For space reasons, we present only the positive conditions (+∂ I
✷
φ and +∂✷l); see [6].
1. if ai =✷ψ , ψ ∈ INT, then +∂
I
✷
ψ ∈ P(1..n) with ✷ ∈MOD;
2. if ai = ¬✷ψ then −∂
I
✷
ψ ∈ P(1..n) with ✷ ∈MOD;
3. if ai =✷l, l ∈ L, then +∂
✷l ∈ P(1..n);
4. if ai = ¬✷l, l ∈ L, then −∂
✷l ∈ P(1..n);
5. if ai = l ∈ L then l ∈ F or ∃Ii∃n :+∂
I
✷
Ii(n, l) ∈ P(1..n).
A rule r ∈ RI is discarded iff ∃ai ∈ A(r) such that
1. if ai =✷ψ , , ψ ∈ INT, then −∂
I
✷
ψ ∈ P(1..n) with ✷ ∈MOD;
2. if ai = ¬✷ψ , ψ ∈ INT, then +∂
I
✷
ψ ∈ P(1..n) with ✷ ∈MOD;
3. if ai =✷l, l ∈ L, then −∂
✷l ∈ P(1..n);
4. if ai = ¬✷l, l ∈ L, then +∂
✷l ∈ P(1..n);
5. if ai = l ∈ L then l 6∈ F and ∀Ii∀n :−∂
I
✷
Ii(n, l) ∈ P(1..n).
Let us define the proof conditions for +∂Adm.
+∂ I
Adm
: If P(n+1) = +∂ I
Adm
φ then
(1) Admφ ∈ F or OBLφ ∈ F , or
(2.1) ∼Admφ 6∈ F , and
(2.2) ∃r ∈ RI⇒[φ ]: r is applicable, and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼φ ], either
(2.3.1) s is discarded, or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ R[φ ,k]:
t is applicable and t > s.
+∂ Adm: If P(n+1) = +∂ Adml then
(1) Adml ∈ F or OBLl ∈ F , or
(2) ∃Ii ∈ INT,∃n ∈ NORM :
+∂ I
Adm
Ii(n, l) ∈ P(1..n).
To show that an interpretation φ is defeasibly provable as an admissible interpreta-
tion, there are two ways: (1) Admφ or OBLφ are a fact, or (2) Admφ must be derived by
the rules of the theory. In the second case, three conditions must hold: (2.1) any com-
plementary of Admφ does belong to the facts; (2.2) there must be a rule introducing the
admissibility for φ which can apply; (2.3) every rule s for ∼φ is either discarded or de-
feated by a stronger rule for φ . The result l of an interpretation is admissible if this is a
fact, or if there is an applicable rule proving an interpretation supporting l.
Proof conditions for ±∂OBL are much easier but we need to work on the fact
that φ is an interpretation of any given provision n and we have to make explicit its
structure. Indeed, that an interpretation Ii for the provision n is obligatory means that
Ii is admissible and that no other (non-conflicting) interpretations for n is admissible.
+∂ IOBL: If P(n+1) = +∂
I
OBL± Ii(n,a) then
(1) OBL± Ii(n,a) ∈ F or
(2.1) ∼OBL± Ii(n,a) 6∈ F , and
(2.2) +∂ I
Adm
± Ii(n,a) ∈ P(1..n), and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[±Im(n,b)]:
Im(n,b) 6=∼Ii(n,a), either
(2.3.1) s is discarded, or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ R❀[∼± Im(n,b),k]:
t is applicable and t > s.
+∂OBL: If P(n+1) = +∂OBLl then
(1) OBLl ∈ F , or
(2) ∃n ∈ NORM:
(2.1) ∃Ii ∈ INT : +∂
I
Adm
Ii(n,a) ∈ P(1..n)
and
(2.2) ∀I j ∈ INT, −∂
I
Adm
Ii(n,x) ∈ P(1..n)
if x 6= a.
Example 4 Consider the theory in Example 3. Facts make rule r1 applicable. Rule r2
has an empty antecedent, so it is applicable, too. The theory assumes that r1 is stronger
than r2, thus we would obtain+∂
I
Adm
Ic(art.575,b) (and so−∂
I
Adm
Il(art.575,a)).Trivially,
we also get +∂ IOBLIc(art.3,c), and +∂
I
OBLIc(art.575,b) is also the case because it is the
only admissible interpretation of art. 575. We also have +∂✷c and +∂✷b, where ✷ ∈
{Adm,OBL}.
4. Defeasible Logic for Reasoning about Canons across Legal Systems
Let us now develop a fresh logical framework which properly addresses the research is-
sues outlined in Section 2 and which extends the machinery of Section 3. In this perspec-
tive, reasoning about interpretive canons across legal systems requires
• to specify to which legal systems legal provisions belong and in which legal sys-
tem canons are applied;
• the introduction of meta-rules to reason about interpretation rules;
• that such meta-rules support the derivation of interpretation rules; in other words,
the head of meta-rules are interpretation rules, while the the antecedents may
include any conditions.
Consider, for instance, the following abstract rule:
r : (OBLILSit (n
LSi
1 , p),a⇒C (s : OBLI
LS j
s (n
LSi
2 ,d)⇒
I
I
LS j
c (n
LSi
1 , p)))
Meta-rule r states that, if (a) it is obligatory the teleological interpretation (It ) in legal
system LSi of legal provision n1 belonging to that system and returning p, and (b) a holds,
then the interpretive canon to be applied in legal system LS j for n1 is the interpretation
by coherence, which returns p as well, but which is conditioned in LS j by the fact that
n2 in this last system is interpreted by substantive reasons as d. In other words, r allows
for importing interpretive results from LSi into LS j in regard to the legal provision n1 in
LSi which can be applied in LS j.
Definition 1 requires a few adjustments: Definition 6 only specifies the aspects that
are changed in the language.
Definition 6 (Language 2) Let LS = {LS1, . . . ,LSm} be the set of legal systems and
⋃
1≤i≤mNORMLSi = {n
LSi
1 ,n
LSi
2 . . .} the set of legal provisions for each legal system.
1. The set INT = {I
LSk
i (n
LS j ,a),¬I
LSk
i (n
LS j ,a)|∃Ii : NORMLS j 7→ L ∈ INTR :
Ii(n
LS j) = a} denotes the set of interpretive acts and their negations.
2. The complementary of an interpretation φ is denoted by ∼φ and is defined as
follows (where, possibly, j = k):
φ ∼φ
I
LS j
i (n
LSk ,a) ∼I
LS j
i (n
LSk ,a) ∈ {¬I
LS j
i (n
LSk ,a), I
LS j
i (n
LSk ,b), I
LS j
s (n
LSk ,c)
I
LSm
i (n
LSk ,b), ILSms (n
LSk ,c)|a 6= b,a 6= c}
¬I
LS j
i (n
LSk ,a) ∼¬I
LS j
i (n
LSk ,a) = I
LS j
i (n
LSk ,a).
Definition 7 (Rules) Let RuleIatom be the set of rules of Definition 2
6. The set RuleI of
rules is defined as
RuleI = RuleIatom∪
{¬(r : φ1, . . . ,φn →֒ ψ)|(r : φ1, . . . ,φn →֒ ψ) ∈ Rule
I
atom, →֒∈ {⇒
I ,❀I}}
6Atomic rules do not substantially change, except for the notation for interpretations in Definition 6.
By convention, if r is a rule, ∼r denotes the complementary rule (if r : φ1, . . . ,φn →֒ ψ
then ∼r is ¬(r : φ1, . . . ,φn →֒ ψ); and if r : ¬(r : φ1, . . . ,φn →֒ ψ) then ∼r is r :
φ1, . . . ,φn →֒ ψ).
Definition 8 (Meta-rules) Let Lab be a set of labels. RuleC = RuleCd ∪Rule
C
❀
is the set
of meta-rules such that
RuleCd = {r : φ1, . . . ,φn ⇒C ψ|r ∈ Lab,A(r)⊆ L∪ModLit∪ModIntr,ψ ∈ Rule
I}
RuleC
❀
= {r : φ1, . . . ,φn❀C ψ|r ∈ Lab,A(r)⊆ L∪ModLit∪ModIntr,ψ ∈ Rule
I}
Definition 9 (Interpretation theory 2) An Interpretation Theory D is a structure
(F,RI ,RC,>), where F, the set of facts, is a set of literals, modal literals, and qualified
interpretations, RI is a set of interpretation rules, RC is a set of meta-rules, and >, the
superiority relation, is a binary relation over R such that >⊆ (RX ×RY )∪ (RC ×RC),
where RX = {C(r)|r ∈ RC[s],s ∈ Ruleatom}.
In the rest of the paper, to make our presentation more readable, we will omit defeasible
arrows for defeasible nested-rules r⇒C with the empty body. That is, a defeasible nested
rule⇒C (p⇒
I q) will be just represented as p⇒I q.
Before providing proof procedures to derive rules, let us
• introduce specific proof tags for this purpose. Remember that →֒ denotes either
⇒ or ❀ to simplify our presentation. ±∂Cr
→֒ means that rule r ∈ RI is (is not)
defeasibly provable using meta-rules;
• highlight that applicability conditions for meta-rules are exactly as in Definition
5, because the body of meta-rules do not differ from those of interpretation rules.
Defeasible derivations of non-nested rules are based on the following procedures.
The general rationale behind the following proof conditions recalls what we discussed
in regard to the provability of literals. The proof of a rule runs as usual in three phases.
We have to find an argument in favour of the rule we want to prove. Second, all counter-
arguments are examined (rules for the opposite conclusion). Third, all the counter-
arguments have to be rebutted (the counter-argument is weaker than the pro-argument)
or undercut (some of the premises of the counter-argument are not provable). In the case
of the derivation of rules using meta-rules, what we have to do is to see when two rules
are in conflict: thus, conflict-detection is based on the notion of incompatibility.
Definition 10 Two non-nested rules r and r′ are incompatible iff r′ is an incompatible
atomic rule of r or r′ is an incompatible negative rule of r.
1. r′ is an incompatible atomic rule of r iff r and r′ are atomic rules and A(r) =
A(r′), C(r) =∼C(r′);
2. r′ is an incompatible negative rule of r iff either r or r′ is not an atomic rule and
A(r) = A(r′), C(r) =C(r′).
The set of all possible incompatible rules for r→֒ is denoted by IC(r→֒) =
{r′|r′ is incompatible with r→֒}.
Example 5 Case 1: r : a⇒I b and a⇒I ¬b are incompatible. Case 2: r : a⇒I b and
¬(r′ : a⇒I b) are incompatible.
Let us state the proof procedures for the defeasible derivation of atomic rules in an
interpretation theory D= (F,RI ,RC,>).
+∂ →֒C : If P(n+1) = +∂Cr
→֒, then
(1) r→֒ ∈ RI , or
(2) (2.1) ∀r′′ ∈ IC(r→֒), ∀r′ ∈ RCs [r
′′], r′ is discarded and
(2.2) ∃t ∈ RC⇒[r
→֒]: t is applicable, and
(2.3) ∀r′′ ∈ IC(r→֒),∀s ∈ RC[r′′], either
(2.3.1) s is discarded, or
(2.3.2) ∃z ∈ RC⇒[r
′′′]: r′′′ ∈ IC(C(s)), z is applicable and z> s.
The provability condition of −∂ →֒XC is omitted for space reasons. Suppose we want to
derive r : OBLI
LS1
i (n
LS1
1 ,a)⇒
I
I
LS2
j (n
LS2
2 ,b). We have the following options. Condition
(1): r is in RI ; or, Condition (2): We use a defeasible meta-rule to derive r. This must
exclude, as a precondition, that any rule, which is incompatible with r, is supported:
(condition 2.1). That is, rules such as
r′ : ¬(OBLILS1i (n
LS1
1 ,a)⇒
I
I
LS2
j (n
LS2
2 ,b)) r
′′ : OBLI
LS1
i (n
LS1
1 ,a)⇒
I
I
LS2
j (n
LS2
2 ,d)
r′′′ : OBLI
LS1
i (n
LS1
1 ,a)⇒
I
I
LS2
k (n
LS2
2 ,d)
should not be supported.
With this done, condition (2.2) states that there should exist a meta-rule such as
t : d⇒C (r : OBLI
LS1
i (n
LS1
1 ,a)⇒
I
I
LS2
j (n
LS2
2 ,b))
such that t is applicable. But this fact must exclude that any meta-rule s supporting, e.g.,
r′,r′′,r′′′ above is applicable. Alternatively, if s is applicable, we have to verify that there
exists a meta-rule z that proves r, such as
z : e⇒C (r : OBLI
LS1
i (n
LS1
1 ,a)⇒
I
I
LS2
j (n
LS2
2 ,b))
such that z is applicable and is stronger that s (see condition 2.3.2).
Given the above proof conditions for deriving non-nested rules, we must also slightly
adjust proof conditions for deriving interpretations of Section 3. The only, but substantial,
difference is that here, each time a rule r is used and applied, we are required to check that
r is provable. Analogously, to discard incompatible rules (when we consider all possible
attacks to the rule we want to use), an additional option is that these incompatible rules
are not provable in the theory.
+∂ I
Adm
: If P(n+1) = +∂ I
Adm
φ then
(1) Admφ ∈ F or OBLφ ∈ F , or
(2.1) ∼Admφ 6∈ F , and
(2.2) ∃r ∈ RI⇒[φ ]: +∂Cr, r is applicable, and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼φ ], either
(2.3.1) −∂Cs, or
(2.3.2) s is discarded, or
(2.3.3) ∃t ∈ R[φ ,k]: t is applicable and t > s.
Example 6 Let us freely elaborate the case described in Example 1. Suppose that the
domestic literal interpretation of art. 340, Civil Code of Cameroon, returns p, saying
that the judicial declaration of paternity outside marriage refers to a rather minimal idea
of entretien, which can even consist in some discontinuous support. With children under
14, teleological interpretation in Cameroon’s system, instead, would interpret entretien
as regular support (q), but literal interpretation is institutionally preferred. In Italian
private law (art. 147, Italian Civil Code), instead, mantenimento, which corresponds to
entretien, means regular support (q), a reading which depends by coherence on art. 30
of the Italian constitution7. One can argue we should align to the case considered in
Cameroon’s law (under 14) but resorting to an interpretation by coherence that takes
art. 30 of the Italian constitution into account.
F = {OBL ILSit
l
(art.30LSit ,a)}
RI = {r3 :⇒
I
I
LScam
l
(art.340LScam , p), r4 : children under14⇒
I
I
LScam
t (art.340
LScam ,q)
r5 : OBL I
LSit
l
(art.30LSit ,a)⇒I ILSitc (art.147
LSit ,q)}
RC = {r6 : OBL I
LSit
l
(art.30LSit ,a)⇒C (r7 : children under14⇒
I
I
LSit
c (art.340
LScam ,q)}
>= {r3 > r4, r7 > r3}.
r7 is applicable and r7 is provable. This determines a conflict with r3, but r7 is stronger
than r3.
5. Summary
This paper extended [6]’s contribution to explore the feasibility of formal methods for ar-
guing with canons of interpretation coming from different legal systems, once they have
accessed domestic legal systems in private international law disputes. In so doing, we
aimed at defining a logic-based conceptual framework that could encompass the occur-
ring interpretive interactions, without neglecting the existing, broader normative back-
ground each legal system is nowadays part of.
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